JASA Book Reviews for September 1975
Table of Contents
HOW HUMAN CAN YOU GET? by Charles Martin, Inter Varsity Press, Downers Grove, Illinois:
(1973), 160 pp. $1.75.
SPEAKING IN TONGUES: Let's Talk About It. Watson E. Mills (ed.) Word Books, Waco, Texas:
162 pp. $4.95.
THE HOLY SPIRIT IN TODAY'S CHURCH: A Handbook of the New Pentecostalism, edited by Erling Jorstad. Abingdon Press, Nashville: (1973), 160 pages. $2.75.
GIFTS OF THE SPIRIT AND THE BODY OF CHRIST: Perspectives on the Charismatic Move
ment, edited by J. Elmo Agrimson. Augsburg Publishing House, Minneapolis: (1974). 112 pages. $2.95.
MYTHS, MODELS AND PARADIGMS: A Com parative Study in Science and Religion by Ian C. Barbour, New York: Harper & Row, 1974. 198 pp. $6.95.
HOW HUMAN CAN YOU GET? by Charles Martin, Inter Varsity Press, Downers Grove,
(1973), 160 pp. $1.75.
This is a gem of a little book. Many books deal with humanism and many books focus on Christianity. This hook converges on both in an elaboration of what it means to be a human being. The coverage is from an avowed Christian viewpoint.
'Why does Martin write on Christianity and Humanism? Bccassse they cover the two main ways of looking at life. Martin hopes that "Christians and Humanists... take time off from digging their entrenched positions deeper and look about them."
The book deals with four language systems: molecule-talk, the language of science; me-talk, the language of personal experience; us-talk and them-talk, the language of interpersonal relationships; and God-talk, the language of theology.
Martin addresses his remarks to the approximately one-third of the population in England who read, God's gift to publishers. The other two-thirds lose little sleep over the human predicament. The third who read are largely students "who read paperbacks as others read shopping lists, and who are extraordinarily well-informed on at least one side of every question." The bookish group is made up of Christians and Humanists, both of whom claim support from the man in the street.
Humanists have considerable excuse for their foggy idea about Cod because the church speaks with so many incongruent voices. Martin's parody on contemporary Christendom is succinct and right on target. At one end is the group arguing for correct cultic behavior (church attendance, especially at Easter and Christmas, is the absolute minimum). At the other extreme, social involvement is the key (church going and doctrine is optional). Somewhere in the middle is the group stressing doctrinal formulations (the vital thing is to say the right words). Out of this plethora of images the Humanist often perceives God not as Father but as boss-the Victorian paterfamilias made seven times hotter.
Charles Martin, a graduate of London University, is the author of several books, including Tangle of the Mind, Introduction to Ethics, and Christian Origins and History. How Human Can You Get? was originally intended for Britishers, but its contents are timely for Americans as well. In publishing the book for Americans, InterVarsity did not Americanize the vocabulary so that words like behaviour, programme, spoilt, and colourful remain.
Martin raises some weighty questions, throws in a dash of humor and overall comes up with some pretty spiffy phrases. The further one reads the better it gets. The last two chapters are the capstone and the best of the ten.
Reviewed by Richard Ruble, Professor of Psychology, John Brown University, Siloam Springs, Arkansas 72761.
SPEAKING IN TONGUES: Let's Talk About It.
Watson E. Mills (ed.) Word Books, Waco, Texas:
162 pp. $4.95.
Here is yet another book on glossolalia. Fifteen years ago the charismatic revival burst upon the religious scene, resulting in a steady stream of articles and honks that seems now in crescendo. I have diligently followed this literature, but found little change in fifteen years. Most authors are theologians with vested interests in maintaining a pro-tongue or antitongue position. Scientific studies of glossolalia have been slower in corning forward. Yet when good scientific studies appear they are seized upon to bolster a pro or con theological position. This rip-off of scientific data to religious ends is all too familiar, even in cases where scientists have explicitly cautioned against the use of their data to sustain ideologies. I am unaware of a dispassionate scholarly theological book on glossolalia, that gives due credence to the available scientific research, to the historical data, and to the religious functions of glossolalia qua religion.
