Historical Science: Evolution (details)

Can theories of evolution be scientific?
I've written three versions of Section 7G — long, medium-long, and medium-short — that became progressively shorter. I suggest that you read them in the opposite order, beginning with the medium-short introductory version of 7G. Can evolution be scientific?

note: most of the links in this page are italicized "inside the page" links (which were links to non-7G parts of the original page) and they don't work; I'll fix them later, and then will remove this apology. The links above and those at the end of the page do work.

7G. Can evolution be scientific? (medium-long version)
Critics of biological evolution (bio-E) sometimes claim it is not truly scientific because: we have never observed major bio-E; E-theory does not make predictions; E-theory cannot be falsified. Are these criticisms justified?
OBSERVATIONS: Can a theory of Total Macro-E (for long-term, large-scale bio-E) be scientific, even though it proposes a process that occurred over a long time period, in the distant past, so it cannot be directly observed? Yes. Both operations science and historical science use similarly scientific methods, adapted to be effective in their differing contexts. In historical science there are reasons for caution about conclusions, due to the inherent limitations of historical data, but scientists have developed methods for reducing the practical impact of these limitations. These methods should be critically examined, but they do not provide a reason to automatically exclude a historical theory from being authentically scientific.
PREDICTIONS: If the same initial situation was "allowed to run" 10 times, there would be 10 different evolutionary results. But even though E-theory could not precisely predict these results, it claims the ability to retroductively explain each result if scientists can construct a historical scenario (connecting the initial and final situations of a historical episode) consistent with the mechanisms of E-theory. / When scientists study bio-E, their goals can be to reconstruct past situations, estimate rates of change or the importance of various causal factors (selection, drift, isolation,...), or build models for large-scale changes.
FALSIFICATION: Could a theory of Total Macro-E ever be rejected by scientists? Maybe, but it would require a change of thinking, since rejection is impossible if scientists maintain two conventional "rules": (1) scientific theories can postulate only natural causes; (2) a theory cannot be rejected unless it is replaced by another scientific theory. If these rules are accepted, it is impossible to avoid a conclusion of natural bio-E. But without MN, could bio-E be falsified?

Hyper-Flexibility in Evolutionary Explanations
In my opinion, acceptance of chemical E is due to philosophical preference, not empirical evidence. For bio-E the situation seems different, with a mix of philosophy and evidence. Why?
First, the complexity increase is much greater in moving from nonlife to life (by chemical E) than in any step proposed for bio-E.
Second, at the starting point for bio-E, but not chemical E, there is heredity that allows natural selection.
Third, a large amount of evidence supports bio-E subtheories, such as micro-E, minor macro-E, and basic fossil-E.
Fourth, in bio-E there are powerful explanatory resources (linked genes, changes of function, developmental genes, statistical bottlenecks,...) that -- combined with the imagination of a creative scientist, plus long periods of time and a variety of evolutionary environments -- provide plenty of flexibility for developing historical scenarios. Due to this hyperflexibility, it is difficult to determine the extent of support for an extrapolation from micro-E to Total Macro-E. And critical questions about E-theory can be dismissed by saying "please be patient and we'll find an explanation." With explanatory hyperflexibility plus appeals to future science, it could be very difficult to falsify bio-E, even if MN didn't make it impossible.
Of course, bio-E could be falsified with clear evidence for out-of-order origins, such as finding human fossils below trilobite fossils in a geological formation. But this is probably irrelevant because if E is wrong, it is probably wrong in ways that are less obvious.

Can we predict the designs of God?
In 1802, William Paley made his famous "watchmaker" argument for design. In 1859, part of Darwin's counter-argument was the existence of "imperfect adaptations" in nature. According to Darwin, these showed that what Paley thought were actual designs, created by God, are just apparent designs produced by evolution. In 1980, Stephen Jay Gould, pondering the implicit theological significance of the panda's thumb, concludes that "If God had designed a beautiful machine to reflect his wisdom and power, surely he would not have used a collection of parts generally fashioned for other purposes. ... Odd arrangements and funny solutions are the proof of evolution -- paths that a sensible God would never tread but that a natural process, constrained by history, follows perforce." { Gould, The Panda's Thumb: More Reflections in Natural History, pp 20-21. }
Gould confidently asserts that God "surely would not" and "would never," as if he knows what God would have done. But when we study the Bible, it seems that God is not trying to produce a history that will be viewed as maximally optimal by all humans, and does not want the role of theistic action to be maximally obvious.
This humble theology is not welcomed by advocates of evolution, who want a competitor with predictions that are different from E-theory and easy to falsify. The young-earth aspects of yeC meet both qualifications. When we shift our focus to questions of design, with independent creation (as in yeC or oeCindependent) there is some justification, but not enough for the bold assertions of Gould, for expecting designs to appear independent and optimal. By contrast, oeCmacro predicts that new species -- whether produced by natural evolution or macromutational creation -- will appear to be modifications of old species, because this is what they really are. Do you see why yeC is often the only alternative that is acknowledged by advocates of evolution?

