Book Reviews

Table of Contents

A WOMAN'S CHOICE by Samuel J. Barr, M.D. with Dan Abelow, Rawson Associates Publishers, Inc., New York, 1977. 155 pages.
THE STERILIZATION CONTROVERSY: A NEW CRISIS FOR THE CATHOLIC HOSPITAL? by John P. Boyle, New York: Paulist Press, 1977, 101 pp., $3.50.
THE TAO OF PHYSICS by Fritjof Capra, Shambhala Publications, Boulder, Colorado, 1975. 330 pages, paperback.
SIGNS OF THE TIMES by Linus J. Dowell, Gennao Anothen Publications, College Station, Texas 77844, 1977. viii - 88 pp. Paperback.
MODIFYING MAN: IMPLICATIONS AND ETHICS Edited by Craig W. Ellison. Washington, D.C., University Press of America, 1977. ix 294 pp.
PRESERVING THE PERSON: A LOOK AT THE HUMAN SCIENCES by C. Stephen Evans, Inter Varsity Press, Downers Grove, IL 60515. Paperback, 175 pages, (1977) $4.95
STRANGE PHENOMENA, Vol. G-2, A Source Book of Unusual Natural Phenomena by William R.
Corliss, Compiler. Glen Arm, Md. 21057, The Sourcebook Project. 1974. $6.95
CLOSE ENCOUNTERS - A Better Explanation by Clifford Wilson and John Weldon, published by Master Books, a division of Creation Life Publishers, San Diego, California, 1978, 368 pages, $2.95 in paper.
THE GENESIS RECORD by Henry M. Morris, Baker Book House, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1976, 716 pp.
THE PROBLEM OF EVOLUTION: A Study of the Philosophical Repercussions of Evolutionary
Science by John N Deely and Raymond J. Nogar, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1973, 470 pp., $13.50.
THE CREATION EVOLUTION CONTROVERSY by Randy J. Wysong, D.V.M., Inquiry Press, P.O. Box 1766 East Lansing, Michigan, 48823, 1976, 455 pages. Pb. $7.95, HB $15.00.
ROCKS, RELICS, AND BIBLICAL RELIABILITY by Clifford A. Wilson, Christian Free University, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Znndervan Publishing House, 1977, 141 pp.
STUDENT ESSAYS ON SCIENCE AND CREATION, VOLUME 1 by Dennis A. Wagner, editor, Goleta, California: Creation Society of Santa Barbara, 1976, 150 pp.

A WOMAN'S CHOICE by Samuel J. Barr, M.D. with Dan Abelow, Rawson Associates Publishers, Inc., New York, 1977. 155 pages.

In the past 100 years, the choices women can make have grown dramatically. Along with the free choice of whom they marry, their options have continued to increase as a result of birth control, abortion, sterilization, artificial insemination, and test-tube fertilization. The authors of this book are principally concerned to broaden women's freedom of choice in the area of abortion, but they also look ahead to the inevitable need for genetic counselling
across a wide spectrum. No one concerned about religious values should disagree with their efforts to have members of the helping professions aid women in making free, moral choices.

The book is also significant because the authors have drawn their theory from practice and then shared both with their readers. The book is largely a series of case studies the doctor has come to know in his abortion clinic in Florida. At the same time, this real-life orientation of the book is its weakness. The doctor's practice is its own justification.

Given different principles, Dr. Barr might have chaired a right-to-life clinic and never performed an abortion. And
yet, in spite of the importance of the doctor's principles, they are never examined nor formally discussed. Barr is an unabashed partisan of every woman's right to an abortion. Little mention is made in his text of opposing viewpoints. He discusses none of the moral issues commonly raised under the heading of abortion. He writes for about fifty percent of the American population which believes that fetal life is God's gift only when the woman who has conceived chooses to bear it.

Daniel Callahan once referred to the "Orwellian" terminology of pro-abortionists. In this book, abortion is always the "procedure." The foetus is both an "accident of nature" and one of the "destructive consequences" of sexual intercourse.

Unsupported numerical statements abound. For example, one in four hundred women needs to call a doctor after an abortion; one in twenty women rejects the idea of birth control; one in five hundred pregnancies can be traced to males who claimed to have had vasectomies but did not. Rhythm is briefly discussed and then dismissed. No mention is made of natural family planning which is a refinement of the rhythm method with a highly proven degree of effectiveness.

Objective language is not the authors' strongpoint. Those opposed to abortion are said to "intimidate" the hospital because of "physician resistance and other nonsense." Their challenge of the FDA critique of birth control pills and saccharin(!) is unsupported. Their own support of the pill is enthusiastic; only another physician can say if their support is over-enthusiastic in the light of recent revelations about the effects of the pill upon some women.

The book is aimed at a popular audience, does not deal in depth with any serious issues, and ultimately only pits the authors' authority against those who would disagree with them. The book is a partisan, sometimes facile presentation of a controversial topic. Case studies of pregnant women from childhood to almost sixty are as moving a testimony as the slides of aborted fetuses. However neither the studies nor the slides do more than inflame passions of those already convinced.

The abortion controversy deserves and needs authors who can weigh and balance the rights of mothers and fathers against the lives they conceive. Barr and Abelow have not written such a book.
Reviewed by William f. Sullivan S. T. D., Associate Professor. Religious Studies Department, St. John Fisher College, Rochester. N. Y., 14618.

THE STERILIZATION CONTROVERSY: A NEW CRISIS FOR THE CATHOLIC HOSPITAL? by John P. Boyle, New York: Paulist Press, 1977, 101 pp., $3.50.

Catholic hospitals are in a quandary. At the same time that the Roman Catholic Church forbids sterilizations, communities served by Catholic hospitals request them, the government-which supplies monetary support-often demands them, and many ambivalent staff physicians are willing to perform them. Catholic hospitals seem to be forced to choose between secularizing to satisfy government and community or reaffirming their Catholic morality and risking legal snarls and social alienation. Believing that Catholic hospitals need not make such a drastic choice,
Professor Boyle seeks an alternative which is very Catholic and yet acceptable to the secular society.

Boyle says that though all conduct is at least tinged with evil, moral acts may be performed if the resulting good outweighs the evil. Preventing a pregnancy that would jeapordize a mother's life, for example, is a good which overbalances surgical risks and the denial of conception. On the other hand, government supported sterilizations to reduce the number of welfare recipients are primarily evil. Boyle supports his situational acceptance of sterilizations with an interpretation of Aquinas' natural law theology and the writings of many contemporary Catholic theologians.
Although Boyle finds fault with Rome's categorical prohibition of sterilizations, he does not belittle Church teachings. Boyle insists that the individual or the particular institution should seek prophetic guidance from the Church before making ethical decisions.

Responsibility is the focus of Boyle's answer for Catholic hospitals. The individual hospital needs a shared purpose with specific policies designed to serve a particular community. For instance, a Catholic hospital which is isolated from other hospitals may decide to perform sterilizations under certain circumstances, while another Catholic facility, located near other hospitals, may decide against sterilizations altogether. Boyle maintains that in this way Catholic hospitals can retain their Catholic identity while effectively ministering to the needs of their communities.
A more suitable title for Boyle's book would be Sterilization and the Catholic Hospital Crisis. According to Boyle, the crisis is the Catholic hospital's loss of identity and purpose; sterilization merely exposes the institution's predicament. This obfuscation hardly devalues Boyle's book, however; Boyle offers a thoughtful statement which the Catholic hospital should not ignore.

Reviewed by John P. Ferri student, The Divinity School. The University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.

THE TAO OF PHYSICS by Fritjof Capra, Shambhala Publications, Boulder, Colorado, 1975. 330 pages, paperback.

With the increasing realization that science, and especially mechanistic classical physics, cannot answer all questions of importance, there has been an increasing interest in the relations between the scientific approach and religious world views. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that this always means an interest in the Judeo-Christian tradition. In this book Capra, a high energy physicist, argues forcefully that the picture of the world which modern physics gives has many features in common with the ideas of eastern religions. The western tradition in general, and Christianity in particular, are given little attention.

The whole range of modern physics, including quantum mechanics, field theory, general relativity, cosmology and current models in particle theory, is covered in a nonmathematical fashion, though with a wealth of illustrations. Much of the book could be recommended simply as an up-to-date popular treatment of these topics. The discussions of the fundamentals of Hinduism, Buddhism and Taoism are also quite worthwhile.

