Suppose that God created the universe in a definite quantum state and
that the many-worlds version of quantum mechanics is correct. Then by many
runs you would presumably be selecting out just parts of this state, say
particular quasi-classical histories (i.e., fairly classical for the
macroscopic variables, but with a particular choice of which quantum
fluctuations occur when they have macroscopic effects). I would personally
suspect that in most of these quasi-classical histories in which an earth-like
planet exists and has conditions at its beginning that are similar to that of
the history of the earth in our quasi-classical history, there may or may not
be 1-celled animals in them, and there would probably not be humans in most of
them. In other words, on a per-history and per-planet basis, I'm agnostic as
to whether the probability of 1-celled animals is high, but I would personally
suspect that the probability of life as complex as humans is very low. (This
is a question that should in principle be answerable from a knowledge of the
quantum state and definitions of "1-celled animals" and "humans," so it is not
fundamentally meaningless, though we certainly don't know how to answer it at
present.)
But I don't think it is a good question to ask whether this is what God
wants, for if He created the entire quantum state, with all its quasiclassical
`many-worlds," He wanted the entire thing, and not just part of it. So He
would presumably would not have been entirely happy with just one
quasiclassical history (one "random run" in human terms that I think are
misleading when talking about the many-worlds version of QM that is not
fundamentally random), or He would have chosen to create just that
quasiclassical history. (Those who don't believe in Everett `many-worlds'
might believe that He indeed just chose one quasiclassical history to exist,
and the rest are just the imaginings of our theories, but to me rejecting the
rest is analogous to Gosse's rejecting the distant past as ideal or
"prochronic" and not real or "diachronic"---it postulates that the correct
theory of reality is more complicated than it would have been if one had not
made that rejection.)
If you postulate a greater divine being that forced God to accept only
one quasiclassical history, then one might speculate as to whether God would be
happier to accept that single history or whether He would prefer to have none
at all, but that is pretty speculative, requiring some pretty strained
assumptions (a greater divine being forcing God to accept something, etc.)
This question I am claiming is not good is analogous to the question of
whether God would want a history in which only the last ten minutes are real or
diachronic, with memories and records of earlier times being merely ideal or
prochronic.
Don Page