Do we need a high predictive contrast?
Because oeCmacro proposes occasional miracles that by definition would be observable, is it possible to empirically distinguish between oeCmacro and evolution? Maybe. It depends on the data.
Imagine having detailed data -- such as complete lab reports for physiology, structure, DNA,... -- for all organisms during a period of change. In this situation, the data would let us distinguish between normal-appearing natural evolution and miraculous-appearing macromutational creation. But in reality the historical data is far less informative, so it might be difficult to distinguish between these theories.
The potential for contrast is further reduced by the flexibility of oeCmacro. A theory of oeCmacro proposes two major mechanisms: continual natural evolution; and occasional miraculous macromutations with all genetic changes occurring at once or spread over generations, occurring in all members of a species (so the whole population is instantly changed) or in only one or two organisms (so effects take time to spread through a population). In addition, theories of oeCmacro can vary from one scientist to another.
This flexibility is not welcomed by advocates of evolution, who want a competitor with predictions that differ from E-theory and are easy to falsify. But there is a low predictive contrast between oeCmacro and E-theory, since oeCmacro is consistent with most evidence for most aspects of evolution: for micro-E, minor macro-E, common descent, basic fossil-E, and mechanisms of E. The major difference is that oeCmacro challenges a conclusion that this evidence provides strong support for Total Macro-E, and raises questions (involving irreducible complexity and rates of change,...) about whether undirected natural process was sufficient to produce all existing biocomplexity in the time that was available.
For critics who complain that, compared with evolution, oeCmacro isn't different enough, we can ask "Is this necessary?" Consider Einstein's theory of special relativity. In most ways, except at extremely high speeds, its observable consequences are almost identical to those of Newton's theory. Is this similarity a weakness to be criticized? Should we demand that, if we are to take Einstein seriously, his theory must be modified so it will differ from Newton's theory in other ways, so there will be a higher predictive contrast?

7G. The Methods of Historical Science (original long version)
( the title has been changed to "Can evolution be scientific?" )

The Methodologies of Historical Science
The basic differences between the logical methods used in historical science (to study events in the past) and operations science (to study ongoing events in the present) are introduced in Section 7C [in the original full page]. This section is a deeper examination of the methodologies used in historical science.

Are theories of EVOLUTION scientific?
Critics of biological evolution (bio-E) sometimes claim it is not truly scientific because: we have never observed major bio-E; E-theory does not make predictions; E-theory cannot be falsified. Are these criticisms justified?
OBSERVATIONS: Can a theory of Total Macro-E be scientific, even though it postulates a historical process that occurred over long periods of time, in the distant past, so the historical events cannot be directly observed? Yes. Both historical science and operations science can be done using similarly scientific methods, adapted to be effective in their differing contexts. In historical science there are reasons for caution about conclusions, due to the inherent limitations of historical data, but scientists have developed methods for reducing the practical impact of these limitations. Although these methods should be critically examined, they do not provide a reason to automatically exclude bio-E from being authentically scientific.
PREDICTIONS: In a historical science it is difficult to make predictions that are both precise (with specific details) and accurate, especially over long periods of time, due to complexity, sensitivity, and randomness: evolutionary contexts and causal factors are complex; outcomes are sensitive to small variations in the initial conditions; all bio-E processes involve some randomness, and some factors (like mutation and genetic drift) are extremely random. These elements combine to produce historical contingency: if 10 situations with similar initial conditions were "allowed to run" 10 times, there would be 10 different results. But even though E-theory could not precisely predict these results, it claims the ability to retroductively explain each already-known result if scientists can construct a historical scenario (connecting the initial and final historical situations) that is consistent with the causal mechanisms of E-theory. / The goals of scientists, during their studies of bio-E, may be to reconstruct past contexts, to estimate the rates of evolutionary change or the importance of various causal factors (selection, drift, isolation,...), or to build models for large-scale and/or long-term changes. { At the end of this section there is a deeper exploration of observations, predictions, and the process of constructing evolutionary historical scenarios. }
FALSIFICATION: Could a theory of natural Total Macro-E (which is the grand conclusion of bio-E) ever be rejected by scientists? Maybe, but it would require a change of thinking, since a rejection would be impossible if scientists continue to obey two currently conventional "rules" of science: (1) scientific theories can postulate only natural mechanisms; (2) a theory cannot be rejected unless it is replaced by another scientific theory. If these naturalistic rules are accepted (*), it is logically impossible to avoid a conclusion that naturalistic Total Evolution -- astronomical, chemical, and biological -- must be the scientifically accepted theory, whether or not the scientific evidence supports it. {* Acceptance of MN is a choice, since there are rational reasons to reject naturalistic restrictions on science, as proposed in Section 7D [in the original full page]. }

