




Communication

Richard Dawkins and the Infected Mind

Richard Dawkins and the Infected Mind

Ben M. Carter



Ben M. Carter

Dawkins says that Darwinism has yet to achieve the same status of certainty that the heliocentric model of the solar system has achieved, and that its current dominance of biology may only be momentary.

All living creatures share a common ancestor. This statement is true in the same sense that it is true that the sun is hotter than the earth or that you have a head.¹ Thus Richard Dawkins, ever the feisty polemicist, begins his latest book, a collection of essays entitled *A Devil's Chaplain*. However, he readily concedes that common ancestry does not verify Darwinism. What he calls "core Darwinism ... the minimal theory that evolution is guided in adaptively nonrandom directions by the nonrandom survival of small random hereditary changes,"² has yet to prove universally true. But, Dawkins says, it is currently "the only viable explanation we have" to account for the truth of evolution.³ Then in a reversal that strikes this reader as remarkable, Dawkins says that Darwinism has yet to achieve the same status of certainty that the heliocentric model of the solar system has achieved, and that its current dominance of biology may only be momentary. Dawkins is quite willing to admit that future scientists may uncover facts that force them either "to abandon Darwinism or modify it beyond recognition."⁴

Nor does Dawkins believe that Darwinism, even perhaps core Darwinism, is universal in the sense that it can be applied in all walks of life. In politics he proclaims himself "a passionate anti-Darwinian,"⁵ and he explicitly sees "no inconsistency in favoring Darwinism as an academic scientist while opposing it as a human being."⁶ This is not a new position for Dawkins as readers of his

The Selfish Gene will recall,⁷ but it is perhaps insufficiently appreciated (certainly it is insufficiently appreciated by Dawkins himself) just how genuinely inconsistent Dawkins' formulation of such a dichotomy is.

The issue here turns on the way in which *is* and *is not* are transformed into *ought* and *ought not* when morality is introduced into an argument, as David Hume observed in the third book of his *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1740—the first two books were published in 1739). The point Hume was making is that what ought to be cannot be deduced from what is and vice versa. The problem for the Darwinist is that Darwinism, as a description of what is, could become the foundation of a political or moral theory about what ought to be, and as such might be construed to provide warrant for all manner of social injustices, as Dawkins well knows. After all, Herbert Spencer, an early proponent of social Darwinism, interpreted the development of human societies in survivalist terms, and Francis Galton, Darwin's cousin, coined the word eugenics in 1883.

However, if one can passionately oppose Darwinism when making political choices, why not when making artistic, ethical, philosophical, or religious choices? Dawkins may assert that it is dishonest to assign distinct magisteria to religion and science,⁸ but, given his willingness to assign distinct magisteria to science and politics, or even to science and more general human concerns, it is not immediately clear why that should be. And this conundrum in Dawkins' thinking is especially striking since he is so willing to distinguish the truth of evolution (one kind of scientific claim) from the Darwinian interpretation of that truth (another kind of scientific claim). After all, Darwinism might be abandoned by future scientists, as Dawkins has admitted, yet science itself be

Ben M. Carter earned his Ph.D. in Christianity in the Non-Western World from the University of Edinburgh. Author of five books and a variety of articles and reviews, he has recently begun writing a column for The Dallas Morning News. He spent many years overseas, particularly in Central America, the Caribbean, and Asia, and is married to Salma Carunia from South India. Ben is an ASA member and currently employed through the Dallas/Fort Worth Hospital Council. He can be reached by email at cartersalma@aol.com.

unaffected, or, as theists from many traditions have observed, evolution might simply be the way God did it.

This possibility means, among other things, that when Dawkins describes mainstream Darwinian selection as “the differential survival of genes within gene pools,”⁹ he is by his own standards quite wrong. Gene pools are identified by the genes within them. To say they survive means only that they endure. As genes in gene pools, they may have been created, intentionally selected for, or evolved in conformity to some program. The differential survival of genes within gene pools says not one thing about Darwinian evolution, and they still will be with us whether or not a Darwinian interpretation survives.