In addition, Capra certainly makes many good points about the similarities between modern physics and eastern religions. In particular, the willingness of, for example, Zen Buddhism to include apparently contradictory aspects of reality has to remind a physicist of the wave-particle duality and the idea of complementarity found in quantum theory, and the dance of Shiva is at least an excellent symbol of the continual creation and annihilation of particles which is always taking place at the most fundamental level of physics.

But there are basic problems with Capra's thesis. No convincing reason is given for the fact that modern physics, like classical physics, did not, after all, develop in the East. It simply will not do, for example, to make a virtue of the fact that the Indians and Chinese were not ensnared like the Greeks by the supposed perfection of circular orbits, without also pointing out that they never came close to Kepler's laws.

One would assume from Capra's book that Christianity has nothing to contribute to the world view of modern physics. In part, this is because Christian mysticism is ignored. A more serious error is the assumption that the inspiration of Newtonian physics represents the best that the Christian tradition could do. But one can argue quite convincingly that the kind of common-sense unitarian theology which is associated with Newton's work actually was a consequence of an abandonment of much of the subtlety and complexity of New Testament and patristic thought.

The Tao of Physics is good as far as it goes, but it hardly presents the whole story. One feature which Christian writers on science and religion should attempt to imitate is the positive approach to the subject. Capra feels no need to defend eastern religions, and so can devote his efforts to an attempt to show how they can contribute something definite in the confrontation with science.

Reviewed by George L. Murphy, Department of Physics, Luther College, Decorah, Iowa 52901.

There is a growing intellectual movement which seeks to unite modern science with Eastern mysticism. With the assertion that Western philosophy has been dominated by Newtonian determinism, it finds the thought forms of Buddhism and Hinduism more congruent with quantum mechanics and relativity. This movement is epitomized by the participation of Nobel Prize-winning scientists in symposia organized by proponents of various forms of Eastern religion, e.g. Ilya Prigogine, 1977 Nobel laureate in Chemistry, participated in a conference organized by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi of Transcendental Meditation, and Eugene Wigner, 1963 Nobel laureate in Physics, participated in a conference on "Science and the Spirit" put on by the Sufi Order of the West.

The Tao of Physics is an important part of this movement. It has been widely read by physicists (it was reviewed in Physics Today, the monthly publication of the American Physical Society). I have also come across many people outside of science who have read it, almost everyone that I know who has any interest in Eastern religion.
In this book Dr. Capra describes the parallels he sees between modern physics and Eastern mysticism. In the beginning of the book he outlines his method, Both physics and mysticism rest on experience. The physicist uses mathematical models of his experience (i.e., his experiments) and the mystic verbal models. The mathematical models of the physicist can then be roughly translated into verbal descriptions, and it is these verbalizations that are compared to the verbalizations of the mystic.

In the first part of the book Capra gives a brief description of modern physics, with emphasis on quantum mechanics. He particularly comments on the field nature of much of physics, the wave-particle duality, and the ephemeral nature of many of the particles encountered in high energy physics. He concludes that modern physics describes the world as a dynamic whole which includes the observer in an essential way.

In the second part of the book the author gives a summary of some of the main currents in Eastern thought, including Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism and Zen. In the third part, which is the meat of the book, he draws detailed comparisons between some aspects of modern physics and some aspects of Eastern thought.

His method is best illustrated by several examples. In modern quantum field theory, the "vacuum" or state of lowest energy is not empty, but consists of particles constantly appearing and disappearing (this actually has observable consequences!) Capra compares this to the Dance of Shiva in Hindu mythology, who is continually creating and destroying the world. In the "bootstrap" theory of elementary particles created by physicist Geoffrey Chew no sub-atomic particles are more fundamental than others, but each can be regarded as being composed of the others. Capra compares this to the picture of reality given in the Buddhist scripture, the A vatamsaka Sutra, by the metaphor of Indra's net. A vast network of pearls hangs over the palace of the god Indra, arranged so that if you look at one pearl you see all of the others reflected in it.

It is easy to find fault with this book. Capra concentrates on those aspects of physics which are congenial to the Eastern viewpoint and ignores or underplays other aspects, perhaps not so congenial. For example, the theory of relativity is used as an example of the way in which our concepts of space and time have to be drastically altered. On the other hand, since relativity (both the special and general theories) also deals with those things which are unchanged when viewed by different observers, one could draw conclusions about the absolute nature of reality, which would not be congenial to Capra's arguments. Capra also leans heavily on the bootstrap model of elementary particles. Recent advances in particle physics, however, show that there may well be fundamental constituents of the elementary particles, the quarks. This again does not fit in well with Capra's viewpoint.

On a more fundamental level, what is Capra trying to show? Is it that the mystic and the physicist see the same thing? Is the spiritual world of the mystic the same as the physical world of the physicist? In his epilogue Capra does not make this claim, but argues rather that both viewpoints are necessary for a balanced world-view (a point which he has been making lately in public talks in connection with the "right brain-left brain" hypothesis). But this distinction is not always maintained clearly throughout the book.

After all these arguments I have to admit that Capra makes a compelling case for some connection between Eastern mysticism and modern physics. As a Christian, this leaves me with many questions. What Capra's world view lacks, as do the scientific and Eastern disciplines he compares, is a convincing basis for morality. What ethics he does conclude with (since everything is one, we should treat each other and the world well) is unconvincing. Our biblical tradition stresses the moral nature of the spiritual realm ("If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine"). Is there spiritual knowledge which is non-moral in character (as there certainly is physical knowledge)? And what is its relationship to the knowledge of God in Christ Jesus? It seems to me that this is a profound problem in comparative religion (and therefore in evangelism) that we will face more and more in the days ahead.

Reviewed by Fred Kuttner, Physics Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, California, 95064.

SIGNS OF THE TIMES by Linus J. Dowell, Gennao Anothen Publications, College Station, Texas 77844, 1977. viii - 88 pp. Paperback.

If you are looking for a compendium of the important biblical signs pointing to, or given by, Jesus, the last half of this book is for you. If, by some chance, you wish to read about how Christ was foretold by the constellations and stars, the first half of Signs of the Times is for you. Otherwise, it isn't.

It is difficult to argue with the second part, as it is mostly Scripture, except for a few quibbles about Dowell's signs. I am not certain that Jacob's ladder, or the Showbread, or the cereal offering, were really typical of Christ. I wonder why Dowel! didn't include Jepthah's daughter.

The first part, certainly, is more controversial. Begging the question of whether or not the stars, or the constellations, are signs of Christ, another question is whether this is cause or effect. That is, did God place the constellations, and cause the stars to be named, to foretell Christ, or did early man have enough foreknowledge to cause him to interpret and name according to what God had revealed? To be specific-is Virgo a God-made picture of a virgin, or a man-named group of stars that could just as well have been named something else? Dowell (p. 83) puts forth the former view. Yet (p. 14), 1 found the curious statement that "One of the reasons it is believed that the constellations were designed is the fact that the arrangement of the stars do not form the figures they represent . 

Does this mean that God is an imperfect designer, or that man was the designer? I am not certain.  Dowell's heart seems to be in the right place. He wants to magnify Christ. However, the first half of the book has some serious flaws, as well as some minor typos. The serious ones include a very incomplete bibliography noted several important cited sources that were not in it. Another flaw is interpreting the evidence to suit his purposes. He reminds me of von Däniken. Dowell is not even above finagling with Scripture, if it suits his purpose. I hope this latter is innocent. For example, Luke 3 gives the genealogy of Joseph, but Dowell says it is of Mary. (p. 42) The worst example of one-sided presentation is the equating of the living creatures of Ezekiel 1:10 with the constellations the sun is located in during the equinoxes and the solstices. (p. 15)

To accomplish this feat, Dowell must:

a. Change Scorpio into an Eagle, citing an authority not listed in the bibliography for evidence that Abraham knew it as such. (This in spite of the fact that he just finished using Scorpio as a scorpion for a lesson.)
b. Use Leo, Taurus and Aquarius, "modern" Zodical signs, in spite of stating on the previous page that the modern signs are not as meaningful, citing yet another unnamed authority.
c. Ignore the discrepancy between Ecekicl's creatures, where the lion and calf are opposite, and the sky, where the sun is supposed to be in Taurus in the spring and Leo in the summer,
d. Not use the Xiv, which uses "calf," but a modern version, which uses ''bull,'' in spite of his preference for the XJV.

A third flaw is that Dowell makes too little reference to the negative aspects of stargazing. (See October, 1970 Eternity for an expose of astrology, including the falsehood of its astronomical foundations.)

It is true that God placed the stars in the heavens for signs and for seasons (Gen. 1:14). It is true that at least some of the constellations may be signs of Christ. (Hercules about to strike the head of the Dragon, for example.) However, I am not certain that such a doctrine is enhanced by this type of defense.