Does the evidence support evolution?
Based on current scientific evidence, current theories of chemical E (the second phase in a historical theory of Total E) seem highly implausible. But in spite of this, there isn't much support within the scientific community for humbly considering, as one of the seven logical possibilities, that "maybe it never occurred." Acceptance of chemical E seems mainly due to philosophical preference, not empirical evidence.
For bio-E the situation is different. Why? First, the increase in complexity is much greater in moving from nonlife to life (during chemical E) than in any step proposed for bio-E. Second, at the starting point for bio-E, but not chemical E, there is heredity that allows natural selection. Third, a large amount of evidence supports many subtheories of bio-E. Fourth, in bio-E there are powerful explanatory resources (linked genes, changes of function, developmental genes, statistical bottlenecks,...*) that -- when combined with the creative imagination of a highly motivated scientist, plus plenty of time for evolution to occur in a variety of environments -- provide lots of flexibility for developing scenarios to explain a wide range of observations. Due to this explanatory flexibility, it is difficult to determine whether the extrapolations inherent in E-theory (from micro-E through minor macro-E to Total Macro-E) are true. And since any difficulties with E-theory (such as questions about irreducible complexity or the fossil record) can be dismissed by just saying "please be patient and eventually we'll find an explanation," it would be extremely difficult to falsify bio-E, even if some of its major claims (such as Total Macro-E) were not true.
{* details: If genes are linked, an unfavorable gene (producing a disadvantageous characteristic) can "hitchhike" along with a favorable gene if these genes are located close together on the same chromosome; or a characteristic (at any level, from biochemistry to structure or behavior) can serve a temporary function before being transformed into a different function that we now observe; or a minor change in a gene that affects a developmental pathway can produce a major change in the organism; or large shifts in gene frequencies can occur quickly in small populations; and more. }
When we're wondering if E could be rejected because it has been scientifically falsified (which differs from a formal falsification using rigorous logic), we should remember the many meanings of evolution because "evolutionary theory" is a broad umbrella that incorporates many sub-theories -- fossil E, common descent, change in a gene pool, micro-E, macro-E, Total Macro-E, and E by a specific mechanism -- each with its own evaluative status. In the past, some sub-theories (especially regarding mechanisms) have been rejected by scientists. But instead of wondering whether to reject, scientists are usually asking "what role does this mechanism play, in what situations, and how important is it in a particular historical episode or in overall evolution?"