How are we to account for this glaring and long term inconsistency in Dawkins’ thought?¹⁰ Using Dawkins’ own criteria, one might suspect his brain has been infected with a religious meme. He is an atheist who feels a profound sense of awe when contemplating the world, and Darwinism, as he has famously admitted, makes it possible to be both an atheist and intellectually fulfilled.¹¹ Indeed, he maintains that had he lived prior to 1859, the year Darwin’s *On the Origin of Species* first appeared, he could not imagine being an atheist.¹² It is Darwinism then that makes Dawkins’ atheism intellectually satisfying. In part this is because, as Dawkins says, “Darwin ... was a scientific materialist,”¹³ and “Darwinism really matters in the universe.”¹⁴ If Darwin is right, then Darwinism, which Daniel Dennett called “reductionism incarnate,”¹⁵ means that much of the universe, perhaps all of its replication processes and their consequences, is reducible to, and fully explicable in, material terms. This, of course, is a theological/philosophical conclusion, which means that, for Dawkins, it may well be a memetic one.

As Dawkins makes clear in his preface to Susan Blackmore’s *The Meme Machine*, a preface that appears in shortened form as an essay “Chinese Junk and Chinese Whispers” in *A Devil’s Chaplain*,¹⁶ he coined the word meme in 1976 to underline for his readers that genes are only specific expressions of replication, and that the principles described in *The Selfish Gene* could apply to any replicator.¹⁷ A meme, as defined by the Oxford Dictionary, is “a self-replicating element of culture, passed on by imitation.”¹⁸ A synonym proposed by C. J. Lumsden and E. O. Wilson in their 1981 book *Genes, Mind, and Culture* is *culturgen*.¹⁹ A meme, like any other replicator, is entirely “selfish.” It has only one purpose: replication, and it replicates best in minds that are host to complementary memes. These memes control our behavior in much the same way that genes control our phenotype, not directly but in interaction with their environment.²⁰ We are, as Dawkins explains to his daughter in a letter that appears at the end of *A Devil’s Chaplain*, people, and we must be good at living in a world full of people. Memes help us do that.

Of course this means that some memes are beneficial. Dawkins would class scientific ideas among this category.²¹ Others, like the advertisement jingle that rattles around in your memory, are simply irritating. Still others like some juvenile crazes can be benign. And others can be pathological. For Dawkins and Dennett, less so perhaps for Blackmore, religious beliefs are examples of pathological memes. Religious people are victims of these pathological memes in the same way that people with influenza are victims of a pathological virus. Minds, because they provide such favorable environments for ideas, are, to use Dawkins’ phrase “typically massively infected” with them.²² And, of course, memes are both the source of ideas and the ideas themselves.

Dawkins coined the word meme in 1976 to underline for his readers that genes are only specific expressions of replication, and that the principles described in The Selfish Gene could apply to any replicator.

The mind, to function at its peak, must be able to counter pathological or viral memes and encourage those that are beneficial. One of the best pieces of anti-viral software the mind has devised is scientific reason.²³ Because scientific reason performs such a vital role for Dawkins, it is important to understand precisely what he means when he talks about it. For Dawkins science is preeminently about evidence.²⁴ However the truth claims of science are based not on evidence alone but on the kind of power science provides: the ability to manipulate matter and predict how it will behave.²⁵ Hence science, to use Peter Medawar’s phrase, is the art of the soluble.²⁶ But how does one solve problems, and how does one know which problems can be solved? After all, Dawkins reminds us that appearances can conceal a truth rather different than the one they reveal because the human mind, “a material product of natural selection,”²⁷ is limited by its evolutionary history.²⁸ Our senses did not evolve to give us a true picture of the world, rather they evolved to give us a useful picture of it. They create a virtual reality with which we interact.²⁹ And, precisely because the reality it generates is a virtual one, the human mind is prone to illusion, prone to imposing patterns where none exist.³⁰ For Dawkins, the appearance of design in nature is one example of such an illusion.³¹



Communication

Richard Dawkins and the Infected Mind

The world as conceived by Dawkins has no truly metaphysical dimension. He is a thoroughgoing materialist, and he understands materialism in terms of physicality. Plainly materialism so construed makes some profound metaphysical assumptions.

Dawkins tells us that science functions as a way to test hunches.³² The scientist is intrigued by a particular phenomenon, and wishes to construct an explanation for that phenomenon that can be tested repeatedly, and is consistent, precise, supported by the evidence, quantifiable, universal, and independent of cultural milieu.³³

No one doubts that science, as a powerful problem-solving tool, can be advantageously applied to resolve certain kinds of questions. For example, a scientist might have a hunch that a particular agent in solution produces a physical effect that can continue to manifest even when diluted to such a degree that the admixture no longer contains a single molecule of that agent, and employ scientific methodology to explore that hunch. Dawkins admits that such a hypothesis is scientific though he finds it implausible.³⁴ But for Dawkins, the hunch that natural processes might reveal purpose, is unscientific. The interesting question is: why does Dawkins make such a distinction? The short answer is that for Dawkins *physical* is the key word. In the case of the first hunch, one is searching for a physical effect, but in the case of the second, one is not. However there is a longer answer that is worth examining.

