Current mainstream-ID does not explicitly appeal to "miraculous actions
of God" to explain anything. But ID would claim that the cat's survival
(if this thought-experiment really occurred) does not seem to be explained
well by the current theory of QM (unless one is willing to accept extremely
small probabilities) and that it might be the result of purposeful design.
Similarly, I would not try to claim (if we assume MN) that "God did it"
is a *scientific* explanation, but I would claim it is the most *plausible*
explanation. Thus we see the limitations of science (which in this case
arrives at the wrong answer if God really is protecting the cat by theistic
action) and the functional value of a "search for truth" that is free to
extend beyond the constraints of MIRM-only MN-science.
Terry has more to say,
>Obviously, if Christians are going to appeal to miraculous actions of God
>in their science, i.e. intelligent design or explanations of surviving
>cats, then we have lost common ground with unbelievers (which is not
>necessarily bad, but for which we should not be surprised that they reject
>our explanation). Plantinga's discussion of Duhemian science has this ring
>to it--one reason to adopt meth odological naturalism is to be able to share
>the scientific enterprise with non-Christians. If we follow this direction
>then we should commit ourselves to developing a science (or a
>subdiscipline) that is fundamentally incompatible with what unbelievers
>will accept. This is a perfectly reasonable way to go and young earth
>creationists as well as intelligent design theorists are moving in this
>direction. They should not be surprised if their views don't make it into
>main stream science (textbooks, professional journals, etc.) but in the
>interest of truth and the way things really happened there is nothing that
>should stop this development.
ID and YEC may be similar in asserting their right to independence from
the "majority assumptions" of the scientific community, but they are very
different in other ways. We should be careful, when noting similarities
between ID and YEC, to also emphasize their differences.
There is often a difference between logic-based "rationality" and wise
pragmatism. At NTSE, according to Koons, the majority of attendees did not
conclude that ID was "fundamentally incompatible" with science, but (as
Terry points out) it is textbook authors & journal editors (not
philosophers of science) who decide which views "make it into mainstream
science."
Or, as in Keith's paraphrasing of Terry's "accomodation" view,
>Its adoption by theists is not an a priori statement of how
>science ought to be done, it is a recognition of how it is done.
*****************************************
But how should we decide when accomodation/cooperation/harmony is "wise
pragmatism", and when it is neither wise nor pragmatic?
When Terry says,
>As for myself, I don't think that origins
>reseach needs these appeals to miraculous actions any more than chemistry
>does.
Keith W answers in a way that seems to make sense,
>there are a variety of kinds of scientific endeavour
>(as you note), and the accomodation may be more likely to break down in the
>case of some than others (which I don't think you say, but may agree to?).
{then Keith describes some differences: variations in falsifiability, or
in the type of experimental base, and so on}
This "awareness of variability between fields" is also consistent with
the principle that ID should not be claimed indiscriminately for all
natural phenomena, but only when a claim of ID seems to be justified by
scientific analysis. To me, but not Terry, ID seems more likely to be
valid in the domain of origins (for some phenomena) than in the domain of
chemistry.
And, as described above, advocates of ID emphasize the importance of
carefully selecting the phenomena for which ID might be claimed as a
plausible explanation. // { Also, Dembski emphasizes that "analytical
principles for recognizing ID" cannot show that a phenomenon/event was *not
designed*. This seems to address our "God of the gaps" concerns. }
Keith concludes,
>If the foregoing is right, it would suggest that we should be rather more
>cautious about the implications of accomodating to the prevailing
>methodological naturalism when dealing with these major paradigms. I am
>not saying that the accomodation necessarily becomes invalid, but that we
>do well to check very carefully for the point at which it might.
>
>Is this fair?
Yes, two criteria can help us decide when to accomodate: we can ask "Are
there logical reasons to doubt the rationality of accomodation?", or "Are
the issues important enough to risk the practical difficulties that might
occur due to non-accomodation?" {and practical difficulties can include
decreased quality-of-relationships between us and scholarly colleagues,
something that -- all other things being equal [and this may or may not be
the case, as discussed by Keith] -- God does not want}
But if we accept MN-science, we can (and should) challenge an assumption
that "whatever MN-science concludes is ALWAYS the truth." (it may be the
truth, but it doesn't have to be) Terry agrees,
>but in the
>interest of truth and the way things really happened there is nothing that
>should stop this development.
Keith summarizes Terry's suggestion for the adoption of MN-science by
Christians for pragmatic reasons,
>Methodological Naturalism is an accomodation to the prevailing
>philosophy and is to be adopted whilst explicitly opposing Ontological
>Naturalism.
This is OK if Ontological Naturalism really is "explicitly opposed."
Craig R