Reviewed by Martin LaBar, Central Wesleyan College, Central, South Carolina 29630.


MODIFYING MAN: IMPLICATIONS AND ETHICS Edited by Craig W. Ellison. Washington, D.C., University Press of America, 1977. ix 294 pp.

Modifying Man is a report of the International Conference on Human Engineering and the Future of Man, held at Wheaton College, July 21-24, 1974. The American Scientific Affiliation, and several other evangelical organizations, were sponsors. Contributors, however, included not only evangelicals but others. There were six position papers, each followed by two or three responses, of which the latter were all by evangelicals, with an opening and a closing paper. Since I cannot comment on all 22 papers, I  shall list them: Overview by Craig W. Ellison; "Control Technology, Values and the Future" by Daniel Callahan, with responses by David F. Allen and Richard L. Spencer; "Biblical Perspectives on Human Engineering" by Donald M. MacKay with responses by Robert L. Herrman and James H. Olthuis; "Genetic Intervention and Values: Are all Men Created Equal?" by Robert L. Sinsheimer, with responses by V. Elving Anderson and Bernard Ramm; "Brain Control: Scientific, Ethical and Political Considerations" by Elliot S. Valenstein, with responses by William P. Wilson and Paul D. Feinberg; "Behavior Control, Values and Future" by Perry London, with responses by Rodger K. Bufford, Allen Verhey and Paul Clement; "Public Policy and Human Engineering" by Mark 0. Hatfield, with responses by John Scanzoni, John A. Olthuis and Carl F.H. Henry; and Summary by Donald M. MacKay. There is also a summary report, with recommendations for action and principles on which to base them.

Callahan's summary seems to me to state our present status rather accurately:

I have stressed questions, only hinting here and there at possible answers. Certainly our society as a whole has no answers to those questions . . . I think there are no ready and obvious answers in sight . .. the western philosophical and religious tradition . . . provides ... many basic insights. (p. 48)

The clearest example of a disagreement between an evangelical and a non-evangelical in the book is found in Spencer's response. He takes Callahan to task for emphasizing biological quality, rather than spiritual, and for equating physical immortality with omnipotence. What Spencer, a pastor with a Ph.D. in ethics from Princeton, says, would probably meet with nearly unanimous approval by readers of this Journal. However, substituting spiritual values for biological does not necessarily give us answers that are any more satisfactory.

As might be expected, MacKay is especially worth reading. He tries to establish a biblical basis for considering how, (and if) to apply technology. The theme of his article is that "new knowledge creates new sins, both of commission and of omission." (p. 88) He would thus steer carefully between the Scylla of manipulation for the wrong reason, or even in the wrong manner, and the Charybdis of thinking with pagans that nature is, by definition, better off without technology. MacKay points out that C.S. Lewis had an anti-technological bias, with its roots in Stoicism, and that "significantly. . .he did not adduce biblical support for this attitude." (p. 75)

His answer to the question: have we any business changing the way things are? is not only yes, but that God commands it of us. However, we should always be careful, not only because we are fallen and sinful, but because we are fallen and finite.

MacKay not only has a strong biblical sense, but a sense of history. This is often sorely lacking, as we seem to be worried about the new, but take for granted that the old is all right. Thus, he points out that the Dust Bowl may have resulted from human sinfulness (greed), but it could just as well have been produced by the human finiteness (ignorance of possible consequences) of people with the best of motives. In fact, he says problems with DDT are a case of the latter.

Not only does he have historical sense, but also common sense! He points out that we do not need to examine electrical implantation techniques, or mind-changing drugs, to find an area where manipulating not just nature, but man himself, has ethical implication. He speaks of education, and, yes, even parenthood. His view is that we have clear responsibility, in the fear of God, to manipulate, (thus avoiding a sin of omission) but that we must try to do it for the right reasons, and in the right manner, so as to avoid sins of commission. He then claims that we have the same responsibility even in brain control, and, maybe, in genetic engineering.

As Sinsheimer says, we have come to a point at which, if we wish, we soon will need no longer accept our genetic endowment as given and can expect increasingly to have the means to intervene in the human gene pool in a conscious manner, if we choose to do so, (p. 113) He then asks two important questions:

Is it ethical to do genetic experiments on humans? Is controlling our genetic destiny any different than controlling our environmental destiny? (which, of course, we have increasingly done for centuries.)

In response to the first question, he has no pat answers, but, perhaps surprisingly, relates it to the second. We are already doing genetic experiments, and genetic experiments which result, occasionally, in the production of monsters, human, but abnormal, some miscarried, some deformed for life. These results are, of course, the products of those genetic experiments called human reproduction!

I, like Sinsheimer, have no sure answers. Sinsheimer does suggest some guidelines, with which Ramm agrees:

1. Go slowly in genetic experimentation. Ramm points out the rapidity with which we have come from Becquerel, Roentgen and Einstein to the specter of fusion warfare.
2. Make individuality of value.
3. Seek advances in general welfare, rather than aiming for specific talents or abilities.

I am certainly not an expert in brain control, so it came as a surprise that Valenstein took over half of his paper to delineate our ignorance in the area. He is not sure we could ever control man's brain with electrical stimuli, even if we were fully convinced it was the right thing to do. As a result, a main thrust of his paper is to criticize some actual and proposed experiments in the area for an insufficient basis in knowledge. Such experimentation is certainly open to ethical challenge.

Then Valenstein, not content with pooh-poohing the potential for exact control of human behavior by electrical stimulation, attacks ethicists! He points out two instances where, for supposedly moral reasons, questions about the morality of experiments have been raised, that have had a negative effect on potentially valuable experimentation. One of these was the claim (false, says Valenstein) that a Mississippi doctor was preferentially carrying out psychosurgery on blacks. Another is the claim (again false) that electroconvulsive shock treatment leads to anatomically detectable brain damage. Says Valenstein:

There is no justification for a condition that forces only the researcher to defend himself while leaving the self-appointed defenders of patients' rights, who often have an equally great impact on patient care, completely uncrtttciced. (p. 163)

I quote one passage from Feinberg's response:

Does society have the right to develop biochemical and surgical techniques that will prevent the possibility of unacceptable behavior? No, they do not, To do so would be to usurp the place of God. (p. 185) I am not certain that I agree, but the statement merits thought.

London points out that we worry too much about new problems, and not enough about old ones. He says we should think about some of the moral implications of conditioning, which has a much greater present effect in controlling human behavior than drugs, surgery or electrical impulses. His paper also is notable for his discussion of deviance, including homosexuality, in the light of how primitive versus advanced societies view deviance.
Hatfield and Scanzoni in reply, deal specifically with the role of the evangelical community in response to human control issues. Scanzoni says that if an evangelical somehow gets an advanced degree . . . we try to
point him/her to a Christian college where, unfortunately, the teaching and administrative load is so great that seldom can serious, frontier research ... be undertaken. (pp. 251-2)

On the other hand, he affirms that Christians have done their job so well over the years that our job is being done by others. We have been the salt of the earth, so much that we may actually have little to contribute that is really unique.

Like some of the respondents, I have selected my ground in this review. I believe that Modifying Man belongs on the shelf of every academic library in the English speaking world, and that it should be ready by members of this Affiliation. It is a book that will not age rapidly, since the issues considered, like the poor, are likely to be with us, in one form or another, always.

Reviewed by Martin LaBor, Central Wesleyan College, Central, South Carolina 29630.

PRESERVING THE PERSON: A LOOK AT THE HUMAN SCIENCES by C. Stephen Evans, Inter Varsity Press, Downers Grove, IL 60515. Paperback, 175 pages, (1977) $4.95

This book is a philosophical work with a practical goal. The central problem addressed is the apparent conflict between the conception of man as personal and hence responsible, and the depersonalized philosophy which Evans sees as implicit in much theorizing and research in the "human sciences." Evans' philosophical task consists of presenting six different approaches ("ideal types") to the ptoblem of reconciliation between personalism and the human sciences. However, Evans feels that the analysis is more than simply theoretical since, "recognizable aspects of these responses can be identified among many thoughtful people, including scientists themselves." (p. 91). He holds that, when developed in detailed and coherent ways, each of these positions can represent a legitimate Christian view, though none of them would be uniquely Christian.