This book make an attempt at such dispassionate analysis. The editor offers us ten chapters on glossolalia from a historical, cultural, religious, theological, anthropological, and linguistic point of view. The editor takes a meliorative position, stating that the religions arguments have been polemical, while what is needed is an analysis in perspective by those who both agree and disagree with the charismatics. Eight authors are theologians, almost all Southern Baptist; one a Wheaton College anthropologist; one a University of Toronto linguist. Thus the author skew is both scholastically and theologically conservative and non-representative.
The bow toward scholarship is deceptive. The editor has assembled a really fine annotated bibliography, relatively comprehensive up to about 1971. Yet there is a singular lack of scholarship by most of the authors. Their work is marred by generalizations and insipid thinking. Two chapters on church history by Bunn and Hinson are cursory. Both ignore the magnum opus in the field: Enthusiasm by Monsignor Knox (Oxford, 1955); also omitted in the bibliography. The chapters on theology and religious interpretations do not systematically review either theological history nor religious history, offering instead personal opinion and interpretation. A chapter on anthropology by Mayers is acceptable, albeit cursory. It largely paraphrases my Journal ASA review of 1968. Without personal modesty my own review is out of date, superceded by the work of anthropologists like Bourginoun, Gerlach, Hine, Goodman, etc. None of the serious socio-cultural research of the past six years is accounted for. Likewise the psychological studies of Kildahl, Maloney, Flog, etc. are not systematically reviewed.
There is one jewel of a chapter on sociolinguistics by William J. Samarin from the University of Toronto. He published a serious longitudinal linguistic study of glossolalia in 1972: Tongues of Men and Angels (Macmillan), which is the major scientific evaluation of glossolalia extant, in my opinion. The short chapter by Samarin in this book summarizes his major linguistic, sociological, and theological observations. It should whet the appetite of the reader to obtain Samarin's book.
To my mind the major linguistic data on glossolalia are now in, i.e., the work of Samarin. The psychological data are still sparse, limited primarily by the biases of population sampling in the reported studies, and the inferences to be drawn from skewed populations. The sociocultural data, primarily from Bourginoun and Gerlach, is fragmentary and not sufficiently explanatory. Classical history of ecstatic religious experience is well represented by Knox, although the scattered historical sources could profitably he drawn together. A current history of ecstatic religion is missing. As I observe the scene, glossolalia was but the precursor of the revival of mystical religion, which is the larger religious movement beyond fundamentalistic charismatics. For example, we've seen the Jesus movement, eastern mysticism, meditation, group sensitivity encounter, and onward, all of which represents a reemphasis on the experiential aspect of religion. This larger perspective, of which glossolalia is but a part, is missed in this book.
In sum, this book sets out to place glossolalia in perspective. The goal is noble, but the effort is marred by trite theology, inadequate scholarship, and a myopic perspective.
Reviewed by E. Mansell Pattison, Department of Psychiatry and Human Behavior, University of California, Irvine
THE HOLY SPIRIT IN TODAY'S CHURCH: A Handbook of the New Pentecostalism, edited by Erling Jorstad. Abingdon Press, Nashville: (1973), 160 pages. $2.75.
GIFTS OF THE SPIRIT AND THE BODY OF CHRIST: Perspectives on the Charismatic Move
ment, edited by J. Elmo Agrimson. Augsburg Publishing House, Minneapolis: (1974). 112 pages. $2.95.
Professor Erling Jnrstad has given us a "reader" relating to the multi-faceted phenomenon known as neo-Pentecostalism. He is Chairman of the Division of History, Philosophy, and Religion at St. Olaf College, Northfield, Minnesota, and has written The Politics of Doomsday and That New-Time Religion: The Jesus Revival in America.
This handbook draws together much helpful contemporary material from those who have written on both sides of the Pentecostal question. It naturally affords the reader a perspective that is relatively unbiased since several viewpoints are presented. In fact, Jorstad works on the assumption that neo-Pentecnstalism is one of the most criticized and defended and yet least understood movements in contemporary Christianity. The editor intends to expose the reader to various writings that reflect the several differing attitudes concerning the nature and significance of the Charismatic revival. He includes writings that present "accurately, clearly, and responsibly" the major themes of the movement (p. 6). His selection of materials is solid and representative of the many viewpoints within the movement itself.
The first two chapters consist of excerpts aimed at clarifying for the reader the history of Pentecostalism and specifically the rise of neo-Pentecostalism in the United States. The third chapter deals with the various controversies that have arisen since the appearance of neoPentecostalism. These initial chapters are written by Professor Jorstad himself, but beginning with Chapter Four ("The Mid-Week Prayer Meeting") the role of Jorstad shifts to that of editor, and he exposes the reader to selected and edited readings from various sources both within and outside of neo-Pentecostal writings.