Can we predict how God would design?
In 1859, one part of Darwin's challenge to Paley's natural theology, which claims that nature reveals the designs of God, was the existence of "imperfect adaptations" in nature. According to Darwin, these showed that what Paley thought were actual designs, created by God, are just apparent designs produced by evolution. More recently, Stephen Jay Gould, pondering the implicit theological significance of the panda's thumb, concludes that "If God had designed a beautiful machine to reflect his wisdom and power, surely he would not have used a collection of parts generally fashioned for other purposes. ... Odd arrangements and funny solutions are the proof of evolution -- paths that a sensible God would never tread but that a natural process, constrained by history, follows perforce." { Stephen J. Gould (1980), The Panda's Thumb: More Reflections in Natural History, pp. 20-21. }
In this declaration of normative theology, Gould confidently asserts that God "surely would not" and "would never," as if he really knows what God would have done, and why. But when we look carefully at the Bible, it seems that God is not trying to produce a history that will be viewed as maximally optimal by all humans, and does not want the role of theistic action to be maximally obvious.
This humble theology is not welcomed by advocates of evolution, for whom the ideal competitor is a theory with predictions that are: (1) distinctively different from E-theory, and (2) easy to falsify. When we look at the four major theistic options we see that the young-earth aspects of yeC meet both qualifications. When we turn from "age of the earth" issues to questions of design, with independent creation (as in yeC or oeCi) there is some justification, although not enough for the bold assertions of Gould, for expecting designs to appear independent and optimal. By contrast, oeCm predicts that new species -- whether they are produced by a natural evolutionary process or by miraculous macromutational creation -- will appear to be modifications of old species, because this is what they really are! It's easy to see why yeC is often the only alternative to evolution that is acknowledged by advocates of evolution.

Do we need a high predictive contrast?
Because oeCm proposes occasional miracles that by definition would be observable, is it possible to empirically distinguish between oeCm and evolution? Maybe, and maybe not. It depends on the precision and completeness of the available data.
Imagine the existence of extremely detailed data -- such as complete, accurate, precise lab reports (for physiology, structure, DNA,...) and fossils, and maybe even VCR tapes -- for all organisms throughout an evolutionary episode. In this imaginary situation, the highly informative data would let us distinguish between normal-appearing natural evolution (either gradual or punctuated) and miraculous-appearing macromutational creation. But in reality the historical data is far less informative, so it could be difficult to distinguish between these theories.
The potential for decisive contrast is further reduced by the flexibility of oeCm. A single theory of oeCm might postulate the operation of several mechanisms: continual natural evolution with rates ranging from gradual neo-Darwinian to faster punctuated equilibrium; and occasional miraculous macromutations, with all genetic changes occurring at once or spread over many generations, and occurring in all members of a species (so the whole population is instantly changed) or in only one or two organisms (so the effects take time to spread through a population). In addition, theories of oeCm can vary from one scientist to another.
This flexibility is not welcomed by opponents of creationism, who (as explained above) prefer a competitive theory with precise predictions that contrast sharply with those of E-theory, and are easy to falsify. But there is a low predictive contrast between oeCm and E-theory, since oeCm is consistent with most evidence for most aspects of evolution: for micro-E, minor macro-E, common descent, fossil-E, and mechanisms of E. The major difference is that oeCm challenges the conventional conclusion that this evidence provides strong support for Total Macro-E, and raises questions (involving irreducible complexity and rates of change and...) about whether undirected natural process was sufficient to produce all existing biocomplexity in the time that was available.
For critics who complain that, compared with evolution, oeCm isn't different enough, we can ask "Is this necessary? Is radical differentness an essential attribute of a theory that is challenging the status quo?" Consider Einstein's theory of motion. In almost all ways, its observable consequences are identical to those of Newton's theory of motion. The only differences occur at extremely high speeds. Should we criticize Einstein's theory because it is so similar to Newton's theory in so many ways? Should we demand that, if we are to take Einstein's theory seriously, it must be modified so it will differ from Newton's theory in other observable ways, so there will be a higher predictive contrast?

note to the reader: The remainder of this section is about "details of historical science" and "what is missing from the section."

