Science in Christian Perspective

Book Reviews


PSCF Book Reviews for December 1974
THE NEW GENETICS AND THE FUTURE OF MAN by Michael Hamilton, Editor, Wm. B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Michigan 1972. 242 pp. Paperback. $3.95.   2 reviews
RELIGION AND THE RISE OF MODERN SCIENCE by R. Hooykaas, Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1972, xiv + 162 pp., $2.65.
THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT: A REASSESSMENT by Bruce  Reichenbach, Charles C. Thomas-Publisher, Springfield, Illinois. 1972. 150 pp.
THE DUST OF DEATH by Os Guinness, InterVarsity Press, Downers Grove, Illinois (1973). Paperback. 419 pp. $4.95.
TOWARDS DEEP SUBJECTIVITY by Roger Poole. New York: Harper and Row (Torchbook), 1972. 152 pages.
THE EARTH IS THE LORDS? by Joyce Blackburn, Waco Texas: Word Books (1972) 160 pp. $4.95.
THE DELICATE CREATION: TOWARDS A THEOLOGY OF THE ENVIRONMENT by Christopher Derrick, Devin-Adair, Old Greenwich, Conn. (1972) $5.95.
THE HOLINESS PENTECOSTAL MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES by Vinson Synan, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan (1972). 248 pp. $5.95.
PREHISTORY AND EARTH MODELS by Melvin A. Cook, London: Max Parrish and Co. Ltd. (1966) 353 pp.
MEMO FOR 1976: SOME POLITICAL OPTIONS, by Wesley Pippcrt. Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1974.

THE NEW GENETICS AND THE FUTURE OF MAN by Michael Hamilton, Editor, Wm. B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Michigan 1972. 242 pp. Paperback. $3.95.   2 reviews

If abortion is one of the issues in which the concerns and disciplines of science and the Christian faith are particularly focused, genetic engineering is certainly another. It is not quite so immediately present as abortion, but its potentialities for the future are, if possible, even more frightening or promising depending on one's outlook. This hook, edited by the Canon of Washington Cathedral, was produced through the cooperation of the National Presbyterian Center, the Board of Christian Social Concerns of the United Methodist Church, and the Episcopal Cathedral of the Diocese of Washington. It is divided into three principal sections, each with four subsections: (I) New Beginnings in Life, (2) Genetic Therapy, and (3) Pollution and Health. Each section is initiated by a paper by a scientist, and the remaining three papers represent reactions and responses by other scientists, lawyers, theologians, and philosophers. The first two divisions of the hook are obviously closely related, whereas the third seems like rather a different topic to he included in the same covers. Because it does seem rather "far out in many eases, the subject of genetic engineering is not as familiar to the informed Christian as it should be. It is fortunately one of the purposes of this book to further communication between laymen and scientists. Every Christian with any kind of social responsibility should have this hook on his must reading list.

The lead article under "New Beginnings of Life" is by Leon R. Kass, a biologist and Executive Secretary of the Committee on the Life Sciences and Social Policy of the National Research Council-National Academy of Sciences. Dr. Kass takes a somewhat dim view of the various possibilities involved in mail's control over new ways to begin life. "Faddishness has replaced tuberculosis as the scourge of the intellectual classes." He considers the state of the art and ethical questions involved in in vitro fertilization, the fertilization ill the test tulle of human egg by human sperm, and the subsequent laboratory culture of the young embryo; the state of the art and ethical questions involved ill cloning or asexual reproduction, the derivation of new individuals from a single parent with whom they are genetically identical; and questions of power, dehumanization and wisdom. He strikes a telling blow at modern reactions ill a footnote,

The current sentimentality which endorses all acts done lovingly because they are lovingly done leads to some strange judgments. A teacher friend recently asked one student who was having difficulty appreciating the crimes of Oedipus, what she would think if she discovered that her sister was having an affair with their father. The girl replied that, although she was personally disgusted by the prospect for herself, she thought that there was probably nothing wrong with it "provided that they (sister and father) had a good relationship." It is unlikely that individuals or a whole society which is unable to find reasons (other than genetic ones) for rejecting incest will be able to sort out any of the questions raised in this paper.

Kass is particularly disturbed by the inherent tendency toward dehumanization involved in cloning.