The controversial issue of "speaking in tongues" is dealt with in Chapter Seven (pp. 77-99). Here the editor presents selections from Don Basham, Larry Christenson and Kilian McDonnell. In its broader aspect, the discussion of spiritual gifts embraces three chapters of the book (pp. 77-134). Of particular interest to pastors is the chapter entitled "What the Churches Can Do" (154-156), a section in which the editor gives some sound advice to those who are having to deal with the issues being raised by the Charismatic revival. These guidelines are brief and to the point but are of sufficient depth that they can become the basis for some genuine discussion and positive action.
Agrimson's book is an anthology of articles that deals with the range of spiritual gifts and the ways these relate functionally to the body of Christ. It, too, attempts to give perspective to the Charismatic movement. The six essays presented in the book are written by recognized authorities in this area of study. The editor contributed the introduction and the concluding essay. Other contributors are Dwayne A. Priebe ("Charismatic Gifts and Christian Experience in Paul"); Paul C. Sonnack ("A Historical Perspective on Some Contemporary Religious Movements"); Johannes A. Schiller ("The Sociology of Charismatic Movements"); John P. Kildahl ("Six Behavioral Observations about Speaking in Tongues"); Arnold Bittlinger ("Baptized in Water and in Spirit"). Kildahl's article is taken from a recent book published by Harper & Row (The Psychology of Speaking in Tongues, 1972). Bittlinger is noted for his work in the area of Charismatic renewal, particularly his recent 1)00k entitled Gifts and Ministries (Eerdmans, 1973).
In 1966 three Southern Baptist Seminary professors attempted to put glossalalia "in the round" by presenting perspectival essays on the phenomenon in terms of its biblical, historical and psychological dimensions (see Frank Stagg, et al, Glossalalia: Tongue Speaking in Biblical, Historical, and Psychological Perspective, Abingdon, 1967). Presently Agrimson, who is President of the Southeastern Minnesota District of the American Lutheran Church, has enlarged the focus to include a variety of additional approaches being made to the Charismatic revival. His writers offer the biblical, historical, sociological, psychological, experiential and pastoral dimensions of the subject. This enlargement of scope is itself a witness to the increasing interest in the phenomenon associated with the Charismatic movement, and various new ways being suggested for studying it.
Increasingly, as more and more Christians are becoming caught up in charismatic renewal, numerous books are appearing that treat the subject from the vantage point of widely differing disciplines. Such an approach gives a fresh perspective and will go a long way toward bringing genuine understanding.
Reviewed by Watson F. Mills, Associate Professor of Religion and Philosophy, Avereit College, Daneille, Virginia.
MYTHS, MODELS AND PARADIGMS: A Comparative Study in Science and Religion by Ian C. Barbour, New York: Harper & Row, 1974. 198 pp. $6.95.
The subtitle of this book indicates that it is a comparative study of science and religion, but the focus of the comparison is primarily on the roles of paradigms and models in science and religion. In this study Barbonr emphasizes three themes. The first is that language has a diversity of functions. Scientific discourse has usually been pointed to as the norm for all other forms of discourse because of its objectivity, but, Barbour
argues, "every type of language has its own logic appropriate to its specific purposes." Whereas some have taken this theme off in the direction of conceptual relativism and Wittgensteinian fideism1 Barbour holds that religious language has cognitive functions and that there is no "sharp contrast between the objectivity of science and the subjectivity of religion."2 Although religious language has some distinctive functions unparalleled by scientific discourse, the contrasts with science are ones of degree and not of kind. This claim is explored in the second and third themes of the book: the role of models and the role of paradigms in religion and science. An examination of these three themes serves to support the position of critical realism that Barbour advocates in both religion and science.
Briefly, critical realism with respect to models holds that models are neither literal pictures of reality (naive realism) nor are they mere dispensable psychological aids that have no crucial role in theory making or scientific discovery. The critical realist takes models seriously but not literally. With respect to paradigms the attitude of the critical realist is a mediating one between naive objectivism and conceptual relativism. Critical realism rejects the textbook view of the growth of science and accepts most of the major theses of Kuhn put forward in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions3 but with important qualifications.
