Science
in Christian PerspectiveScience
in Christian Perspective
An Anthropological Perspective on Man
CLAUDE E. STIPE
Department of Sociology and Anthropology
Marquette University Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233
From: JASA 28 (December 1976): 173-180.
Introduction
"Man" and "human" are not scientific, but rather colloquial
terms. In considering the relationship of man to other organisms-the question
of taxonomy-it is preferable to use terms such as hominid or Homo
sapiens rather
than "man." For most people the term "man" has a "cry
restricted meaning, referring only to Homo sapiens sapiens (Clark 1955:6).
There is actually little agreement on what is meant
by "man." Some emphasize the achievement of upright posture, others
the acquisition of language, and still others the use of tools or the
attainment
of large brain size, etc. (Quigley 1971:520). In a review of John
Pfeiffer's The
Emergence of Man, L. S. B. Leakey (1971:381) claims that it is not
clear whether
Pfeiffer is equating man with the genus Homo or only with Homo
sapiens.
Simpson claims that all attempts to answer the
question, "What is man?" before 1859 are completely
worthless and should
therefore be studiously ignored. In discussing the nature of man the only fixed
point of departure is man's biological nature, both in its evolutionary history
and present condition. Simpson recognizes that a biological study of
man may never
give a satisfactorily complete answer to the question, and that the
older approaches
through metaphysics, theology, art, and other nonbiological,
nonscientific fields
can still contribute.
But unless they accept, by speculation or by implication, the nature of man as
a biological organism, they are merely fictional fantasies or
falsities, however
interesting they may be in those nonfactual categories (Simpson 1966:3).
Not everyone agrees with Simpson on the basic importance of man's
biological nature.
Others (cf. Quigley 1971:521; Roe 1963:320) note that most of the
criteria which
have been suggested for differentiating man from other animals are behavioral
in nature, rather than changes in physical structure which can be documented by
the fossil record.
One problem in considering the nature of man is that certain terms
may be interpreted
differently than the user intended. For example, the statement that man is an
animal is interpreted by some to mean that man is simply an animal,
and therefore
they feel compelled to reject the statement. Bube's introduction to a special
edition of the Journal ASA on whether man is only a complex machine deals with
an analogous problem:
It's the "only" in the question, "Is man only a complex
machine?" that causes the problem . That man is a
complex machine is a scientific conclusion. That man is only a complex machine
is a subjective philosophical speculation not derivable from science . . . . We
should expect that every event in which a human being takes part can
be described
on each of the levels appropriately associated with the physical sciences, the
biological sciences, the psychological and social sciences, and ultimately in
terms of that theology which relates the event and the man to Cod. It is never
a question of something happening on this level but not on another;
it is always
a question of something happening on every level simultaneously (Bube
1970:122).
It is difficult to be "objective" about the nature of man, for we all
have so much vested interest in the conclusions. Man has been characterized in
many ways: a little lower than the angels, a mechanical misfit, a
ridiculous weakling,
and/or the most dangerous creature alive. It is obvious that these statements
are based on value judgments and are not open to scientific verification.
In this paper I would like to explore the question of the uniqueness
of man from
three different perspectives: paleontology, biochemistry, and language.
Paleontology
In 1961 Howell stated that "Human evolutionary studies are still greatly
hindered by a taxonomic morass which is seriously in need of
revision" (1961:119),
and acknowledged the difficulty of applying the biological species concept to
fossil populations. The situation has improved little (if any) since
then, Livingstone
(1961:117) has complained that to most physical anthropologists, a hump here or
a difference of a centimeter someplace else is conclusive evidence
for placing
two specimens in separate species, and that the process of, e.g.,
assigning mandibles
to different species on the basis of morphological differences, makes neither
ecological nor morphological sense.
I would go even further and maintain that we shall never infer or
understand the
course of human evolution by comparative anatomy or detailed analysis
of the miserable
scraps of bone which have been found. Only by considering these
scraps as living,
kicking animals who thus conform to all the general laws of ecology
and evolution
will we ever understand our own ascent or descent (Livingstone 1961:117).
The fact is that the judgments of anthropologists on anatomy,
taxonomy and phylogeny
are liable to error, controversy and revision. "Yesterday's Paranthro pus
becomes today's Australopithecus, whilst today's Australopithecus is tomorrow's
(though not yesterday's)
Homo!" (Tobias 1974:410-11).