For man is the watershed which divides the world into those things that belong to nature and those that are made by men. To lay one's hands on human generation is to take a major step toward making man himself simply another of the man-made things . ..To the extent that we view as knowable only those aspects of nature which are reducible to material for manipulation, to that extent we surrender our human and humanizing ability to perceive and sense the mysteries of nature.

Kass makes no claim to being either "a theologian or a student of religion," but his arguments are consciously informed by the "great religions traditions which have informed our civilization." His is a prophetic voice that deserves to be heard.

Let us simply look at what we have done in our conquest of nonhuman nature. We find there no grounds for nptinsisin as we now consider offers to turn our technology loose on human nature. In absence of standards to guide and restrain the use of this awesome power, we can only dehumanize man as we have despoiled our planet.'

Respondent Frank P. Grad, Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, attempts to mitigate the legal and ethical consequences implied by Dr. Kass. Respondent Joseph Fletcher, labelled a theologian, disagrees sharply with Kass on many scores ("It is plain enough that be (Kass) is not very trustful of human nature.') arid proceeds to attempt to apply his brand of "situational ethics" to the problem with some bizarre effects.

I would vote, for example, for cloning top-grade soldiers and scientists or for supplying them by genetic intervention if needed to offset an elitist or tyrannical power plot by other cloners.

He steps aside from the details of genetic engineering, because he has "too little technical grasp of the subject," but he is able to call for a "consensus built around a humanistic ethic that is not metaratiooal or based on faith assumptions, but derives its cogency from shared values and reportable experience." Respondent Daniel Callahan, a philosopher, takes a mediating position more like that of Kass. In this division of the hook, biologist Kass has far more of value to tell us than theologian Fletcher.

Genetic therapy, the attempt to treat hereditary diseases by influencing the genes directly, is the subject of the opening chapter of the second division of the hook, by W. French Anderson, head of the Section on Human Biochemistry, Molecular Disease Branch, National Heart and Lung Institute, National Institutes of Health. He indicates the positive applications of genetic therapy to genetic diseases (diabetes, phenylketonoria, sickle-cell anemia, hemophilia, cystic fibrosis), viral diseases (measles, German measles, mumps, chicken pox, smallpox, poliomyelitis, influenza, mononucleosis and the common cold), the area of cancer, and the area of aging. He also indicates the negative possibilities of misuse of genetic therapy, and the alternatives that might also be pursued.

Respondent Arno C. Motulsky, a clinical geneticist at the University of Washington Medical School where he heads the Division of Medical Genetics, basically agrees with Anderson, but feels that the reality of gene therapy is a long distance away in the future. Respondent Alexander M. Capron, lawyer, cautions that the law can both aid science and halt scientific endeavor. Respondent Paul Ramsey, theologian from Princeton, gives voice again to his often repeated concerns about the impact of genetic therapy-or genetic engineering, as he believes it must be called-in an article that parallels that of Dr. Kass with respect to new beginnings of life. He is primarily concerned that men do not take upon themselves the choice of how to "help" one who has no voice in the matter.

We ought not to choose for another the hazards he must hear, while choosing at the same time to give him life in which to hear them and suffer our chosen experimentations.
Treatment is construed to include killing the patient for his own sake in order that he may not have a life deemed by others not to he worth living.
The efforts called "treatment" extend to the elimination of the patient. Strange treatments, that;...

Dr. Ramsey calls our attention to the unknown dangers and pitfalls of genetic experimentation with the goal of genetic engineering, and questions whether the possible disasters are worth the possible benefits.
This area holds such dangers of untold human suffering, dehumanization, exploitation, radical alteration of the conditions of human existence, genetic SST's and Lake Erics, that we are obligated to search out ways by which regulatory public policy can be devised.

Before us then opens up the dizzy, abysmal prospect that man can be present where the foundations of the world were laid. Piece by piece of information may destroy our sense that, for all the genetic corruption, God made the world and the human creature and they are good. We may finally lose our faith that, under God, life should always be affirmed with joy and hope beyond despair and lose also our concern that even genetically defective lives he saved and cared for.

In the lead article of the third division on "Pollution and Health", Samuel S. Epstein, professor of pharmacology at Case Western Reserve School of Medicine, gives an excellent summary of the types of pollutants and the three major classes of public health hazards: carcinogens (producing cancer), mutagens (producing genetic mutations), and teratogens (prodoing congenital malformations). He warns of the public danger of untested chemicals added to our food and our environment and insists on the importance of open access to all relevant data.