Those who are familiar with Barbour's earlier work Issues in Science and Religion4 will expect a work that is both synoptic with respect to the problems he discusses and synthetic with respect to the conclusions that he offers. If this work is approached with those expectations, one will not be disappointed. In several ways this book is an amplification of some of the issues raised by himself in Issues and others in two collections of essays edited by Barbour,5 The main thrust of Myths, Models and Paradigms is the exposition of critical realism via the comparisons of the roles that models and paradigms play in science and religion. Surrounding this discussion are a constellation of related issues which include discussions on the distinctions between metaphor and symbol; the use of analogy in metaphor, myth and parable; the cognitive function of myths; a critique of Bultmann's demythologizing; the adequacy of Ian Ramsey's "disclosure models" and John Hick's version of "seeing as" - "experiencing as" and Barbour's own suggestion of viewing the theory ladenness of experience as "interpreting as." Some of the other specific issues will be commented on after a further elaboration of Barbour's critical realism.
When Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions first appeared in 1962, it caused a stir especially among followers of Karl Popper, because it was believed that Kuhn's account of scientific revolutions was too subjective, irrational and led to conceptual relativism. While Popper and his followers had argued that falsification was decisive in overthrowing a theory, Kuhn maintained that falsifications are never viewed as such unless other conditions obtained-i.e., there was a crisis and an alternative theory that handled the anomalies of the present theory was on the horizon. The criteria for assessment of the paradigm are dependent on or relative to the paradigm; thus, any two paradigms are incommensurable. Imre Lakatos, a follower of Popper, rather critically summed up the results of Kuhn's analysis as follows:
For Kuhn scientific change - from one paradigm to another is a mystical conversion which is not and cannot be governed by rules of reason and which falls totally within the realm of the (social) psychology of discovery. Scientific change is a kind of religious change.6
There are no rational standards for their comparison. Each paradigm contains its own standards. The crisis sweeps away not only the old theories and rules hot also the standards which made us respect them. The new paradigm brings a totally new rationality. There are no superparadigmatic standards. The change is a hand wagon effect. Thus in Kuhn's view scientific revolution is irrational, a matter of mob psychology.7
In response to criticisms like these, Kuhn has modified and clarified many of his views. Barbour's own position of critical realism is a synthesis of the best insights of both Kuhn and his critics. Barbour's position has three prominent modifications of Kuhn's view. First, although Kuhn and Barbour are in agreement that all data are theory-laden, Barbour disagrees that rival theories are incommensurable because of it. Barbour believes that there is "a common core of overlap in observation languages" which allows for a common ground for interparadigmatic discussion. This concession would account for the fact that there is a residue of some observation statements and laws which survive scientific revolutions and are incorporated within the new "research programme". This would also tend to account for the textbook version of science which sees science as one uninterrupted line of progress and continual accretions of knowledge. Second, Kuhn has been criticized for his views about the relevance of falsification to the refutation of theories and paradigm shifts, and Barbour agrees with this criticism to the extent that he allows that observation does exert some control over the falsification of theories. The control that observation exercises over theories (falsification risk) is inversely proportional to the comprehensiveness, generality or scope of a theory. Third, Kuhn held that there are no rules for choosing among research programmes, and Barbnur agrees with this but suggests that there are criteria for assessment which are not applied in any rigorous way or reducible to formal rules.
The criteria that Barbour offers for the rational assessment are apparently to be paradigm independent, but he offers no argument for this.8 The criteria (simplicity, internal consistency and systematic interrelatedness, extensibility or fruitfulness, and comprehensiveness) are also the familiar ones.9
Barbour's critical realism as applied to models is much indebted to Mary Hesse10 in his discussion of their status and function in science. As mentioned above, the critical realist takes models seriously but not literally. Barbour argues that the instrumentalist account of the role of models fails to account for the tenacity and commitment that the scientist shows and has for his models, theories and research programmes. Barbour agrees with Kuhn over against Lakatns that scientists make ontological and not just methodological commitments in these areas. But this commitment is not to exclude it or make it immune from criticism. Both of these aspects, ontological commitment and critical reservation are concisely put in this quote from Leonard Nash:
We must not then take a theoretic model [an imaginative mental construct that attempts to represent symbolically an unknown process] too literally; indeed we may err by taking the model too literally. But, as we would realize the full heuristic power inherent in it, we must take the model very seriously . . . . If our models are to lead us to ask, and seek answers for, new questions about the world, we must regard them as something more than 'logical super-floities', 'illicit attempts at explanation', 'convenient fictions', or the like. The lesson of scientific history is unmistakable. To the hypothetical entities sketched by our theories we must venture at least provisional grants of ontologie status. Major discoveries are made when invisible atoms, electrons, nuclei, viruses, vitamins, hormones, and genes are regarded as existing.11
Of the specific issues surrounding Barbour's comparative study one of the most interesting is the issue of falsification in science and theology. In a section titled "on the falsification of beliefs",12 Barbour neatly summarizes the old debate concerning Flew's challenge to specify the conditions for falsification as a condition for meaningful assertions.13 One response to this challenge along Wittgensteinian lines is to point out the diversity of functions that language has and that all criteria are relative to the language game in which they occur. Religious language has its own logic appropriate to its specific purposes. This is the response of Wittgensteinian fideism and Barbour rejects it on the same grounds that he rejects conceptual relativism with regard to paradigms.