Campbell succinctly states the problem of taxonomy in relation to
fossil forms:
Palenspecies are sequent, continuous, and not discrete units, and they cannot
be distinguished by morphological characters alone. Somewhere, many times, an
Australopithecus gave birth to a Home and they were indistinguishable
at the taxonomic
level. Nothing is to be gained by creating intermediate taxonomic categories,
for neither morphological nor behavioral boundaries exist in reality, however
hard we look for them (Campbell 1972:39).
In the past the general opinion has been that the more we learn about fossils,
and the more of them we find, the clearer will be our understanding
of their relationships
to one another. However, it seems that the opposite is true.
Progress in the study of human evolution based on the fossil record has been
beset by nearly as many problems as it has resolved. While today we
know far more
of the fossil evidence than those who wrote early in this century, we have also
come to realize more clearly the theoretical difficulties which stand
in our way.
We know that we can never do more than present hypotheses on the
basis of presently
available evidence. As time-bound creatures, no ultimate truth about the origin
and evolution of mankind can ever be known to us.
The recent discovery of so many fossil hominids has . . , opened up a
wider range
of hypothetical possibilities than have been appropriate in the past. , . . The
numerous fossils now known offer alternative interpretations
(Campbell 1972:27).
Leakey (1973:173) notes that the collection of hominids found in 1972
in the East
Rudolph area of North Kenya has presented more questions than
answers. He concludes
that the pattern of hominid development in east Africa was much more
complex than
had earlier been thought.
An interesting approach to the problem of interpretation is taken by
Wolpoff (1968).
After admitting that one can never be really sure about which
specimens constitute
a species, he notes that the final interpretation must rest on the
framework which
one selects, and that the framework must be generated by one's
hypotheses concerning
the selective pressures that oriented human development. The best one can do is
to choose the framework which most closely fits the
"facts," and although
the facts do not speak for themselves, we can always manage to do a great deal
of talking for them. Wolpoff's framework is that man has adapted culturally
to the physical environment, and morphologically to effectively
hearing culture.
"Because of this hominid adaptive characteristic, it is
difficult to understand
how different hominid species could have arisen or have been
maintained sympatrically" (Wolpoff 1968; 479). He then concludes that "the question of
sympatric hominid
speciation is more than a mere taxonomic problem. An entire theory
about hominid
evolution is at stake" (Wolpoff 1968:480). He therefore accepts
all hominids
alive at a given time as being within the range of variation of a
single species.
It is commonly held that beginning with the australopithecines there
was no speciation,
only phyletic change. However, the recent finds in south and east Africa seem
to point to the conclusion that hominid development has been cladistic rather
than only phyletic. In east Africa it seems that at least two types of hominid
were in existence at the same time from the earliest stages of Au.stralopithecus,
and some australopithecines seem to be present with Homo erectus at Olduvai and
Ternifine (Tobias 1973:326).
It is necessary to use imagination to develop models or hypotheses for handling
the problems of human development, but we are still in a preliminary phase of
the work-collecting data and attempting to put it in order. Although some seem
to thrive on speculation (e.g., Todd and Blumenberg 1974), most
prefer to be tentative
in their reconstructions.
A few examples will serve to illustrate the "taxonomic morass." The
Meganthropus mandibles were identified as Homo erectus by some and
Australopithecus robustus by others (Wolpoff 1971:401). The Vertesszollos find is classified as
Homo sapiens by Raemsch (1974:436), whereas others classify it as
Homo erectus.
At Olduvai Gorge, Hominid 7 has been variously classified as Australopithecus
and Homo lsalnlis, and Hominid 13 as Homo Jiahilis and Homo erectus (Kinzey 1971:531).
As we now consider the fossil data, it is important to keep in mind Wolpoff's
(1968:477) statement that "The interpretive problem is inevitable in the
study of fossil man, and the question of which specimens do or do not
constitute
a species will always remain open."
The most commonly mentioned candidate for the earliest known hominid
(on the line
of modern man) is Ramapithecus, specimens of which have been found
in both Africa
and India. Unfortunately, the finds are extremely fragmentary, with no skulls,
limb bones, or even canine teeth (Washburn 1971:534). For example, Rarnapithecus
wickeri consists only of an incomplete upper dentition in two
maxillary fragments
and part of the left side of the mandible.
This paucity of information does not deter some people from
speculating broadly.