Evolutionary Retroductions and Predictions (details)
Evolutionary theory can be used to propose a theory-based scenario for a particular historical period that spans time in a series of historical situations. An initial situation, analogous to the initial conditions for an experimental system in a laboratory experiment, includes the initial environments and characteristics of one or more species. Intermediate situations and a final situation are similarly defined. The entire episode involves a sequence of situations: initial, intermediate(s), and final.
RETRODUCTIONS: In contrast with deductive logic that predicts by asking "If this is the initial situation and theory, then what will be the observations for the final situation?", retroductive logic asks a reversed question in the past tense, "These are the observations, so what could the scenario (composed of situations and theories) have been?" Historical retroduction is a creative-and-critical thinking strategy, with imagination guided by deduction, whose goal is to generate a historical scenario, constructed by combining situations with theory, that would produce the known observations for a historical period. During retroduction a scientist can adjust either of the sources, situational or theoretical, that are used to construct a scenario.
SCENARIOS: For a period in the history of nature, evolutionary theorists try to construct a sequential scenario -- for the environments and characteristics of species in initial, intermediate, and final situations -- that is consistent with the causal mechanisms of E-theory. Part of the challenge is to decide how to use available observations to reconstruct, as completely and accurately as possible, the details of situations at various times. And because the Modern Synthesis of E-theory contains a variety of mechanisms (for producing and expressing genetic variability, and for changing the gene frequencies in a population), scientists also must decide which causal mechanism(s) to propose for the "changes in situation" they have proposed. Due to the flexibility in proposing situations and mechanisms, for one episode it may be possible to construct a number of competitive scenarios, all consistent with the core concepts of E-theory. Each scenario can be compared with available data, to check for degree of agreement and, when necessary, to make adjustments in the components (the postulated situations, mechanisms,...) used in constructing the scenario.
GOALS: In analyzing an episode, the primary goal(s) of scientists might be descriptive and/or theoretical. / descriptive goals: Scientists can use observations and theory-based analysis in an attempt to reconstruct the characteristics of a past situation in a way that is more detailed and accurate. / theoretical goals: Scientists can analyze the observation-based situations they have proposed, in an effort to estimate the rates of change for genotypes and the resulting phenotypes, or the roles played by various factors (natural selection, random drift, geographic isolation,...) in a causal mechanism, or the importance of genes that control developmental pathways, or...
LEVELS: An evolutionary study can involve different levels of time, change, and space. / Levels of Time: Scientists can try to construct scenarios for periods that are short or long. / Levels of Change: The changes being studied can be small (within one species or a group of closely related species) or large (involving major changes between widely divergent species). / Levels of Space: Scientists can focus on a small area, or they can do a large-scale biogeographical analysis that integrates the analyses already done for smaller areas. / A wide variety of evolutionary research projects are possible, involving analysis and synthesis for various combinations of time, change, and space. / { Critics of evolution question the logical validity of extrapolating from small-scale studies of micro-E and minor macro-E (which have solid empirical support) to large-scale theories of Total Macro-E (which have far less empirical support). }

OBSERVATIONS: Most information about evolution comes from field studies of past events, with data about species preserved in fossils. But scientists can also gather information in other ways, including detailed examinations of different modern-day species (to compare their physiological, structural, and behavioral characteristics, and the composition of their proteins and genes) and current events (such as observing natural selection in bacteria or mutations in fruitflies, analyzing current biogeographical patterns, or exploring an ecosystem to learn more about the interactions of species with each other and with their environment). Usually scientists are working with data they already know, but not always. Sometimes predictions can be made about data that will be observed in the future, whether this data is from events in the distant past (like old fossils that are newly discovered) or in the future (such as lab data about gene sequences, to be used for comparative analysis). The inherent limitations of historical data are that for the major events in macroevolutionary history there can be no direct observations, and there can be no rigorously controlled experiments with reproducible data.

PREDICTIONS: In most historical sciences, including evolution, it is difficult to make predictions that are both precise (with specific details) and accurate. Generally, accuracy decreases when precision increases, and when time-duration increases the accuracy and precision both decrease. In making predictions the main obstacles to achieving "precision with accuracy" are complexity, sensitivity, and randomness: evolutionary situations and causal factors are complex; outcomes are sensitive to small variations in initial conditions; all processes involve some randomness, and some factors (like mutation and genetic drift) are extremely random. These three elements combine to produce historical contingency: if similar initial situations were "allowed to run" 10 times, there would be 10 different results. But even though E-theory could not precisely predict the results, it claims the ability to retroductively explain each result if scientists can construct a scenario (connecting the initial and final situations) that is consistent with the causal mechanisms of E-theory. And despite a typical divergence in results for long-term runs, sometimes there is convergence such as similar environmental niches being filled by species with similar characteristics.
Some of the uncertainties in evolutionary prediction (re: complexity, sensitivity, randomness) are roughly analogous to those in weather prediction. And relationships for time duration are similar; as time increases, accuracy decreases. The scientific principles of weather forecasting allow precise short-term predictions, such as what will happen in the next hour in a specific location. Consistencies in seasonal weather patterns allow nonprecise long-term predictions (in Wisconsin it will be cold with occasional snow in January, and hot with occasional thunderstorms in July) and probabilistic predictions such as the total snowfall in January or the probability of snow on January 16. But it would be impossible, a month in advance, to make accurate long-term predictions about the precise times when snowfalling or thunderstorming will occur.
When these phenomena do occur, however, they will be consistent with theories of meteorological science (which are applications, for complex situations, of conventional theories in physics,...) and they can be retroductively explained using these theories. Similarly, evolutionary theories can be used to make precise short-term predictions (sometimes), nonprecise long-term predictions, probabilistic predictions, and (most important for historical science) theory-based retroductions.