The world as conceived by Dawkins has no truly metaphysical dimension. He is a thoroughgoing materialist, and he understands materialism in terms of physicality. Plainly materialism so construed makes some profound metaphysical assumptions. One such assumption is that metaphysical entities like spirits and disembodied souls do not exist because they are not physical. However, the overwhelming majority of people who live, and who have ever lived, believe they have souls distinct from their bodies and that they experience the presence of spirits. Therefore the materialist must believe that the overwhelming majority of people, many of whom are very bright, are fundamentally deluded about something extremely important, and that mere empiricism is insufficient for establishing the truth of a thing.

To state this problem in a different way: it is not enough that many people report seeing an elephant. Before their reports are credible, a theory of the world must exist that allows for the presence of the elephant.

Or conversely, a theory that denies the existence of elephants might be a scientific theory in the sense that it is falsifiable, but most of us, because we have experienced elephants, would give it no credence. So what gives the claim that spirits and disembodied souls do not exist special scientific status? The answer is that such a claim has no scientific status at all. Rather it is a philosophical claim based on materialism, but materialism, as an exclusive interpretation of reality, has no scientific status. Dawkins merely thinks it does. He believes the methodological naturalism of science confirms his own metaphysical naturalism.

Pascal Boyer points out that religious ideas are invariably counterintuitive,³⁵ but he goes on to observe that a caterpillar's metamorphosis into a butterfly is also profoundly counterintuitive and that we accept it only because the empirical evidence for it is overwhelming. And, to the surprise of no one who knows anything about science, Boyer observes that the same can be said of many scientific conclusions.³⁶ Boyer also says that, despite their counterintuitive aspect, religious ideas, like scientific ones, often seem quite sensible when viewed from the perspective of those who hold those ideas.³⁷ Indeed, he points out that religious beliefs may well seem self-evident to believers.³⁸ And he argues that religious claims are selective, that the religious realm is not a domain where anything goes.³⁹

That scientific analysis produces counterintuitive conclusions is no surprise to Dawkins. He often writes about it. In *A Devil's Chaplain*, he even describes how a quantum can simultaneously behave like a particle or, when interfered with by a non-existent copy of itself, can behave like a wave.⁴⁰ What is it that convinces Dawkins of that truth? Empiricism. The phenomenon can be observed, tested repeatedly in a controlled environment, and quantified. But something more than empiricism is involved. Dawkins also has a theory of the world into which the phenomenon can be slotted.

Let us try a thought experiment. Let us suppose that something other than a non-existent copy of a quantum is interfering with that quantum. Let us suppose that metaphysical entities are the cause, that the mind of God transforms the quantum into a wave, or perhaps little demons interfere

with it. The results of the scientific experiments would be identical, but to account for them one would appeal to the divine or the demon rather than a nonexistent quantum. Which supposition is more credible? One's world view decides. But notice that if we assume that the mind of God or a little demon affects a quantum, then we must also assume that the perception that it is being transformed by a nonexistent copy of itself is an illusion. Hence, one's world view will, in such cases, determine what one understands as an illusion.

The Intelligent Design theory (ID) has illumined this issue in a new way. Though critical of ID, Michael Murray lays out the various options clearly and concludes that one might embrace a thoroughgoing methodological naturalism and still make room for design if, as Van Till has done, one adopted a Leibnizian rather than a Newtonian position.⁴¹ The issue, according to Murray, is decided by how one imagines a world creator's involvement in creation. If the world creator does not exist, then the creator has no involvement at all, and methodological naturalism is the obvious option. But a world creator might exist and have arranged everything that happens from the beginning, stacked the deck, as Murray describes it. Such a situation would lend itself to methodological naturalism and still leave an important role for natural theology. On the other hand, a world creator might have created a world which required occasional intervention on the part of its creator. Such a world would prove problematic for methodological naturalism since it would mean that a naturalistic approach could not provide a true explanation of affairs. The important point here is that each of these three options entails an assumption about the kind of being the creator is, existing or nonexistent, deck-stacking or intervening. In other words, there is an implicit religious world view involved.