The six ideal types are organized into three sets of two types each. First, there are Reinterpreters who accept both "scientism" ("the truth which science gives us is both ultimate and complete," p. 88) and the "unity of science thesis" (there is properly only one scientific method, and it "consists of giving deterministic causal explanations which
are empirically testable.", p. 90). Within this framework, Compatibilists believe that the image of the personal is compatible with mechanism, while Capitulators hold that that image can be modified (without losing anything essential) to produce the desired compatibility. Limiters of Science reject at least part of "scientism"; Territorialists feel that science does not tell us the whole truth about reality (science applies only to certain "territories" of reality), and Perspectivalists are convinced that scientific truth is not ultimate (science is limited by its perspective; it cannot discover everything that is true, even if it might possibly have something to say about everything). Finally, Humanizers of Science reject the "unity of science thesis," arguing that the scientific method described above is not appropriate for the human sciences (the Particularists) or that the method is not necessarily appropriate even for the natural sciences (the Generalists).

Based on a sketch of some of the difficulties of each position, Evans shares his own opinion as to the best approach to reconciling the personal and the scientific views of man, a combination of the Perspectivalist Limiter of Science and the Particularist Humanizer of Science positions. However, his writing is not explicitly guided by a dogmatic concern to convince us of his own opinion. Rather, he has a practical goal:

What I have hoped to do is to help those engaged in carrying out this integration gain a greater self-consciousness about their approach, a greater understanding of the issues and their significance, and a clearer perception of what alternatives there may be. (p. 157).

In my opinion, Evans has done something to accomplish this goal, but unfortunately he has left undone much that is relevant and even near-crucial to the full-bodied attainment of this goal.

In setting himself a philosophical task of identifying "ideal types," Evans has skimped on important details connecting his discussion with the human sciences and human scientists as they are today. In particular, concerning individuals, only one contemporary social scientist is discussed in any detail (Donald MacKay). The following will show the extent and nature of this problem as it relates to each of his ideal types.

Evans discusses no examples of Christian Capitulators in the social sciences, except to point out that such an individual would of necessity place a strong emphasis on the "creative sovereignty of God." Under Compatibilists, Calvinism, and particularly the Westminster Confession, is specifically referred to, but again, no social scientists are discussed. Concerning the Territorialists, only the classical example of Descartes' mind-body dualism is outlined, and again, no social scientists are discussed. Finally, two social science representatives appear, both evangelicals: Donald MacKay and Malcolm Jeeves are both presented as Perspectivalists. Special focus is given to MacKay's complementarity viewpoint and to his arguments that even if the activity of man's brain were completely mechanistic and determined, still the only sensible (logically correct) thing a man could say about himself as he tries to make the decision is "I have a decision to make" (He would be logically incorrect to believe the prediction of a superscientist who knew exactly his brain state.) As Evans points out, it is not entirely clear what one ought to make of this logical demonstration. But regardless, MacKay is a good example of an evangelical who as a brain researcher holds
to a Perspectivalist position. Under the Particularist approach to humanizing science, the only social scientists mentioned are the sociologist Max Weber, Abraham Maslow and the "third force" in psychology, and Rollo May and existential psychology. The latter two are hardly more than mentioned. Much more time is spent discussing philosophers viewed as Particularists: Collingwood, Winch, Husserl, and Schutz. Finally, the Generalists are represented only by Polanyi, Toulmin, and Kuhn, of whom only the first was a social scientist. For a person who feels that "aspects of these (six) responses can be identified among many thoughtful . . . scientists," Evans has given the reader very little to go on.

The general criticism stated above can be seen in other ways that relate directly to the substance of the various human sciences. First, the extent to which Evans uses dated theoretical views in his presentation of the "threat of mechanism" is startling. In addition to brain research and relevant philosophical positions, separate chapters are given to the following threats to personalism: Freud, behaviorism (a la Watson and Skinner), and sociology (a la Durkheim). Has nothing happened in psychology since Freud, Watson and Skinner? Has nothing happened in sociology since Durkheim and Weber? Surely the more recent developments in these areas are relevant to the topic of this book. To what extent are the philosophical presuppositions which Evans outlines characteristic of researchers and theorists active today? Evans provides us with no relevant data. Given this, the thoughtful reader (though perhaps not the casual one) is left wondering how strong and pervasive the attack on personalism really is. Second, even though Evans gives clear warnings (pp. 35, 45, 59, 67) that his review of the "threat of mechanism" is "consciously one-sided," "sketchy," and gives only some "general tendencies represented by these particular individuals," nevertheless I am bothered by the limited and stereotyped way that he presents the theoretical views of important social scientists. For example, he admits that there is no single Freudian view, yet he goes on to discuss "Freud's view of the person" as if it was/is unitary (pp. 36ff). Similarly, Skinner's views (and his responses to criticisms of behaviorism such as are summarized in About Behaviorism) are given short shrift. In other words, instead of a careful and dispassionate analysis of these areas and researchers, Evans' presentation looks somewhat polemical.

A more balanced account should focus on what scientists do and why, rather than simply on philosophical presuppositions that might underlie such action. Many working scientists are basically problem solvers rather than philosophers, and for a good reason. Theories are designed and tested against the world which God has made. If a particular mechanistic approach is discovered to be adequate, then it will be applied, for good or for ill. An example might be the potential discovery of chemical brain mechanisms responsible for the occurrence of schizophrenia. This kind of discovery should not frighten God's people, as it simply represents an instance of developing and refining the dominance over God's world that He gave to man in Genesis 1:28. We tend to be frightened, oftentimes, because we do not understand adequately what science cannot do. For example, Skinner's extrapolations in Walden Two and some other places are no more than that-extrapolations. Behavioristic science has not demonstrated that such extreme control of human behavior is possible through contingency management, though behavioristic philosophy might believe that it is. In an important sense, the science should come before the philosophy. If the science shows that such extreme control is possible, then it must be dealt with regardless of the philosophy. On the other hand, if the facts of the world are otherwise than the philosophy suggests, then the corresponding science will not be successful and no problem will remain.

Many evangelicals would perhaps do well to consider more seriously the exciting and positive possibilities inherent in seemingly mechanistic approaches. It is clear that a strict determinism presents epistemological and moral difficulties (see Ch. 6) and such difficulties should be examined closely. However, it should be remembered that, from a Christian perspective, such difficulties need not be worked through anew: as Evans points out, a more thoroughgoing Calvinism would become more attractive. Whether such changes would be good or bad depends ultimately not on what we prefer but on whether the more mechanistic approach is true. In the human sciences, this mandates in-depth involvement with the present and currently being-discovered facts, something evangelicals have not been noted for.

In the human sciences, it would be better for Christians to spend more time becoming familiar with the present facts and working out the details of a Christian approach to those facts rather than expending their energy battling philosophies that might turn out to be inadequate when tested against the reality of the world God has made. This implies that we must know in depth the present facts. Evans' book does not help us much in accomplishing this goal in the human sciences. I myself benefited from reading this book; it certainly serves as a valuable tool for organizing philosophies in the human sciences. However, much toward the goal of organization was accomplished in his earlier Christian Scholars Review paper (CSR, 1976, VI, 97113). It is unfortunate that, when he expanded it to book length Evans chose a polemic (albeit a mild one) for personalism rather than a dispassionate and in-depth analysis of the relationship between personalism and the human sciences.

Reviewed by Steven P. McNeeI, Bethel College, St. Paul, Minnesota.

Speaking as a Christian who is also an academic psychologist, I will say immediately that this is a book whose appearance I welcome heartily. As implied by the book's title, Evans (a Yale Ph.D. in philosophy now teaching at Wheaton College) takes on the question as to whether the essentially mechanistic image of human beings that emerges from the "human sciences" (particularly brain physiology, psychology, and sociology) is at all reconcilable with the traditional-and biblical-vision of the person as a free soul who at least partially transcends environmental influences and is therefore morally accountable for actions performed. Concern with this question is hardly unique; indeed, it is an enduring old chestnut which is constantly being re-warmed in the pages of the Journal ASA -not to mention in the entire history of philosophy. But Evans, while not a natural or social scientist himself has done as a unique service in illuminating the history, complexity, and Christian implications of this question in a way that
probably none of the rest of us (badly, if at all, trained in philosophy and rank amateurs as biblical theologians) could as adequately do. Some of the unique features of this volume that commend its reading to the Christian/scientific community are the following.

Evans constructs and elucidates a very useful taxonomy of characteristic "Christian" approaches to resolving the mechanistic with the personalistic view of humanity. In doing so, he warns against the over-confident claim on the part of anyone to have developed the Christian resolution of these two views. Each of the six approaches he describes could be, according to the author, the basis for a coherent Christian position, and while he himself acknowledges his preference for one (or rather, a combination) of these, he in no way absolutizes this preference as being the correct one for all Christians.