Todd and Blumenberg (1974:383) state that there was an obvious extension of the
juvenile period, which they infer from the differential attrition of the molar
teeth which resulted from their delayed eruption. Poirier (1974:408) comments
that if this is true (remembering, of course, that the evidence is from wear on
a limited sample), the possibility has important implications for the
"socialization
and learning process." Ulumenberg (1974:419) even maintains that
the ecology
and habits of Ramapithecos can be extrapolated from the presumably associated
fauna, while others strongly disagree.
Although Campbell admits that "on superficial examination"
the Rarnapithecus
specimens seem very ape
The uniqueness of man from three different perspectives: paleontology, biochemistry and language.
like, he maintains that the total morphological pattern is not that of an ape
and varies from it quite specifically.
No one feature of this specimen can be characterized as hominid, as
distinct from pongid, but the total morphological pattern is significant and falls very close
to what might have been predicted for a form intermediate between an
early Dryopfthecns
ape and an Australopithecus (Campbell 1972:30).
He then states that one's opinion of whether Ramna
pithecus is or is not on the line of man "can only be based on a personal
assessment of very complex and conflicting evidence" (Campbell 1972:43).
Others (cf. Aguirre 1974:399; Clark 1974:402; Kortlandt 1974: 429)
have specifically
questioned the hominid status of Ramapithecus, and Washburn (1971:534) argues
that "dogmatic assertions of what our ancestors 'must' have been like or
how they 'must' have behaved on the basis of this evidence is
unfortunate."
The traditional viewpoint has been that the genus Homo evolved from
the australopithecines.
Depending on one's interpretation, it was either the gracile (africanus) or the
robust (rohustus) form from which Homo was derived. However, recent discoveries
in east Africa have made the picture less clear. As a result of his
work at Omo, Olduvai, and East Rudolph, Lcakey (1971:244) has concluded that the data (both
cranial and postcranial) seem to suggest that Homo and Australopithecus existed
at the same time and shared the same habitat. The East Rudolph specimens of
Australopithecus date from about 3 m.y. (million years
ago) to just over 1 m.y., with very little morphological change
during that time.
Those classified as Homo have been recovered from deposits covering a similar
time span, but show greater morphological variation (Leakey 1974:653).
The mandibular specimens from East Rudolph which have been attributed to Homo
are in many ways similar to those specimens included in the africanus
collection
from Sterkfontein, South Africa, Therefore Leakey (1972:268) has concluded that
the latter collection contains specimens that represent two different lineages
-Australopithecus and Homo-and has recently (1974; 655) concluded that the East
Rudolph forms of Australopithecus are much like the rohustus forms from south
Africa, It is very probable that the finds which Leakey (1972) has classified
as Homo at East Rudolph would have been called africanus if found in
other areas
(cf. Robinson 1972:240). Robinson would solve the discrepancy by transferring
all africanus specimens to Homo, which would result in three species of Homo:
Homo ofrfcanos in south and east Africa, Homo erectus for the lava, Pekin, etc.
finds, and Homo sapiens for the rest.
There is still the problem of chronology to he dealt with. Most of
the K/Ar (potassium-argon)
dates for the australopithecioes have been very early, leading to the
conclusion
that the robustus form died out, leaving the africanus form to give
rise to Homo.
However, the discovery in Kenya of a specimen which seems to be
long to the robustus form and which is dated by K/Ar at 1.1-1,2 m.y.
raises further
questions. Were the robustus forms really an over-specialized group heading for
extinction, or were they as recently as 1 m.y. still a viable and
adaptable group
(Carney, et. a!. 1971: 514) ?
Swedlund (1974:519) argues that if there were in actuality two
australopithecine
species, they must have been allopatric-that is, not related-hut arising from
two different lines. He (1974:525) believes, however, that the
africanus and robustus
forms fit most logically into a single species, and that those who
want to separate
them must develop a credible ecological framework to explain the extinction of
the robust forms. The only infallible criterion for defining a given species is
whether or not the individuals comprising the study population are capable of
interbreeding successfully, and since we have no indication of this
for the australopithecincs,
the answer can only be tentative.
It has also been hypothesized (Butzer 1974:382) that the Taung specimen (which
was the first Australopithecus discovered) may postdate the arrival
of true Homo
in southern Africa, which would open a new range of problems
concerning the relationship
between the two forms in that area.