If one's world view dictates something like whether a quantum is transformed by a nonexistent copy of itself or by a mischievous little demon, that is whether some ontological possibility can be dismissed as an illusion, what is to prevent that world view from dictating whether the absence of design in nature is an illusion? If the design advocates have done nothing else, they have served to highlight how nonempirical, interpretive, and faith-based the materialist's argument is. Such a problem comes out clearly in Leif Edward Ottersen Kennair's critique of ID in an article that appeared in the September 2003 issue of *Zygon*. Discussing design theorists' claims to be engaged in genuine science, Kennair observes: "[E]ven if design theory proved to be true, its scientific value would be minimal unless it could predict and explain the world as it really is."⁴² Since Kennair says that both Christianity and evolutionary psychology have a commitment to explaining the world as it really is,⁴³ one wishes he had explained how ID could be true yet also be of minimal value in explaining the world as it really is.

Anyway, why should an evolutionist like Richard Dawkins care so passionately about ID? Accept design and one can have the entire evolutionary scenario: ancient earth, fossils, genetic kinship, even a modified form of natural selection. One can have it all except hard-core Darwinism as an exclusive explanation. This is where the issue comes to a head for Dawkins. Darwinism makes his atheism intellectually fulfilling for him. He believes the universe to be a certain way, a realm ultimately describable in terms of matter in motion, and given that belief, Darwinism allows him to account for the universe as he finds it: swarming with creatures that evidence apparent design. Of course, Darwinism is—from Dawkins own perspective—a meme, and as such could be quite neutral, but in his mind it seems to have metastasized into the kind of "pathology" he would otherwise associate with religion. Dawkins is drunk on Darwinism.

Why should an evolutionist like Richard Dawkins care so passionately about ID? Accept design and one can have the entire evolutionary scenario ... except hard-core Darwinism as an exclusive explanation. This is where the issue comes to a head for Dawkins. Darwinism makes his atheism intellectually fulfilling for him.

To illustrate exactly how this works, I will cite an example Dawkins himself provides: the phenomenon of ring species, but I will preface this by noting a phenomenon that may be related: the evolution of language. In Gen. 11:1-9, we read the story of how God confused the languages of people and scattered them over the Earth. Those who left the plain of Shinar were not speaking any modern tongue. The languages of today obviously evolved from earlier versions. But they evolved not because there was competition that eliminated less fit languages and encouraged more fit languages. Instead they seem to have evolved through the process of replication itself. Information, as it replicates, can become unstable and hence tends to be modified. In the case of language, this does not suggest



Communication

Richard Dawkins and the Infected Mind

Darwinism is – from Dawkins own perspective – a meme, and as such could be quite neutral, but in his mind it seems to have metastasized into the kind of “pathology” he would otherwise associate with religion. Dawkins is drunk on Darwinism.

the absence of intelligence but rather the presence of it.

This capacity for information to be modified into new but related expressions may also account for the well-known phenomenon called “ring species.” Such a species is comprised of varieties that live in a habitat that can be diagramed as a ring. Along the trajectory of the ring, variations or subspecies appear. Although these varieties can interbreed, they gradually differentiate along the ring, until at its overlapping terminal points, they are intersterile. There are several well-documented examples of ring species including the greenish warblers (*Phylloscopus trochiloids*) of eastern Europe and central and northern Asia and the California salamander (*Ensatina eschscholtzii*), but perhaps the best known is the Herring Gull (*Larus argentatus*)/Lesser Black-backed Gull (*Larus fuscus*) ring.

The taxonomy of the Herring Gull and Lesser Black-backed Gull is so complex that authorities may distinguish between two and eight species in their ring which loops across the northern hemisphere. The Herring Gull hybridizes with subspecies in the west, the Lesser Black-backed Gull with subspecies in the east, but in Britain and western Europe, the gulls indisputably comprise two species. As Dawkins puts it, if you follow Herring Gulls westward, you will find that the Herring Gulls look less and less like Herring Gulls and more like Lesser Black-backed Gulls until when you arrive back in Britain you discover they have in fact become Lesser Black-backed Gulls.⁴⁴ Since the various species or subspecies exist together quite well along the trajectory of the ring, no obvious selective pressures underlie this change. Rather the change looks more like the change one associates with language modification. That is, it does not seem to be occasioned by natural selection. It is not Darwinian in the sense Dawkins usually uses the term though it may be evidence for the action of mind in the way we described it above (see endnote 2).