The author also gives us an overview of the philosophical and historical roots of the personalistic/mechanistic dilemma, tracing the emergence of scientism (i.e., the view that science can pronounce truthfully and exhaustively on all aspects of reality) from J.S. Mitt and Auguste Comte through to 20th-century logical positivism and beyond to Kuhn and his contemporaries, and also traces the mindbody problem from Descartes through to modern brain science and cybernetics. While this overview is undoubtedly simple from the standpoint of the professional philosopher, it is of tremendous value in orienting social and natural scientists (and I count myself among these) whose academic training has been ahistoric-if not downright anti-historic -with regard to these issues.

Evans is neither naively scientistic nor defensively personalistic in his approach to the preservation of the person. He freely acknowledges the strengths and usefulness of the mechanistic model, reminding readers that
the fact that the acceptance of a scientific view of man would be painful is no argument against it ... To the extent that these scientists offer us truth about the human condition, nothing will be
gained by denying or ignoring that truth. to. 69)

But he also shows how the espousal of a purely mechanistic view of humanity repeatedly leads to inescapable selfcontradictions or antinomies. How can scientists, faced with ethical decisions regarding the use of their powers consistently view themselves as amoral machines? How can sociologists (or brain scientists, or Freudians, or Skinnerians) use their knowledge to prescribe improvements for society at the same time they declare all "values" and "prescriptions" to be merely the relative products of mechanistic forces such as social conditioning, physiology, early family history, or environmental contingencies? How can the scientist accept a mechanistic account of his own scientific activity without, by the same token, conceding that this work cannot be scientific because, if merely mechanistic, then it is not rational in character? And how are we to explain the constant tendency on the part of selfstyled mechanists to regard only their past, regretted actions and beliefs as determined, while their present convictions (including the belief in determinism) are seen as freely and rationally arrived at? The conclusion, writes Evans, is that "Personalism seems to be in trouble, but we (i.e., Christian and non-Christian humanists alike) are in trouble if personalism is not viable." (p. 87)

According to Evans' taxonomy, Christians in the human sciences have tended to resolve the mechanistic and personalistic accounts of humanity in one of three ways,

1) that choice being determined by the response to two theses regarding scientism (la: "Science gives us the truth about all aspects of reality," and lb: "Science gives us the ultimate truth about all aspects of reality it deals with), and also by the response to two statements regarding the unity of science (2a: "There is one method which all genuine sciences employ," and 2b: "This is the method of the natural sciences, and consists of giving deterministic, causal explanations which are empirically testable.") Those whom Evans calls "Rein terpreters of the Persona/" accept all four statements; "Limiters of Science" accept both statements about the unity of science, but reject one or the other statement concerning scientism, while those Evans calls "Humanizers of Science" reject not only the theses about scientism, but one or both these concerning the unity of science.

Each of these three types subdivides into two others. Among "Reinterpreters," Evans finds both "Capitulators" and "Compatibilists." The former accept a thorough-going mechanistic model of humanity, and tend to justify it scripturally by leaning heavily on biblical passages stressing the sovereignty of God over all of reality, including human choices, to the relative neglect of other passages which imply and expect free choice on the part of those to whom God addresses Himself. "Compatibilists" (whom Evans also calls "soft determinists") try to have their cake and eat it, saying that human beings are both free and determined, in a way too mysterious to be grasped by merely human understanding. Evans maintains that this is neither an equivocal nor a lazy position provided it is the result of a sincere intellectual struggle. He concludes his discussion of these two types, however, by saying that no Christian can really be a "pure Reinterpreter" (and, indeed, few claim to be) inasmuch as a purely mechanistic account of reality can at most suggest how God operates, but never to what end, or why.

Among the "Limiters of Science" (with whom most north American Christians number themselves, according to Evans) there are "Territorialists" and "Perspectivalists." The former, rejecting thesis la, are essentially dualists, who acknowledge the right of science to investigate and declare mechanical the workings of man's physical side, but not the mental or spiritual aspects, which are declared to be impenetrable by the scientific method. "Perspectivalists," on the other hand, accept statement la, but reject lb, saying, in effect, "Though the scientist may have something to say about everything, he does not tell the whole story about some things indeed, perhaps not about any thing" (p. 105). This, by implication, stresses the need for other perspectives on reality than that of science. Evans outlines the positions of Malcolm Jeeves and Donald MacKay as being representatives of this position, and ends up endorsing their approach quite strongly, but also rightly points out that, for both types of "Limiters," there remains the problem of how to put the fragmented, multiperspectivalized Humpty Dumpty of humanity back together again. Talk of different "dimensions" or "categories" inevitably does violence to the unitary reality of persons which is evident both in Scripture and naive experience, and neither the Territorialist nor Perspectivalist approach has been able to do justice to this.

The most radical attempts to grapple with the mechanistic/personalistic dilemma come from Evans' third type of integrators, the "Humanizers of Science," who question not only the limits of science but also the scope and nature
of its method. Among these, the "Particularists" have no quarrel with the use of the hypotheticodeductive method in the study of sub-human reality, but maintain that the study of human activity requires that we understand persons not as objects, but from their own subjective stance as agents. It is not enough merely to record behavior; we must also penetrate the subjective meaning of that behavior, for "If we ignore the framework of meaning in terms of which the persons under study understand their behavior, we risk studying a fantasy world which does not exist" (p. 127). Such a methodology is not seen as a return to the introspectionism of pre-behaviorist psychology because "frameworks of meaning" are not totally private, but rather acquired in a social context shared with others and are hence capable of intersubjective verifiability. The writings of Wilhelm Dilthey, Max Weber, R.G. Collingwood, and Peter Winch are cited as reinforcing such a viewpointalthough the names of Christian thinkers are conspicious by their absence; it would seem that most are among the more conservative Perspectivalists. Even more radical than the Particularists are those Evans calls "Generalists": these do not even admit the validity of the positivist account of natural science methodology. Representatives such as Michael Polanyi, Thomas Kuhn, Stephen Toulmin, and Paul Feyerabend, point out that all observations of reality are contaminated by one's paradigm, and that "the choice of paradigm cannot be settled by an appeal to observation of facts, because choice of paradigm largely settles the kind of facts perceivable" (p. 136). On this view, the whole enterprise of traditional "objective" science is exposed as a highly subjective undertaking-so much so that some thinkers (Feyerabend is one) now claim that the scientific ideal of objective truth is totally impossible.

Evans finally expresses his own preference for a Perspectival position combined with that of a "moderate Humanizer" who admits the possibility of a place for mechanistic explanations of some aspects of human behavior. Such a combination of approaches, he argues, does most justice to four essential concepts-namely, the creatureliness of the person before God, the transcendence of the person over the mechanistic, the unity of the person, and, in addition, the integrity of science.

In sum, this is a tremendously helpful little book for all who are concerned to dialogue with fellow Christians and with others in the sciences in order to clarify differences and similarities of approach. It also provides an excellent orientation to many standard references in the history and philosophy of science for those who wish to dig deeper into these areas. It would make an excellent undergraduate text for a variety of courses in the social sciences, whether at a Christian or secular college. On all these grounds it can be recommended as a valuable addition to the library of the Christian scholar.

Reviewed by Mary Stewart Van Leeuwen, Department of Psychology, York University, Toronto, Canada.


STRANGE PHENOMENA, Vol. G-2, A Source Book of Unusual Natural Phenomena by William R.
Corliss, Compiler. Glen Arm, Md. 21057, The Sourcebook Project. 1974. $6.95

There are ten source books plus two handbooks in this project. A third Handbook in Astronomy will be published in March 1979. The compiler has also written 16 full-length books plus articles and booklets. The present book, G-2, is in the Geophysics Series. Other series are Astronomy, Geology, Archaeology, Biology and Psychology. Previous reviewers have said that they are "fascinating reading," and "dependable eye-witness accounts."
Corliss is one of those strange breed of men who is not only attracted by the anomalies found in the natural world but who is willing to spend the time to gather them and publish them for the edification of others. This is, it seems to me from my own experience, a very useful endeavor. In asking about how many hybrids there were in nature (as I was, at that time, engaged in assessing the various speciation forces and their importance), I was greeted with blank stares. No one knew. For a period of some 20 years, I then gathered these references and was astonished to learn that there were at least (since I could not cover all the literature) 27,000 hybrids. I therefore concluded that recombination was an important factor, something which can be stated only by someonw who knows.
In the looseleaf book under consideration, there is, on page G2-57-60 several articles on the manna of the Bible (lichens, tree exudates, etc.) which might be of interest since this information is hard to come by. Manna is in the Geophysics series because manna came "down from the sky."