A more interesting response is to question Flew's challenge itself. This is Barbour's strategy. Barbonr, however, confuses two issues here. Flew's challenge embodies a thesis about meaning an assertion, to be meaningful, must be specifiably falsifiable. That this thesis is untenable is shown by the work of Wittgenstein and Austin. But even if religious assertion are shown to be meaningful because they are part of a language game that is played, it would still leave open their cognitive status. Karl Popper never intended his falsification thesis as a thesis about meaning but he did think that it provided a line of demarcation between science and nonscience.14 It is this issue that Barbour must, and in fact does, address if he is to maintain that the difference between religion and science is one of degree and not kind.
The first part of Barbour's attack is to point out that, "The demand for the specification of falsifying conditions seems unreasonable, since it cannot be met by scientific theories, especially those of great generality.15 A theory that is faced with a falsifying instance may modify some auxiliary hypothesis, make an ad hoc adjustment in the theory or simply set the falsification instance aside as an anomaly. "Crucial experiments" are dubbed as such by history and are hardly ever recognized as such when they occur. But a real problem arises when it is realized that the crucial part of science, first order principles, are unfalsifiable. In this case it is not so much not being able to specify what will falsify them because it is difficult to see, but rather because nothing is allowed to count against them. John F. Miller holds the position that there is a logical similarity between religion and science because they both have unfalsifiable first principles.
As in religion with its first order non-falsifiable statements, nothing is allotted to count against these important first-order scientific principles which have been discussed (causality, determinism, the principle of rectilinear propagation of light, the law of the conservation of energy). Therefore, religion and science are logically similar in this respect: both have within their conceptual frameworks or world-views non-verifiable principles of first order status which are principles in accordance with which inferences are drawn and evidence is adduced.16
Barbour objects to Miller's thesis on two grounds however. The first is that Barbour believes that, "A prolonged accumulation of anomalies or ad hoc amendments would, I believe, bring about reformulations of the principle itself or qualifications of its universality".17 He notes that Miller bases his case for quantum determinism largely on the writings of Planck, but this now represents a minority view among scientists and philosophers. Thus, not all physicists assume that determinism must hold in the atomic domain. The second reason for objecting to Miller's position is that Miller, along with many others who have written on the subject, have assumed that falsifiability and unfalsifiability are mutually exclusive categories, when in fact a theory's resistence to falsification is proportional to its generality. Thus, on Barbour's analysis it is no longer necessary to see religion and science as either contrasting or logically similar but on a spectrum. And a further consequence of Barbour's view is that it completely obliterates Popper's line of demarcation.
Barbour's views on falsification then amount to this: the specification of possible instances of falsification is an unreasonable demand because it cannot be met. In theories of high generality there is no piece of evidence which "decisively counts against" such theories, but they do "count against" it. Like straws on a camel's back they accumulate to an extent that if another promising beast of burden should come along, it will be noticed that either the camel's back is broken or is breaking. Barbour believes that this is the ease in both religion and science. Nothing in them is immune from falsification but we may not be able to specify that future straw which will break the camel's back.
