Re: Once again...ID

Garry DeWeese (DeWeese@Colorado.edu)
Tue, 28 Apr 1998 09:43:36 -0600

Hi Linda,

At 03:21 PM 4/27/1998 -0400, Linda R. Barrett wrote:
>
>Garry DeWeese wrote:
>
>> [snip] Our representations of the relations between these properties of
>> [space-time and matter/energy] are what we call the laws of nature. Now
>> it appears that some of the laws are indeterminate in principle, not merely
>> due to the limits of our knowledge.
>
>I'm curious which laws you were thinking of as being "indeterminate in
>principle". How would you know whether the indeterminism is in principle or
>due to limits of our knowledge?

Perhaps we don't. That's why I said that it *appears* that some of the
laws are indeterminate. However, the standard interpretations of QM do
entail in-principle indeterminancy, so I was trying to allow for that.

>> [snip]
>
>I don't see why either (i) or (ii) should be objectionable. Isn't God
>sovereign? Doesn't he intervene in our world now, providentially? How do we
>know that some of his interventions don't appear (to us) to be "random"? Why
>should that not also have happened before we were here? Why would we
recognize
>providential intervention in the world today, but not as the world was
forming?
>
>Some of the processes God uses may appear to us to be random. It seems that
>most of his dealings with the world follow the patterns he set up (designed)
>when he initially created the world, which we call natural laws. Can't
God use
>random processes as well? (Maybe that's contradictory, but I can't put my
>finger on the contradiction.)
>

If I rightly understand some of the views being expressed on this listserv,
it seems that God's providence is restricted to "sustenance," and
"governance" is restricted to the God's determination of the conditions of
creation. This is what puzzles me. In this regard I agree with what you
wrote.

However, I have difficulty in asserting that God can use a (truly) random
process, be assured of the outcome, and not need to (or be expected to)
providentially intervene in the governance of the random process. It is in
the assurance of the outcome of a (truly) random process that I think the
contradiction lies.

Blessings,
Garry DeWeese