George Murphy wrote:
> I think that there are good theological reasons (which I sketched briefly before) for
> saying that
> 1) with possibly a few miraculous exceptions, God does everything though
> natural processes,
First, (1) is poorly worded. Do you really mean "possibly"? Does Christian theology allow
that it is really "possible" that the acts of creation, incarnation, resurrection, and
ascension were accomplished by second causes? Second, a rule with ad hoc exceptions is not a
rule. Therefore the claim that "God does everything through natural processes, except some
things" is trivially true without some way of classifying together all the things that don't
fall under the rule. Third, even if (1) were true, progressive creation or formation by
direct divine action (DDA) are compatible with it, for (1) leaves the exception clause wide
open. Therefore these "good theological reasons" for (1) do not in any way decide the issue
in question: macroevolution or formation by DDA (or some other mechanism). And fourth, the
"theological reasons" for believing (1) are (in my view) *not* good reasons for believing
(1). Redemptive history is filled with events that appear to involve DDA; and they don't
appear to be "possibly a few miraculous exceptions". If humans have an immaterial part,
then must we assume that God gives it to us and regenerates us solely by natural processes
and without DDA? Is all of God's spiritual activity with respect to humans limited to
natural processes? And if angels and/or demons are in any way involved in the events of the
world today, it seems quite silly to assume that they are not permitted to perform any acts
which cannot be explained in terms of natural processes. Moreover, your statement assumes
that most of God's acts are the one's He performs through natural processes. How could you
possibly know that? When God loves Himself, is that act done through a natural process or is
it a "miraculous exception"? Since the correct answer is 'neither', the claim that there are
good theological reasons for believing (1) is simply false.
> Concerning Genesis 1, I certainly do not think that the language about the earth
> & waters bringing forth life teaches a specific mechanism of the chemical evolution of
> life. (Nobody who accepts evolution, e.g., imagines that animals sprang directly out of
> the ground.) It does, however, point very strongly toward the earth & waters being able
> to bring forth life in accord with God's will. The point can be made more strongly if
> we look at the Hebrew. The verb in 1:11, "Let the earth put forth..." is tadhshe' &
> that in 1:24, "Let the earth bring forth ..." is totse'. Both are the Hiph`il, or
> active causative form, of the of the corresponding verb, & thus mean that the earth is
> to cause plants and animals to come forth. (1:20 is not so specific. The verb is in
> the Qal & means simply "Let the waters swarm ...".) Thus the text seems to say that the
> earth is a genuine secondary cause of living things.
If only exegesis were that simple. The exegete must not neglect discourse sensitivity and
communicative intent. The Hiph'il does not trump the genre. If the author is making use of
phenomenological language, then it would be an exegetical mistake to claim that these verses
mean that earth is the efficient (as opposed to material) cause of the formation of plants
and animals. In fact, there are good reasons for believing that phenomenological language is
being used here. It has been a while since I read it, but I believe that Bruce Waltke's
article, "The literary genre of Genesis, chapter one" [Crux 27:4 (December 1991), 2-10]
discusses this.
- Bryan
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