If species might evolve in the same way that language does, and if the evolution of language is evidence of intelligence, then the evolution of species might also evidence intelligence. For example, in the evolution of species, one has a shift in the genetic frequencies of gene pools. That means the

information code in those pools changes. The same is true in the evolution of language: the information codes change. Not only do new words appear and old words take on new functions, but pronunciation and grammar shift over time, creating dialects and eventually new languages. Hence, we might think of the emergence of a new species in the way we think of an emergent language, as an expression of mind. Such a model fits comfortably into our information-rich world and allows us to capitalize on its information as an explanatory principle rather than as a phenomenon to be explained. It also allows us to acknowledge evolution as an increase in variety and complexity without having to account for that increase as a mindless process. However, I doubt materialists like Dawkins will find this proposal attractive, perhaps because their minds have been too heavily infected with a family of memes that blinds them to alternative interpretations. ☞

Notes

¹Richard Dawkins, *A Devil's Chaplain* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2003), 17–8, or true in the same sense that it is true that the earth revolves around the sun, 219.

²*Ibid.*, 81. I find this an odd definition since nonrandom might well be evidence for mind. It is almost as though Dawkins were claiming that even if the design argument prevailed, Darwinism would be vindicated since mind would secure Darwinism's requirement that the direction of the change and the survival of the changes be nonrandom. Mind, after all, might simply be exploiting random changes in an opportunistic way, rather like domestic breeders have (see the first two chapters of Darwin's *On the Origin of Species*).

³*Ibid.*, 84.

⁴*Ibid.*, 81.

⁵*Ibid.*, 10–1. Science, he acknowledges, “is not politically neutral” (p. 193).

⁶*Ibid.*, 11. Interesting distinction between scientists and humans.

⁷Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 139.

⁸Dawkins, *A Devil's Chaplain*, 150.

⁹*Ibid.*, 227.

¹⁰To be fair, this level of confusion is not unique to Dawkins. For example, Dr. Francisco Ayala in an article available on the Internet at www.counterblance.org (www.meta-library.net/evolution/evolution-print.html) writes: “Natural selection is a statistical bias in the relative rate of reproduction of alternative genetic units.” But that is wrong. Selection itself whether natural or otherwise is a statistical bias. It may be, as he says later in his paper, “a consequence of the differential multiplication of living beings,” but that does not tell us how “natural” such differential multiplication is or how much variety can be generated in such a manner. Yet this claim is fundamental to Ayala's

argument that Darwin completed the Copernican revolution by making the origin of design in living things comprehensible to human reason and thereby resolving the “conceptual schizophrenia” between the physical and the biological sciences.

¹¹Dawkins, *The Blind Watchmaker* (W. W. Norton & Company, 1996), 6.

¹²Ibid., 5.

¹³Dawkins, *A Devil’s Chaplain*, 191.

¹⁴Ibid., 79.

¹⁵Daniel Dennett, *Darwin’s Dangerous Idea* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 82.

¹⁶The essay was modified in a way I found quite interesting. Most of the shortening involves the kind of editorial alteration that one would expect when a preface to one book is reprinted as an essay in another, and there is the bow to shifts in style, as, for example, when the “is not” in the preface becomes “isn’t” in the essay. But one striking change of real content is the elimination of the reference to Plato found in the preface (xii). While preparing a paper on communication for the 51st annual Evangelical Theological Society conference in 1999, I wrote to Susan Blackmore and argued, based on Dawkins’ reference to Plato in his preface to her book, that memes might stand-in for Platonic forms. She objected, but her reasons were quite unpersuasive. Perhaps my comments caused her to bring the subject to Dawkins’ attention or perhaps others noticed the same thing I had. For whatever reason, the reference to Plato disappears in the essay.

¹⁷Dawkins, *A Devil’s Chaplain*, 126–7.

¹⁸Ibid., 120.

¹⁹Ibid., 125.

²⁰The environment of a gene is made up not only of the larger world in which the organism lives but also of other genes. The same is true of the meme, its environment is comprised in part by other memes.

²¹Dawkins, *A Devil’s Chaplain*, 145.

²²Ibid., 137.

²³Ibid., 141.

²⁴Ibid., 246. It is important to distinguish here between evidence and proof. Science, as an empirical enterprise, is inductive, so evidence

is central to its truth claims. But not all truth claims rely on evidence. The truth claims of mathematics or deductive logic, for example, are based on algorithmic proofs that are compelling irrespective of any evidence.