The discovery of the KNM-EH 1470 skull at Koobi Fora (Leakey 1973) has caused
further speculation. The cranial capacity of the find is aproximately 800 cc,
and the probable K/Ar date is 2.9 m.y., which means that a Homo form predates
many of the australopithecines in east Africa. One interpretation of the data
posits a sympatric relationship between Home and Australopithecus,
with Home providing
scavenging opportunities for Australopithecus:
However, as H. erector developed ever more sophisticated behavioral
and technological
means of defense against predators, the utility of the relationship
with australopithecines
would have diminished. The gradual extinction of Australopithecus may have been
an inevitable outcome of the breakdown in association with Homo, for predation
pressure would inexorably have shifted to Australopithecus (Todd and Blumenberg
1974:387).
Needless to say, this reconstruction has not met with unqualified approval. To
quote one critic:
I can only remark that such unbridled speculation can be justified
only by accepting
at face value the unwarranted assertions of many authors,
interpreting altogether
too liberally the cautious statements of others, and exercising a selectivity
that excludes from consideration voluminous contrary opinion (Kress
1974:405).
As the above data show, there are a number of different interpretations of the
African fossil finds, each of which can be supported by experts. One can argue
that the robustus and africanus forms of Australopithecus belong to separate
genera,
or belong to separate species, or were simply the males and females,
respectively,
of the same species. In interpreting the relation
ship between Homo and Australopithecus, possibly only
the robust forms should be classified as Australopithecus
and the africanus forms as Homo. On the other hand, possibly some of those now
classified as Homo should be reclassified as africanus. One can argue
that there
was only one hominid species alive at a given time, or that there were two (or
more).
According to the most generally accepted framework, the Australopithecus stage
of human evolution was followed by the Home credos stage, which in
turn was followed
by the Neanderthal stage, and finally by modern man. Ordinarily all
hominids beginning
with Neanderthal Man are labelled Home sapiens, and there are even
those who would
include the Home ercetus forms in that species. Modern man is then classified
as Home sapiens sapiens to distinguish him from Home sapiens neanderthalensis.
Much controversy still exists about the relationships
between Neanderthals and anatomically modern Home
sapiens, with widely different interpretations being used. Brose and
Wolpoff (1971)
argue against the quite commonly held theory that Neanderthals were replaced by
Home sapiens sapiens, and insist that the latter (in the form of
Upper Paleolithic
man) evolved from the Middle Paleolithic Neanderthals. Their
definition of Neanderthal,
which includes "all hominid specimens dated within the time span from the
end of the Hiss to the appearance of anatomically modern H.
sapiens" (1971:1156),
raises problems. For example, this would include Fontechcvade, a find which is
considered by others to be Home sapiens sapiens. Their suggestion
that all populations
of modem man are derived from a universal Neanderthal population is
not meaningful
in terms of populations (Howells 1974:25). Brose and Wolpoff do not deal with
the Swanscombe find-which is Second Interglacial in date-but others
(e.g., Howell
1960) would classify it as well as Steinheim with the Neanderthals in spite of
its more modern characteristics.
The relationship between the "progressive" (more modern
appearing) Neanderthals
like Skhul from Palestine and the "classical" (more
primitive appearing)
Neanderthals is not clearly understood. One of the major problems is that the
progressive forms predate the classical forms. Brosc and Wolpoff
(1971:1183) classify
Omo 1 and Skhul 5 as transitional Neanderthals, but admit that both
would be identified
as Home sapiens sapiens if they had been found in a different
geological context.
Callus (1969:495) suggests that the classical Neanderthals may he seen as a subspecies which like Homo
sapiens evolved from the Homo erectus substratum, but lost plasticity early and
changed very little. It is therefore neither a descendant of early Neanderthals
nor an ancestor of Homo sapiens sapiens. Howells (1974:26) would
prefer to recognize
a category of "archaic Home sapiens" which are not at all Neanderthal
in the strict sense.
Which of these fossil forms can we call "man"? If one uses
the criterion
of religious beliefs, then Neanderthals almost certainly qualify because they
had many of the same practices which we classify as religious when found among
peoples living today. If one uses the manufacture and use of tools in a certain
pattern, then we have man at least as early as the Homo erectus
forms. There has
been a continuing controversy over whether Australopithecus made stone tools.