What is missing from this section?
Here is a description, from Section 7C, for some of what is (or will be) in Sections 7C and 7G, regarding historical science:
Section 7G contains a deeper analysis of historical science, personal agency, and supernatural agency. It examines cause-effect principles and hypothetico-deductive inference. It describes how the process of retroductive inference is affected by predictive accuracy and precision, which in turn are affected by contingency and complexity, empirical and theoretical knowledge, mechanisms and agency. It explains why, although in historical science there are reasons for caution due to inherent limitations in the available data, scientists can develop methods for reducing the practical impact of the limitations. These methods should be critically analyzed, but we should not automatically eliminate historical science (whether it proposes design or non-design) from being authentically scientific.

Some of this is here already, other parts will be written later. There will be discussions about the following topics:
the principle (from 7C [in the original full page]) that in order to do empirical science, the effects (not the causes) must be observable, because an unobservable cause (such as gravity, or theistic action?) can produce observable effects;
the ways in which design theories are (and are not) analogous to Newton's theory of universal gravitation; basically, they're similar in lacking a detailed causal mechanism (Newton just said "this is what happens" but didn't try to explain how or why by proposing a mechanism) and because both propose that an observed effect is produced by an unobservable cause, but they're different in level of descriptive detail and predictive precision (unlike design theories, Newton's equation, F = GMm/rr, is a detailed description that allows precise predictions); one is an operations theory, the other is a historical theory; because Newton's theory has been accepted (for centuries) as authentically scientific, this is evidence that a mechanistic explanation is not required for science (in fact, positivists prefer a theory that limits itself to a "description of observables" rather than speculating about unobservable causes and mechanisms);
more about mechanisms and matching and the principle that we should "think about testability in a way that is logically appropriate, that achieves a match between the claims made by design and the methods used to justify these claims"; the types of predictions and postdictions/retroductions that typically are (and aren't) made by historical theories (in general) and various design theories (in particular);
historical science can involve retroductions about recent history, not just ancient history;
more about "science in the future" and "proving a negative" (re: the impossibility of proving an impossibility?) and how we should define (and use) evaluation criteria for deciding the extent to which a claim that "it's impossible" is scientifically justified;
different types of evaluative status (intrinsic and relative, for pursuit and acceptance, for truth and utility) and interpretations (realist and instrumentalist) for the goals of theory construction;
an in-depth analysis of irreducible complexity (what it is and how it differs from non-irreducible complexity, some arguments for and against its existence,...) plus links to a page that will connect you to analyses (by others) about these questions;
a claim that E-theory would be empirically falsifiable if we found clear evidence for out-of-order origins, such as finding human fossils below trilobite fossils in a pre-Cambrian geological formation; even though this claim is logically true and it does make E potentially falsifiable, it is irrelevant if E is wrong in other ways (involving irreducible complexity or rates of change or...) and if, regarding these other ways to falsify E, advocates of E insist on perpetual denial by continuing to use "unrealistically imaginative scenarios" or requests to "be patient and eventually we'll find an answer";
more about the two stages (or more) of design investigation; first determine whether design occurred, then investigate the details (of how, when, why, who,...); one general question about design is "How much intelligence is required for intelligent design?" --- Is there design-directed action when animals (or humans) choose who to mate with, who to kill (for a predator seeking prey), or in the choice of strategies during a competition (with or without cooperation) for scarce resources? Is it intelligence when animals "control and change their environment" in ways that affect the evolution of their own species or other species? Is there design in the construction of a skyscraper, beaver dam, bird nest, ant hill, or coral reef? What distinctions should we make, using what criteria? What are the functional roles (and defining characteristics) of cognition and instinct?

And there may be more. I'm not sure when the "unfinished topics" outlined above will be written, or even (when they are written) whether they'll be in this section or in another page that is an "appendix for interesting (but not essential) methodological details."

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