Certainly every library should have this set of books and the members of the American Scientific Affiliation, in various disciplines as they are, might care for certain volumes relating to their speciality.

Reviewed by Irving Pt'. Knobloch, Department of Botany & Plant Pathology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan.


CLOSE ENCOUNTERS - A Better Explanation by Clifford Wilson and John Weldon, published by Master Books, a division of Creation Life Publishers, San Diego, California, 1978, 368 pages, $2.95 in paper.

Dr. Wilson and Mr. Weldon have joined efforts to produce a volume offering an alternate explanation for the numerous sightings of UFOs and contacts with earth people by their occupants. The book concerns itself only with close encounters of the third kind (CE III), a category that was popularized by the movie of the same name and involves occupants of the UFO. The authors are believers in the reality of the many sightings and contacts as documented in their earlier separately authored books. The first few chapters of this book review the literature and the theories concerning UFOs and contactees. The later chapters detail their better explanation.

They detail and elaborate an ignored or overlooked aspect of many messages transmitted by the UFO extra
terrestrials, namely, that their teachings are anti-Christian, pro-occult and Eastern mystic in world view and in specifics. Wilson and Weldon ascribe this orientation to demonic sources. Chapter 12 is a warning against involvement in innocent occult activities because they can so easily lead into bondage to the extraterrestrials. Three case histories of people who have toyed with UFOology and nearly become enslaved to it are given in Chapter 14. In Appendix C, the authors analyze three books dealing with the theory that all supernatural elements in the Bible are a result of flying saucers or their inhabitants, including Ezekiel's vision.

The book presents much detail about UFOs that was new to this reviewer, a nominal follower of these events, and information about their anti-Christian teachings and emphases was enlightening.

Reviewed by Robert Carlstrom, Columbia, Maryland 21045.

THE GENESIS RECORD by Henry M. Morris, Baker Book House, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1976, 716 pp.

This commentary on the book of Genesis is a monumental work from the fertile pen of a man who has a rare combination of characteristics which together have made him God's man for this task. Dr. Morris is a scientist, has deep spiritual insight, and a capacity to write in a way which not only holds the attention, but which has inspired thousands to go on and study further for themselves the themes on which he writes. In the case of the book of Genesis, such a work was really needed, as the usual work by theologians tends eithed to make blunders, or to be shallow in many of the areas where Genesis touches on science. Dr. Morris instead writes with a penetrating and thought-provoking insight that is fresh and interesting.

In the Introduction he sets out clearly his position. He believes the entire book of Genesis, including the first eleven chapters, to be inspired of God. He supports this with the fact there are at least 200 allusions to Genesis in the New Testament, over 100 of these to the first eleven chapters; that every one of the NT authors refers to Genesis 1-11, and that Christ Himself quotes or refers to this often challenged portion of Scripture at least six times. Since these references in the NT consider Genesis as historically true and authoritative, the inspiration of the NT stands or falls with Genesis.

He refutes the documentary hypothesis that Genesis and the rest of the Pentateuch were compiled from later documents and attributed to Moses so that they would be accepted as authoritative. He shows briefly that in the points in which the documentary theory was testable historically, it has been proven false by archeological discoveries, which instead confirm the historical statements of the Bible.

In the second chapter, which deals with the creation of the world, Dr. Morris points out that the Bible's statement that, "In the beginning God created", is the only explanation of the origin of matter, as all other philosophies start with matter (or energy) as preexistent and then deal with its evolution. He then begins a narrative commentary which deals with every verse of Genesis.

Not all will agree with all of his interpretations, but this is perhaps true of any commentary. Some of his controversial interpretations are: His idea that there was no death before Adam sinned; that most fossils are a result of the flood; that creation was recent and that it was accomplished in six literal 24-hour days.

While on the one hand Dr. Morris bends over backwards to avoid excessive typology, on the other he comes out with some strange speculations that are at the same time one of the strengths and one of the weaknesses of his work. They are a strength, because the reader becomes actively involved in agreeing or disagreeing with him and thinking through the implications, but at the same time a weakness particularly for those who want to read a commentary uncritically accepting all its interpretations. An example is his description of the creation of Eve. He states:

In any ease, God put Adam into a 'deep sleep' and, while Adam slept, performed a marvelous surgical operation. Since this sleep was not necessary to prevent pain (as yet, there was no knowledge of pain or suffering in the world), there must have been some profound spiritual picture in the action.

It is difficult for me to accept the statement that pain was not yet in existence. Since pain is given to protect us from continuing to hurt ourselves, I would expect the nerves to have been created completely functional from the beginning. In Genesis 3:16 at the Fall, God says that He will multiply Eve's pain in child bearing, inferring the possibility of pain before the Fall also.

In this case, Morris' reason is evidently to make it fit with his theory that there was no death, even among animal life before the fall. From my point of view, tempered by living 12 years in Italy, where the dominant theology is built on logical reasoning, and seeing how far from biblical truth we can be taken by doctrine built in this way, I feel that this sort of thing in the long run weakens rather than strengthens his work.

Moving from the account of creation to the area of God's relation to man in the rest of Genesis, I was not expecting too much, feeling that since Dr. Morris is a scientist, his interest and area of ability to make a real contribution would lie mostly in the chapters dealing with creation. I was therefore happily surprised to find not only good interpretation, but also a succession of heartgripping applications of God's word to my own life, which for me made the book an excellent devotional aid. In fact, while I almost never use anything other than original study of the Bible for my own quiet time, I found myself daily picking up Morris' book for this purpose. It has each passage written out, and then followed by comments given with real spiritual insight that warms the heart and helps the life.
This part however, is also interspersed with occasional speculations which stimulated me to alternately positive and negative reactions, but at least kept the hook lively.

I can almost guarantee that there will be a number of things you will disagree with in Morris' commentary, some of them radically perhaps, but I can hardly see how any reader of this journal can get along without it.
Reviewed by Thomas F. Heiszre, 2405 1st Street, Tillamook, Oregon 97141.

THE PROBLEM OF EVOLUTION: A Study of the Philosophical Repercussions of Evolutionary
Science by John N Deely and Raymond J. Nogar, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1973, 470 pp., $13.50.

This work basically is naturalistic with some Roman Catholic inclination especially in contributions by the late junior author, who had been a priest and mentor of the senior author. Two premises are held: (1) that the living world developed by evolution and (2) that the concept of natural selection and disclosures of modern genetics have rendered untenable contrary explanations of evolution. Man, considered to be part of the phylogenetic continuity and "evolution become conscious of itself", is engaged, in various noetic and ontological extertions such as represented by this book.

The volume is divided into: I. Historical Perspectives (cosmological, biological, psycho-social), 82 pages; II. Contemporary Discussions, 320 pages; and III. Bibliography, 32 pages; these being followed by a 7-page "Retrospect" and a 2S-page Index. There are many footnotes. The extensive second section has, in addition to contributions by Deely and Nogar, reprints from T. Dobzhansky, L. A. White, J. Steward, D. Bidney, NI. J. Adler, F. J. Ayala, J. Dewey, B. M. Ashley, C. H. Waddington, A. M. Dubarle, F. T. de Chardin, J. Huxley, and L. Eiseley. In this miscellany papers range from evolutionary humanism with its rejection of the supernatural (Huxley) to a theo- and Christocentric repudiation of humanism (Nogar). The bibliography is divided into six sections; and among the host of evolutionary publications here I spotted two (D. Murray and P. A. Zimmerman) which tend to be anti-evolutionary, but these were not discussed in the text.

"The problem of evolution" to the authors is not whether to reject macroevolution on a scientific or philosophic basis (although some of the problems are mentioned), but how to incorporate into our family of thoughts the evolutionary baby now on our doorstep (or already crawling inside the door). For these authors evolution is epigenetic, random and opportunistic; and the ascent of evolutionary science is the greatest dialectical epistemological advance of modern times. They say:

The decisive difference between the classical and contemporary world-view turns out to he neither a preference for typically distinct explanatory modes nor a mere transformation in the physical image of the universe, but rather a datum, an element of - experience for which no logical construction can be substituted and upon which all the logical construtcions of the science of nature finally rest, the realization, specifically, that nothing in the universe is exempt from radical transformation. (pp. 52-53)

There is nothing in the known evidence to warrant the assumption that evolution is the expression or product of a single, harmonious plan or law, rather than of a multitude of lines of causality its a universe full of chance and accident. This may seem to be an obvious point, but obvious or not, its importance cannot be uverstressed. (p. 10)
Near the end of the hook effort is made to brighten the bleakness of an existential pessimism by announcing man's current responsibility.