²⁵Ibid., 15, 19.

²⁶Ibid., 198, 200.

²⁷Ibid., 191.

²⁸Ibid., 19.

²⁹Ibid., 46. This idea that the mind creates a virtual reality is one Dawkins has explored before, particularly in *Unweaving the Rainbow* (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998), see Chap. 11 “Reweaving the World.”

³⁰Ibid., 185.

³¹Ibid., 225.

³²Ibid., 246.

³³Ibid., 145. Such requirements suggest that science is ill equipped to construct a theory of unique things like the universe, the life and behavior of particular individuals, or the specific course that history took, especially if we assume, as Gould did, that a replay of events would lead to very different results.

³⁴Ibid., 184.

³⁵Pascal Boyer, *Religion Explained* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 65.

I refer to Boyer’s book because in a footnote on page 118 of *A Devil’s Chaplain* Dawkins refers to it as a thoughtful book on such subjects.

³⁶Ibid., 68.

³⁷Ibid., 12.

³⁸Ibid., 17.

³⁹Ibid., 29.

⁴⁰Dawkins, *A Devil’s Chaplain*, 18.

⁴¹Michael J. Murray, “Natural Providence (Or Design Trouble),” *Faith and Philosophy* 20, no. 3 (2003): 307–27.

⁴²Leif Edward Ottesen Kennair, “Challenging Design: How Best to Account for the World as It Really Is,” *Zygon* 38, no. 3 (2003): 546.

⁴³Ibid., 544, 555.

⁴⁴Dawkins, *A Devil’s Chaplain*, 22.

Books Received and Available for Review

Contact the book review editor if you would like to review one of these books. Choose alternate selections. Richard Ruble, Book Review Editor, *Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith*, 212 Western Hills Drive, Siloam Springs, AR 72761. richardanne@cox-internet.com

David Adams & Ken Schurb, eds., *The Anonymous God: The Church Confronts Civil Religion and American Society*, Concordia Publishing House, 290 pages, 2004

Mary Jo Bane, et al., eds., *Taking Faith Seriously*, Harvard Univ. Press, 382 pages, 2005

Chris Bosso, *Environment, Inc.: From Grassroots to Beltway*, Univ. of Kansas Press, 224 pages, 2005

David Chidester, *Authentic Fakes: Religion and American Popular Culture*, Univ. Cal. Press, 300 pages, 2005

William Cleary, *Prayers to an Evolutionary God*, Skylight Paths, 182 pages, 2004

Richard Deyo & Donald Patrick, *Hope or Hype: The Obsession with Medical Advances and the High Cost of False Promises*, American Management Association, 335 pages, 2005

Phil Dowe, *Galileo, Darwin, and Hawking: The Interplay of Science, Reason, and Religion*, Eerdmans, 205 pages, 2005

Hope Egan, *Holy Cow: Does God Care What We Eat? First Fruits of Zion*, Inc., 160 pages, 2005

David Hart, *The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth*, Eerdmans, 450 pages, 2004

William Hutton & Jonathan Eagle, *Earth’s Catastrophic Past and Future: A Scientific Analysis of Information*

Channeled by Edgar Cayce, Universal Publishers, 572 pages, 2004

John McGraw, *Brain and Belief: An Exploration of the Human Soul*, Aegis Press, 400 pages, 2004

Brenda McNeil & Rick Richardson, *The Heart of Racial Justice: How Soul Change Leads to Social Change*, IVP, 188 pages, 2004

Michael Mallery, *Our Improbably Universe: A Physicist Considers How We Got Here*, Thunder’s Mouth Press, 227 pages, 2004

Gilbert Meilaender, *Bioethics: A Primer for Christians*, Eerdmans, 126 pages, 2005

Keith Miller, ed., *Perspectives on an Evolving Creation*, Eerdmans, 526 pages, 2005

Lawrence Olsen, *Two Revelations: A High View of Science and Scripture*, Xulon Press, 174 pages, 2005

Brad Stetson & J. G. Conti, *The Truth about Tolerance: Pluralism, Diversity and the Culture Wars*, IVP, 206 pages, 2005

Richard Thompson, *God and Science: Divine Causation and the Laws of Nature*, Govardhan Hill Publishing, 216 pages, 2004

Mark I. Wallace, *Finding God in the Singing River: Christianity, Spirit, Nature*, Fortress Press, 184 pages, 2005