It has been claimed that the Oldowan culture was a product of the
australopithecines,
but later L. S. B. Leakey attributed it to Homo habilis. With the discovery of
KNM-EH 1470, the possibility that only Homo was a maker of stone
tools has again
been suggested (Blumenberg and Todd 1974:387).
Biochemistry
Another way in which scientists have attempted to understand the place of man
in nature is to compare contemporary man with contemporary great apes. If they
had a common ancestor (which evolutionists believe to be true), there should he
biochemical similarities. Since man has more in common with the
African apes (chimpanzees
and gorillas) than with the Asian apes (orangutans and gibbons), most
of the investigation
has been on the former.
Soon after the field of molecular biology expanded in the 1950's,
many researchers
became interested in comparing proteins and nucleic acids of one species with
another in an attempt to estimate the "genetic distance"
between species.
One method involved the use of the chromosome banding technique, by
which chromosomes
could be compared. It was discovered that the four gorilla
chromosomes corresponding
to human numbers 3, 13, 15 and X are identical in banding patterns with those
human chromosomes. When the same method was used with chimpanzees, it was found
that six chimpanzee chromosomes (corresponding to human numbers 3, 7,
8, 10, 14,
and X) are identical with those of humans (Miller, et. al. 1974:537).
It has been
claimed that a total of fifteen chromosomes of man and chimpanzees
have such similar
banding patterns that homology seems clear in spite of minor differences; that
there is general agreement on homologies for three more, with a fourth seeming
highly probable; and that for the remaining four the homologies are considered
to be far less certain (Warburton, at. al. 1973:457-59).
One major difference is that humans have 23 pairs of chromosomes,
whereas chimpanzees
have 24 pairs. One suggestion (Warburton, at. al. 1973:459) is that the short
arm of human chromosome #2 corresponds to the long arm of chimpanzee chromosome
#17, whereas the long arm of human chromosome #2 corresponds to all
of chimpanzee
chromosome #13. It has also been suggested (King and Wilson 1975:114) that if
one takes the point of view that man and chimpanzees had a common
ancestor, there
were at least ten large inversions and translocations and one
chromosomal fusion
since that common ancestor.
Other similarities have been noted. For example, blood types A, B,
AB, and 0 are
found in chimpanzees (though they are not exactly the same chemically
as in man),
and chimpanzee hemoglobin seems to he identical with human hemoglobin (Buettner-Janusch
1973:
434, 460)
.
Its summarizing the results of the biochemical comparison of man and
chimpanzees,
King and Wilson (1975:107) conclude that the "genetic distance
between humans
and chimpanzees is probably too small to account for their
substantial organismal
differences." Amino acid sequencing, immunological, and
electrophoretic methods
of protein comparison all yielded concordant estimates of genetic resemblance,
all indicating that the average human polypeptide is more than 99
percent identical
to its chimpanzee counterpart. They also found that genetic distance measured
by DNA hybridization indicates that man and chimpanzees are as alike as sibling
species of other organisms, and that the antigenic differences found among the
serum proteins of congeneric squirrel species are several times greater than those between humans and chimpanzees (King and Wilson
1975:113-115).
The major problem to which King and Wilson address themselves is how
the two species
could be so distinct morphologically and culturally when they are so
similar genetically.
They finally conclude that there must be a small number of genetic changes in
systems controlling the expression of genes, and that the organismal
differences
may he due to arrangement of genes on chromosomes rather than from
point mutations
(King and Wilson 1975:115).
Language
A number of attempts have recently been made to discover the language
capabilities
of nonhuman primates. Because chimpanzees relate relatively well to man, they
have been used in these experiments. Since early attempts to teach them the use
of vocal symbols was almost a total failure, current experiments
utilize language
without vocalization.
Probably the best-known instance is the work of the Gardners with
Washoe (Gardner
and Gardner 1969). Since hand signals are an important part of
chimpanzee behavior
in the wild, they decided to use American Sign Language (ASL) in which motions
stand for words. It has been claimed that the most primitive and
simplest capacity
for language in humans is to give names to things (cf. Lancaster 1968:446). If
this is correct, then Washoe used language, for there is evidence
that she assigned
names (cf. Bronowski and Bellugi 1970:670). For example, she used the sign for
"dog" and "cat" in response to pictures of the animals in
magazines, and even used the same sign for different breeds of dogs and cats.