Whatever shape our world may take in the next generation or in the next ten generations, for post-Darwinian man there will be no escape from responsibility. With man evolution has passed from a drift to a conscious destiny. We now know that it is we who are responsible for shaping the future. We have passed from drift to choice; and even if our choice shall be to continue drifting, it remains our choice. (p. 401)

I for one do not find this especially challenging; for we would he somewhat like a ship at sea with neither reason for being there nor port of origin or destiny; and if we so choose, we can move the rudder. But, in addition to questioning the authors' position regarding man (and animal) origins, I feel that the authors are not able satisfactorily to demonstrate that man could escape his deterministic framework to gain freedom necessary to affect the future causal sequence of events. Therefore, while he may in fact be able to move the rudder, he would have no reason to believe that he actually could be able to steer the ship.

While reading the book, I wondered if the senior author, Deely, actually shares the same vital faith in Christ and Cod's biblical revelation that the junior author evidences; or is our God merely gratuitous in his evolutionism? Is Deely the first generation fruit of a theologian's evolutionistic indoctrination? I should prefer to believe that Deely writes as he does hoping that with candid scholarship he may attract naturalistics who are outside the fold. But I wonder! As Nogar says on p. 397: "Creation can he hopeful, expectant of promise, only so long as the Creator remains in sight."

Reviewed by Wayne Frair, The King's College, Briarclif f Manor, New York 10510.

THE CREATION EVOLUTION CONTROVERSY by Randy J. Wysong, D.V.M., Inquiry Press, P.O. Box 1766 East Lansing, Michigan, 48823, 1976, 455 pages. Pb. $7.95, HB $15.00.

The author, Randy Wysong, has his Doctor's Degree in Veterinary Medicine from Michigan State University. He has been in private practice for a number of years and teaches a college course on origins. This book is the result of the information he has used in his course.

Ever since the modern theory of evolution by natural selection was proposed by Herbert Spencer and Charles Darwin, debate has raged as to which theory, creationism or evolution, more fully explains the facts. The debate, which tends to be characterized by a high degree of emotionalism on both sides, peaked in the '20's with the Scopes trial, and was relatively dormant in the '30's and '40's. The formation of several Creationist movements in the early '60's and re-examination of some of the difficulties with the evolutionary position, has produced a strong resurgence of this debate. Evidence of this debate can be seen in the flourishing of a large number of creationistic organizations, most of them having their inception only a few years ago.

Today there are literally hundreds of books published espousing the various "creationist" positions, but unfortunately there is a tendency for a dichotomy of views to crystallize as probably never before. Many of the more vocal creationists advertise their position as being the most scientifically correct concept, and the evolutionary position as a "plot," foolish and suicidal. Many evolutionists, on the other hand, tend to characterize the creationist as uninformed, unaware, ignorant and uneducated, feeling the evolutionary position is the only "scientifically" correct position. Tragically, often people on both sides never study in depth the "other" side. Many do not have an intellectual understanding of "the other side", realizing one can hold to the "other side", and at the same time be intelligent and informed. Wysong's, The Creation-Evolution Controversy, is an honest attempt to put forth both sides in a logical, understanding manner so the reader can understand both positions, regardless of the position he opts for. In reality, Wysong points out, most of us are somewhere between "atheistic evolution" and "instant divine fiat creation," and few are at the extremes. While the position Wysong takes is clearly for creationism, the evolutionary position is, in most cases, adequately and fairly presented.

Importantly, the book begins with a discussion of methodology, i.e., the scientific method and other "methods of knowing." This background material is necessary for us to understand the controversy adequately. Unfortunately, many of those with definite opinions are not familiar with the nuances of the scientific method and the methods used to evaluate the sources of data. Importantly, in this area emotions strongly influence many of our views, and the first step to eliminate emotional distortions (and the irrationalities which result) is a clear differentiation of verifiable data from supositions based upon emotions, desires, and even defense mechanisms. Wysong attempts to do this.
A difference between Wysong's discussion and many others is his commendable use of reasoning and semiformal logic. Complex suppositions are broken down into the basic problem, the data are presented on each side, and then conclusions are postulated. The effort to incorporate a large amount of "pure reasoning" is somewhat unusual in discussions of this kind. While reasoning of some type, of course, is included in all discussions, the reasoning is more of a flow of ideas designed to reach a predetermined conclusion, and not a dialogue flow where the problem is broken down into it's basic parts, data are referred to and alternatives are discussed, and then evidence is summarized. Although evolutionary theories are most always based on scholarly erudition, there is typically a lack of serious considerations of various alternative viewpoints.

The discussion of biochemistry illustrates this technique. Briefly, there are two main amino acid enantiomers (amino acids which are alike atomically but are different mechanically), the L and D forms. Although amino acids can exist in both forms, all proteins derived from living organisms, with insignificant ezpectations, are composed only of the
- forms. Yet when amino acids are synthesized in the laboratory for commercial use, or when they are formed under conditions which theoretically duplicate the conditions found in the early earth, there is always a 50-50% mixture of D and L forms. Creationists would use this to support the contention that amino acids were not formed randomly. Evolutionists would argue that the L and D forms exist randomly, but natural selection has selected the D forms. But since both the D and L forms function in the life process in identical ways, i.e., there is no evidence that the organism can differentiate L or D forms, and if there is no difference between the two compounds chemically, the selection advantage of "L" forms is unclear. On the other hand, the design argument does not provide an answer as to why "L" forms were preferred to "D" forms. Why should purposeful design prefer "L" forms if there is no reason to select this over the other design? If there is no advantage to "L" forms the choice of one of two equally attractive alternatives would be indicated. Chance, though, would select 50-50, not 100-0 as the design argument would predict.

The format of the hook is first to define terms and then present the needed background material, A specific area, such as thermodynamics, is selected and discussed; then the evidence for evolution is presented, and lastly the evidence for creation. A complete discussion of the topics reviewed could take volumes considering the fact that over 18,000 books have been published in this area. The author is therefore forced to skim only the highlights of the chemical and mechanical principles and laws relative to the origin of plant and animal life.

A large number of photographs, drawings, charts, and diagrams clarify the discussion. This, plus the fact that the author has taken pains to discuss complex scientific ideas in a clear, readable fashion, enables the book to he utilized with profit by laymen and scientists alike.

Wysong uses an impressive array of information from biochemistry, anatomy, history, geology and philosophy to discuss the creation-evolution controversy. This book is an excellent review for those who want to look at both sides of the controversy. Tragically, though, few evolutionists will seriously explore the merits of the position called creationism, and probably few creationists will seriously explore, even in an effort to understand the evidence, the reasoning behind the various modern evolutionary theories purported to explain the existence of the Universe.
Because the book has amassed a wide variety of information about creationism, including hundreds of references, many from secular sources and reputable journals, the hook is a good general review of the evolution-creation controversy for both the beginning and advanced student. As Wysong was a committed evolutionist during most of his undergraduate and graduate studies, he understands the evolutionary position and is able to present it, in many cases, quite accurately, even though when the book was written the writer opted for the creationist position.

Reviewed by Jerry Bergman, Department at Educational Foundations and Inquiry, Bowling Green University, Bawling Green, Ohio 43403.

ROCKS, RELICS, AND BIBLICAL RELIABILITY by Clifford A. Wilson, Christian Free University, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Znndervan Publishing House, 1977, 141 pp.

One comes to a review of this book with mixed emotions. Evangelical Christians welcome such a scholarly presentation of archaeological research supporting the reliability of the Biblical text. But the Gospel depends on faith, not Concrete proof. The author of the book of Hebrews states in chapter eleven, verse six;

For whoever would draw near to God must believe that He exists and that He rewards those who seek Him (RSV). While it is based upon the biblical message, in the final analysis conversion is an existential experience, a leap of faith into the arms of God. Believers accept the Bible as true, the eternal Word of God, and in turn rejoice over all scientific corroboration of its contents. But they do not require it. One is reminded of Jesus' remark to Thomas, the one who demanded visible proof: Have you believed because you have seen Me? Blessed are those who have not seen and believe (John 20:29, BSV). In line with the purpose of the Probe Ministries, the organization responsible for this curriculum series, these books covering the various academic disciplines provide an evengelical alternative for college and university students. To meet this objective the book being reviewed is eminently qualified. It provides fascinating reading, is scholarly and devout. The author begins with some worthy observations: Let it be immediately said that we do not suggest that archaeology "proves" the Bible. The Bible is primarily a hook of spiritual assertions, and as such its "proof" is beyond history. We do not have the original manuscripts of the Bible, and it is good that we do not. Because mankind is constantly idolizing religious relics, doubtless the manuscripts of the Bible would be worshipped if they were in existence. The noteworthy thing is that the copies we have are remarkably preserved and amazingly accurate. The amazing accuracy of the texts used in translation can be illustrated by the findings from the Dead Sea Scrolls . . . . not one single doctrine of the Bible has been altered following the discovery of these scrolls. The author discusses at length the records of BabyInnia and Assyria, their myths and legends, creation and flood stories, ages of ancient people, and compares them with Genesis 1-11. He states that "this is an area of Scripture that consistently turns out to be historical after all."