Barbour's views are interesting and important but one wishes that he would have addressed some other alternatives in addition to those discussed. Are, for instance, some of the key interpretive terms, concepts and principles unfalsifiable because they are definitional and not empirical? Or, on Alastair MeKinnon's view,18 does science contain assertations which are both necessary and eontentful? Isn't causality really the bedrock interpretive principle which Miller claims it is? Might it not be the case that there are certain beliefs that a scientist cannot abandon without at the same time giving up science? As McKinnon suggests, might not the belief that there is order in the world be such a belief which constitutes the activity of a scientist? These are questions which Barbour does not raise but one wishes he had.
Of particular interest is Barbour's discussion of complementary models in physics and theology. The use of complementary models in theology might seem to invite all manner of uncritical acceptance and justification of otherwise untenable dichotomies in theology but, from his analysis of complementary models in physics, Barbour suggests rules governing their use which would prohibit it. It is pointed out that the use of complementary models does not a priori preclude searching for a unitary model and it can be used only in situations where the models refer to the same entity and are of the same logical type. This stipulation has an important consequence in that it prevents us from viewing science and religion as complementary, since they are not of the same logical type. Science and religion, Barbour maintains, are attempts at interpreting different aspects of reality and serve different functions.
For these reasons I will speak of science and religion as alternative languages using alternative models, and restrict the term complementary to models of the same logical type within a given langnage.19
Despite these restrictions Barbour does see complementary models in use that do meet these criteria. In particular, Barbour discusses Tillich's use of personal and impersonal symbols in talking about God. Barbour also notes that unlike complementary models in science there is no unifying mathematical formalism that allows at least probabilistic prediction of particular observations in theology. In science the inconsistency is at the level of models, not at the level of the theory. In theology, however, a conceptual unity is provided by theological and doctrinal schemes, in a manner similar to the functioning of mathematical formulae. "But their relation to experience is more ambiguous, and no one would claim for them any kind of predictive power on even a probabilistic basis".20
Barhour has a too brief discussion of the Christian paradigm and different models for the relationship between God and the world that should be of interest to theologians and philosophers of religion. Barbour's own persuasion is a variation of process theology which is indebted to Whitehead, Hartshorne and Cobb but is not identical with any of them. These modelsmonarchical, deistic, dialogie, agent and social or processare assessed according to the above mentioned criteria for adequacy and the process model is found to be the most adequate. Barbour mentions one of the recent critiques of process theology by H. P. Owen. The objection that Barhour singles out is that a finite God is unworthy of worship and only a necessary being is the proper object of worship. Barbour's reply is that it is Cod's love and not his omnipotence that inspires and justifies reverence and worship. But this objection is one of the least substantial of three that Owen makes and one would have hoped that Barbour would have addressed the others also .21
Model of Divine Action
One aspect of Barbour's book that is, I think, extremely significant is the application of the insights of philosophy of action to the action of God in nature. It is claimed in recent philosophical psychology that not all bodily movements are human actions; muscle spasms and other involuntary movements are exempt. Bodily movements can he adequately explained in terms and categories of physiology, but human actions must refer to intentions. A collection of bodily movements cannot be specified as an action without a conative intention or purpose and context that interprets the movements. Thus, there are "two ways of talking about a single set of events"22 that are not incompatible but rather two languages, one being interpretive of the first. This analysis of human action when applied analogically to God's action in nature, results in seeing the scientific analysis of physical nature on par with the physiological analysis of bodily movements, with Divine intentions providing the interpretations of significant events in human and cosmic history. Just as not all bodily movements are human actions, not all events need be expressions of divine purpose, nor would they exhaustively express God any more than the personality of an agent is fully expressed in any sequence of events. Using this model of God's activity, it can be seen that God does not need gaps in nature in order to act, and the causal explanation is as compatible with God's activity as a physiological explanation is compatible with an intentional explanation of human action.
This model of Divine action has limited application in that it does not account for all those actions sometimes ascribed to God. Miracles that contravene the usual regularities cannot be accommodated on this model unless, as it may turn out, these apparent contraventions are really exemplifications of the operations of some as yet unknown mechanism. In short, this model can account only for what can be accounted for in a causal language. Another feature of this model that a classical theist might find objectionable is that God's relation to the world is modeled on a person's relation to one's body and it fits well with a panentheistic model of God, John Compton who so ably presents this model in an article called "Science and God's Action in Nature"23 presents it in conjunction with a process model of God, but this feature of the model is a neutral analogy and does not mandate a process interpretation.