She also applied the sign for "open" to doors, bottles, the
refrigerator,
etc., and would sign "more food" when there was none in sight. Some
other typical combinations of signs which Washoe used were "go in,"
"go out," "open key" (for a locked door), and "please
open hurry" (Peters 1972; 39).
Another experiment was conducted with a chimpanzee named Sarah (Premack 1971).
The basic linguistic unit chosen is the word (no phonemes are used),
each of which
is represented by a piece of plastic hacked with metal, which adheres
to a magnetic
slate. The experimenters began with a two word stage, such as
"Mary apple,"
which meant that to obtain an apple when Mary was present, Sarah would have to
put the words in that order. She learned to distinguish between same
and different:
e.g., she was given two cups and had to place between them a marker
meaning "same."
The same process was used for testing for an understanding of different. Sarah
not only learned the names of items, but was required to write, for
example, "apple
not name of banana." She also learned color, shape and size, and was able,
for example, to put a brown colored object in a red dish when asked
to. An interesting
experiment involved Sarah's ability to produce sentences which were appropriate
to the behavior of the trainer, rather than just behave in ways which
were appropriate
to the trainer's sentences.
On each trial she was given three words-two color words and "on." She
was required to place them on the board in a way that corresponded
to, or described,
the
trainer's placement of the cards. Thus, if the trainer put the blue card on the
green one, Sarah, who held the words "green," "blue," and
"on," was required to write "blue on green," She
was correct
on eight of the first ten trials (Premack 1971:814).
Of course, it is possible that rather than symbolizing, Sarah was
only connecting
a piece of plastic with a given object. To test this possibility, she was given
an apple and a pair of alternatives (e.g., red and green, round and
square, square
with a stemlike protuberance and plain square, etc.) and was required
to indicate
which of the alternatives was more like the apple.
The properties she assigned to the word "apple" show that
her analysis
of the word was based not on the physical form of she blue piece of
plastic, but
on the object that the plastic represents (Premack 1971:820).
A computer controlled training situation devised for a chimpanzee
named Lana was
much more complicated. Each "Ycrkish word" or lexigram is a
distinctive
geometric white symbol on a colored background, and the keys of a console are
imprinted with these color-coded lexigrams.
Each key is constructed of laminated clear acrylic plastic. Lamps
located behind
the keys allow for (i) no backlighting, when the keys are
inoperative; (ii) lowintensity
backlighting, when the keys are operative; and (iii) high iotensity
backlighting,
which signals Lana that she has successfully depressed the key,
whereupon a facsimile
of the lexigram on the key surface appears on a projector above the
console. The
consoles were designed to allow for alternations in the position of
keys so that
the location of a key would not reliably indicate its meaning (Rombaugh, et. of.
1973:731).
Each sentence must he ended with the period key, which is a signal to
the computer
to evaluate the communication. If the communication is unacceptable (that is,
incorrect), the computer erases the projected images and resets the word keys.
If the communication is correct, the computer also activates the
dispensing mechanism
which gives the requested reward, e.g., music, movies, M&M's,
etc., and sounds
a tone. To be acceptable, each sentence has to start with
"please" and
end with a period. An example of a communication would he
"please/machine/give!
M&M/period." To ensure that she was not just memorizing an
order on the
console, the keys were randomly assigned among others on the console. Lana has
discerned that once she has made an error, there is no point in
continuing a sentence.
She then pushes the period key, which erases her abortive attempt,
and tries again.
The experimenters conclude that
The results of these . . . experiments are taken as evidence that
Lana accurately
perceives Yerkish words, reads their serial order, and discriminates
whether they
can or cannot be completed in order to obtain the various incentives.
And if successful
completion of the valid sentence starts is viewed as analogous to typewriting,
it can be said that Lana both reads and writes (Rombaugh, at. at.
1973:733).
It has been argued that the results of such experiments give clear evidence for
relatively simple semantic and syntactic comprehension competence in
chimpanzees.
Peters maintains that it is not our state of knowledge that
segregates our linguistic
capacities from those of other primates, but rather our state of ignorance and our
prior methodological naivete. He strongly suggests that there are probably degrees of linguistic
competence and that our ignorance is the only reason for
not expecting
that "at least some components of linguistic competence may be shared by
a wider set of taxa than Homo zapienz" (Peters 1972:33). He is aware that
we still are faced with the question of why, if chimpanzees can learn
to develop
such a system in captivity, they have failed to develop a communication system
with proto-linguistic features in the wild (1972:45)
Not all researchers are convinced that the experiments demonstrate
the linguistic
capacity of chimpanzees. Mistler-Lachman and Lachman (1974:892) argue that the
conditioning of Lana does not imply language use, and that there is no evidence
that the meanings for terms, or syntax for strings exists anywhere but in the
linguistic competence of the trainers. They also note that the highly
structured
and carefully controlled training procedures are totally unlike the
circumstances
in which a human child learns a language.
