Re:[reiterations] Dawkins on Goodenough

John_R_Zimmer@rush.edu
Tue, 19 Oct 1999 08:07:33 -0500

Paul Arveson comments on David Burwasser:

>>
>> So -- I offer a first draft of an encompassing definition of religion:
>>
>> A person's religion connects that person, on a deeply emotional and
>> intuitive level, with the larger universe of which one is a part, in
>> a way that inspires both encompassing inspirations about that universe
>> and guidelines for behavior within it, that flow in an unforced manner
>>> from encounter with that connection.
>>

>Thank you for at least attempting to define the word. However, it contains
a paradox. I don't understand how one derives "guidelines for behavior" --
what
should be -- from observations of the larger universe. If we are connected
to it, then what is, is right. What could be wrong, that we would need
guidelines about? Is there really anything here that leads to moral
principles
that would ever lead one to protest something that "goes against the flow"?
(I'm reminded of Camus' book The Plague).

Comment:

Scientific (or natural) definitions of 'religion' are tough because
it is easy to confuse a defining trait with a particular religious
ideology. The reason why this is so easy is that many religious
ideologies evoke the defining traits. In this context, the above
definition might be regarded as an evocative definition.

Let us look at what is evoked:

One is part of a larger universe.
One can connect with that through deep emotion and intuition.
the larger universe (by inspiring guidelines for behavior).

Can we turn these evocations into natural traits by adding the term
'Humans have a cognitive ability to recognize that..." ?
Here is where a natural definition would get confused with
evocative definitions.

Can we 'figure out' how these evocative claims relate to one
another? Paul points to the 'paradox' of how the claims relate.
After all, there is no mechanism through which one derives
'guidelines for behavior'.

These two problems make understanding religion - from a natural
point of view - most difficult. And this is especially poignant
in regards to what Phil Johnson has noted - the undulating
line between philosophical and methodological naturalism, where
a scientist's religious sensibility can fix on the 'natural'
processes that he studies.

Ray