 Refering to the Genesis 2:5-6 account, he suggests the "water-vapor blanket" theory of A. E. Ringwood, submitted in January 1970 to the Lunar Science conference at Houston, Texas. This would, he feels, explain the Flood, long-lived men protected by water-vapor from ultraviolet rays, the sudden death of animals in non-tropical areas with large quantities of undigested food in their stomachs, etc. The Genesis 11 account of the Tower of Babel is no longer looked upon as being without foundation, states the author. Considerable amount of evidence suggests that at one time men did speak one language, and their later divergencies had their origin in the general area of Sumer, the biblical Shinar.

The fact is, many seemingly mythological records must be taken seriously after all. As we compare the Biblical with the nonbiblical accounts, we find that these records of early Genesis are far more acceptable than seemed possible a century ago. Tablet after tablet has been recovered, and we are able to see similarities to many Bible documents. It is significant, too, that the Bible records have a habit of proving superior to the distorted and often grotesque records of the same events as they are known from the libraries of Israel's neighbors.

The story of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah has been explained. Earthquake activity is indicated, with various layers of the earth disrupted and hurled high into the air. Bitumen is plentiful there, with the obvious picture of fierly bituminous pitch (brimstone) raining down from heaven.

The author also deals with the now generally discredited "documentary hypothesis" of the Pentateuch. He refers to the researches of George Mendenhall of the University of Michigan, supporting the unity of the books and the Mosaic authorship, the early dating of these writings and their superiority over other legal codes of the same period.
He suggests geological activity as making possible the crossing of the Jordan River by Joshua and the Hebrew people, as well as the walls of Jericho falling down to effect its destruction by the army of Israel. In this regard he makes a cogent observation:

Somtimcs the miracles of the Bible are miracles of synchronization, or timing. If God is in control of the forces of nature, He can cause those forces to he brought together at the right moment of time to fulfill His purposes.
However, there is a caution that should be observed, convincing as the above quotation seems to be. The very definition of a miracle is something that occurs "outside" known laws of nature. In the biblical sense it is a supernatural intervention of God. This reviewer is reminded of the third grade boy who had just listened to his Sunday School teacher explain the escape from Egypt of the Israelites by crossing the Sea of Reeds, where the water is usually only twelve inches deep. "Golly!" the boy exclaimed. "What a miracle! God drowned the Egyptians, chariots and all, in only one foot of muddy water!"

The author spends considerable time dealing with the Dead Sea Scrolls. Parts of every book of the Old Testament have been found, except Esther. The Bedouin people had found many writings long before 1947, but had burned them because of the fragmant aroma they gave off. This may explain why Esther is missing, plus parts of the other books as well. The DeuteroIsaiah theory, which few scholars hold today, has been disprnven by these scrolls, and their early biblical date affirmed.

The author describes a modern archaeologist as working with a Bible in one hand and a trowel in the other. He concludes the book with his conviction "that the Bible is not only the ancient world's most reliable history textbook; it is God's revelation of Himself in Jesus Christ!"

Reviewed by Albert I. Fuson, Cajon Valley Union School District, San Diego, California.
169

STUDENT ESSAYS ON SCIENCE AND CREATION, VOLUME 1 by Dennis A. Wagner, editor, Goleta, California: Creation Society of Santa Barbara, 1976, 150 pp.

While much of this book review may appear negative, it is the conviction of the writer that both practitioners and teachers of science need to become familiar with the type of mind set and predetermined rationalization that characterize a considerable segment of the evangelical Christian community. Thus, it would be of value to read this treatise whatever one's convictions may be.

This review is written by one who does not himself accept the evolutionary hpyothesis, whatever validity that may merit. But he would not want to support his views with the reasoning and quasi-scientific data found in this book!
A quotation apropos to this discussion is that of the German theologian Dietrieh Bonhoeffer: "Do not try to make the Bible relevant. Its relevance is axiomatic. Do not defend God's Word but testify to it. Trust to the Word. It is a ship loaded to the very limits of her capacity."

Two books which present a better defense of the creationist position are Harold Hill's, From God to You by Way of the Zoo (1976) and Modern Science and the Genesis Record, by Harry Rimmer (1973).

The book being reviewed is more philosophical than scientific. "Two glaring weaknesses are evident at once. No mention is made of theistic evolution. Biblical creationism vs. atheistic, or "chance," evolutionism hold the stage. Thus, it does not speak to the many evangelical Christians who are in the former category.

Secondly, three of the four authors are undergraduate students, the other holds a B.S. degree in engineering. The Creationist Society of Santa Barbara was founded and is run by college students, mainly of that institution. They have had no chance for mature graduate research. However, as it has been stated earlier, many "born again" Christians attempt to bolster their faith by this kind of intellectual gymnastics.

Most people find objectivity difficult. So do these authors. They come to the discussion with preconceived conclusions. Creationism is true; the evolutionary hypothesis false. The confrontation is made, and all data must be selective and bent to prove their position. Of course, the reverse is evident all too often. Scientists come to the discussion with pro-evolutionist convictions, and cannot see the other side at all.

A statement is made near the beginning of the book which is worthy of quoting, though the authors do not seem to remember it after that. Thus we conclude that neither creation nor evolution can he considered scientific theories, in the true sense. They are both unobservable, unrepeatable and unfalsifiable. Creation and evolution are postulates, working hypotheses by which we can interpret data. They are systems of thought, not scientific facts in themselves, and therefore equally scientific (or unscientific).

Belief in the theory of evolution is thus exactly parallel to belief in special creation-both are concepts which believers know to be true, but neither, up to the present, has been capable of proof. The authors quote D.M.S. Watson who describes evolution as, a theory universally accepted not because it can be proved by logical coherent evidence to be true, but because the only alternative, special creation, is clearly incredible.

This gets to the core of the whole problem. The motive behind nontheistic evolution is, in the mind of this reviewer, to leave God out-not involved, not necessary, non-existent. Many evangelical Christians have adopted this secular view and in turn adapted it to their biblical interpretation. It is futile to engage in any debate. Salvation depends on an acceptance of Jesus Christ, as Son of God and Savior, and his literal resurrection from the grave. interpretation of the biblical evangelical believer it is not Atonement.

The authors contend that creationism should he taught along with evolution in the public schools. It would indeed need an instructor holding that point of view. If taught by a non-theistic evolutionist it would result in a ludicrous situation. At times the authors are guilty of faulty exegesis of quoted Scripture passages, with which they attempt to prove their arguments. This, coupled with the associated derived specious reasoning does not help their cause. Frequently they engage in ridicule of some professors at the University of California at Santa Barbara, which the authors attend. This hardly is a plus item.

They suggest that if the views of creationists were to prevail they would urge the continuance of research into evolution to see if any new evidences or proofs could be found. Such a high degree of tolerance is difficult to believe as a real possibility.

One of the most glaring weaknesses of the whole hook is the oft stated belief, even the foundation of their creationism position, that the universe was created in six twenty-four hour days, about 10,000 years ago. Even the Scofield Bible does not make that claim, nor do many well known fundamentalist biblical scholars. It seems wholly extraneous to their cause. No consideration is made of the "day-age" theory, the "gap" theory, or the "chaos" theory, held by many evangelical Christians. The authors do not discuss the "local flood" theory, but insist on a general deluge occuring less than 6000 years ago.

A few observations in closing. One's views on evolution depend on the attitude one takes to the study of the Bible-interpretation, understanding of hermeneutics, lower and higher criticism of the text, even a working knowledge of Greek and Hebrew. In either case creationist or theistic evolution theories demand "faith."
One's commitment to Christ, and his evangelical status, are not at stake. One or the other theory is wrong. But its adherents are not any less Christian. One group has made an erroneous interpretation of the Scripture both hold to be the true and eternal Word of God. The only untenable and un-Christian view is that of the non-theistic evolutionist. He needs the concern and prayers of us all!

Reviewed by Albert J. Pusan, Cajon Valley Union School District, San Diego, California.