1These two terms, "conceptual relativism" and "Wittgcnsteinian fideism" are not used by Harbour but they characterize the view that he wishes to avoid. Conceptual relativism holds that reality, truth and meaning are dependent upon the conceptual scheme in which they occur. Wittgensteinian fideism is the application of this view to religious language.
2Ian C. Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms: A Comparative Study in Science and Religion (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), p. 5.
3Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., Phoenix Books (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1970).
4Ian G. Harbour, Issues in Science and Religion (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966; Harper Torch Books, New York: Harper & Row, 1971).
5Ian G Barbour, ed., Science and Religion: New Perspectives on the Dialogue (New York: Harper & Row, 1968); Ian C, Barbour, ed. Earth Might Be Fair: Reflections on Ethics, Religion and Ecology (Englewood Cliffs, N,J,: Prentice-Hall, 1972).
6lmre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes", Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 93.
7 ibid., p. 178.
8Barbour in Issues mentions Ferre in connection with the following criteria. Ferre's argument deals with criteria for judging the adequacy of metaphysical systems. The criteria developed out of an analysis of their function 'to unify and "make sense" out of ranges of ideas otherwise unrelated draw meaning out of "blooming, buzzing confusion"' Frederick Ferre, Language, Logic and God (New York: Haprer & Row, 1961; Harper Torchbooks, 1969), p. 162.
9Barhour, Myths, p. 143. Cf. Barbour, Issues, pp. 144-148, 252-255; Ferre, Language, pp. 160-165; and Basil Mitchell, The Justification of Religious Belief (New York: Macmillan, 1963),
10Mary B. Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science (London: Sheed and Ward Ltd., 1963; Notre Dame, Ind.; Notre Dame University Press, 1966); and Mary B. Hesse "Models and Analogies in Science" vol. 5, Paul Edwards, ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy, pp. 355-356.
11Leonard Nash, The Nature of Natural Science (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1963), p. 251. Quoted in Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms, p. 38.
12Barbour, Myths, pp. 126-137.
l3Anthony Flew, "Theology and Falsification" in Anthony Flew and Alastair MacIntyre, eds., New Essays in Philosophical Theology (London: SCM Press, 1955; New York: Macmillan, 1964), pp. 96-99.
14See Bryan Magee, Karl Popper (New York: Viking Press, 1973), p. 43.
l5Barbour, Myths, p. 129,
16John F. Miller III, "Science and Religion: Their Logical Similiarity", Religious Studies 5 (October, 1969), p. 64. Quoted in Barbour, Myths, p. 131.
17Barhnor, Ibid., p. 132.
185ee Alastair McKinnon, Falsification and Belief, (The Hague: Moulton & Co., 1970).
19Barhoor, Myths, p. 78.
20Ibid., p. 91.
25The claimed advantage of the process model of God over the classical model is that it more adequately accounts for the relation between the infinite and the finite. It is, however, just this claim that Owen disputes. The reason for this is that "In all its forms, it [process theology] involves selfcontradiction. The same being cannot be both absolute and relative, both changeless and changing, both eternal and temporal" II. P. Owen, Concepts of Deity (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), p. 88. Owen discusses and rejects various attempts to show that this is only paradox and not contradiction and rejects them. It is Harbour's suggestion that ehristnlogical models are complementary models and that it is the christologieal model that is one of the sources for the process model. In short, a suggested reply to Owen might be that the process model is not contradictory but uses complementary models in the same way that models are used in explaining the human and divine natures of Christ. This reply, however, must be spelled out and Harbour does not do it here.
The third objection is especially important in light of the emphasis that Harbour places on human experience as the data which religious beliefs can be tested against. (Of course, experience is not uninterpreted but neither is it completely malleable. The relation of experience to the falsification of religious beliefs stands in the same relation as observation does to the falsification of comprehensive theoretical models: experience and observation can count against a position but not decisively unless this negative evidence accumulates and a rival model or belief with promise is in sight.) One of the most significant items of human experience is the feeling of absolute dependence 'which Sehleiermacher and Otto rightly took to be differentiating marks of the religious consciousness" (Owen, Concepts, p. 89). The argument is that the only justifiable object of such an experience is an infinite God without qualification. A finite God would not make sense of this experience.
22Barhour, Myths, p. 159,
23John Compton, "Science and God's Action in Nature, in Harbour", Earth, pp. 33-47.
Reviewed by T. Pence, Department of Philosophy, Purdue University, Lafayette, Indiana.
JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SCIENTIFIC AFFILIATION