The animal is reinforced with 100 percent consistency; it is
presented with only
well-formed strings; and only the well-formed strings for a particular phase of
training receive reinforcement, In contrast, human children are inconsistently
reinforced; they are presented with illformed strings; and their
ill-formed productions
are often rewarded, especially if they are factually correct (Mistler-Laehman
and Laehman 1974:871).
Washoe seemed to use various orderings of words indiscriminately and
did not differentiate
the basic grammatical relations. Although signs for "you,"
"me,"
and "tickle," have occurred in all possible orders in Washoe's signed
sequences, the different orders do not seem to refer to different situations in
any systematic way. Her spontaneous signed combinations seem to
represent unordered
sequences of names for various aspects of a situation (Bronowski and
Bcllugi 1970:
672). Children do not need to be taught the rules of grammatical
structure because
they discover them for themselves. They not only have the capacity to
learn names
as they are specifically taught by other humans in the early stages of language
learning, but more importantly, they have the ability to analyze the
regularities
in the language, to break down the utterances into component parts and then to
understand the parts so that they can put them together again in new
combinations.
When one knows a language, it seems that the relationship between a
sentence and
the reality it refers to was achieved by putting the sentence
together. Whereas,
in actuality, it begins by taking reality apart.
In short, we must not think of sentences as assembled from words which have an
independent existence already, separate from any kind of sentence . . . . The
experience of learning about the world consists of an inner analysis
and a subsequent
synthesis. In this way, human language expresses a specifically human
way of analyzing
our experience of the eternal world. This analysis is as much a part
of learning
language as is the more obvious synthesis of sentences from a
vocabulary of words.
In short, language expresses not a specific linguistic faculty hot a
constellation
of general faculties of the human mind (Brnnowski and Bellugi 1970:673).
It is, therefore, this process of total reconstitution which is characteristic of the human mind. At the present we have no
evidence that the
nonhuman primate is capable of doing this even when given the
vocabulary readymade.
Finally, Chomsky (1972:67) argues that a careful consideration of experiments
with chimpanzees provides little support for the assumption that human language
evolved from systems of animal communication. He concludes that they
demonstrate
more clearly that human language is a unique phenomenon for which there is no
significant analogue in the animal world. The postulation of a lower stage in
the evolution of language in which vocal gestures were used for expression of
emotional states, and a higher stage in which articulated sound is
used for expression
of thought, leaves a gap for which Chomsky sees no bridge.
There is no more basis for assuming an evolutionary development of
"higher"
from "lower" stages, in this case, than there is for
assuming an evolutionary
development from breathing to walking; the stages have no significant analogy,
it appears, and seem to involve entirely different processes and
principles (Chomsky
1972:68).
Chomsky also questions the concept that language is characteristically used to
communicate information, either in fact or in intention. In reality
language can
be used either to inform or mislead, to clarify our thoughts to other people,
to display our cleverness, or even simply for play. The crucial
factor in understanding
language and the capacities on which it rests is to ask what it is, not how it
is used, or for what purposes it is used. When we ask what it is,
we find no striking similarity to animal communication systems. There
is nothing
useful to be said about behavior or thought at the level of
abstraction at which
animal and human communication fall together (Chomsky 1972:70),
In summary, although many experiments have been devised to determine
the linguistic
capacities of nonhuman primates, it seems that possession of human language is
associated with a specific type of mental organization, not simply a
higher degree
of intelligence (cf. Lancaster 1968:446).
Conclusion
What then is "man" from an anthropological viewpoint? In
terms of language,
there seems to be no question that he has abilities which are different in kind
rather than only degree from all nonhuman primates. Although there
are some close
biochemical correspondences between contemporary man and the African
great apes,
there are crucial cultural differences as well as major morphological
differences
between the two groups. Conclusions from paleontology are difficult
to draw because
of the problems of interpretation. However, Neanderthals should
almost certainly
be classified as "man," and probably Homo erectus forms as well.
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