Respondent Julius E. Johnson, Director of Research and Development of the Dow Chemical Company, does not disagree with Dr. Epstein, but argues for a calm and careful approach to attacking the pollution problem. Respondent Leonard Bickwit, Jr., a U.S. Senate counsel, tackles the question of the legal controls involved in pollution control and correction. Respondent Charles W. Powers, theologian from Yale Divinity School, considers the problems of responsibility for both the individual and the institution.

In such a situation it is easy to slip into a frame of mind that suggests that everyone (person, group, or institution) is responsible for everything; the unhappy result is that no one takes responsibility for anything.

He considers the responsibility of the church in these areas in its role as corporate investor, consumer, property owner and employer. His discussion emphasizes, at least for this reviewer, the ambiguities of viewing the church as an investor in big corporations.

Our history indicates that man has gone far to pollute and degrade the natural world into which he has been placed. Environmental degradation has proceeded without limitation almost to the point where wholesale human death would be the next natural consequence of unchanged policies and practices. The great threat is that man is now turning his attention to the last category of nature not appreciably subject before this to group pollution and degradation: man himself. If genetic engineering produces in the human race the kind of effects that man has produced in strip mining, water pollution, material waste, and denuding of forest lands, we will yet face the ultimate in pollution. The voices of Kass, Ramsey and Epstein are voices that Christians will do well to heed as we wait, striving to live today for Christ in our own world, even though we look for another.

Reviewed by Richard H. Rube, Department of Materials Science and Enginceering, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305.

A Second Review of The New Genetics and the Future of Man

The most interesting paper is the first, on "New Beginnings in Life" by Leon R. Kass, dealing with cloning and fertilizing eggs outside the body, and either reimplanting them in their mother or some other woman, which seems feasible now, or in vitro culture, which may become so. All biology students, and especially those entering medicine, ought to he exposed to the ideas presented here.

Kass asks some hard questions, and they require some hard answers:

What do you do with unwanted fertilized embryos? Is this murder? If it is, why isn't an IUD a device to murder?
Shouldn't we beware of losing our sense of the mystery of life?
What if implantation produces a defective child?
Would you like to live your life with someone else's genotype?
Who makes the choices?
What would all these developments do to the family?

In the middle section on Genetic Therapy, two presidents, Lawyer Alexander NI. Capron and Paul Ramsey, a lawyer and a theologian raise questions, in reaction to a straightforward account of the possibilities of genetic therapy. The lead article here, by W. French Anderson, states that gene therapy using viruses has already been tried, using viruses on two sisters suffering from a defect in arginine metabolism. Since no reference is cited, apparently this is the first published report.

Capron's hard questions are such as;

Is genetic therapy really a good thing?
Wouldn't it be cheaper to require mandatory screening of all couples, and simply not allow some of them to have children?
Is there any such thing as a patient capable of giving rational consent to experimentation on himself?
Can we afford to lose the variety the gene pool now affords us? If we wipe out sickle cell aneosia, what happens if malaria returns in force?

Ramsey's questions are:

What is actually being treated in a "therapeutic" abortion-the fetus, the parent's desires or society's pocketbook?
Isn't the "treatment" of arginemia mentioned by Anderson just prolongation of a subnormal life for experimental purposes?
Do we want to live in a world where behavior genetics is a master science?
Aren't many so-called medical decisions really social?
Proceeding with heart transplants was not only a medical decision, but a fund allocation decision.

Two valuable points are made in the section on pollution and health. One is that the best solution to pollution is to allow citizens to sue when their environment is damaged. Experience in Michigan does not seem to indicate that this will open the floodgates holding hack the crackpots. The second is that investors, especially if they are churches, ought to work for social responsibility.

This reviewer also has some questions:

Why don't we make adoption easier?

Is there any real hope of evaluating the moral effects of any new technology before it is used? Would theologians tolerate a committee of citizens passing on fields of investigation?
Is there any hope for a society whose best thinkers, (such as the contributors to this volume) in dealing with profound questions such as these, seem to have no absolute values, nor any reason to think anyone else should?

The New Genetics and the Future of Man goes a lung way from Watson and Crick and Mendel. It asks some important questions. I like to think the ASA can help shed some light on the answers.
Reviewed by Martin LaBar, Central Wesle yen College, Central, South Carolina 29630

RELIGION AND THE RISE OF MODERN SCIENCE by R. Hooykaas, Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1972, xiv + 162 pp., $2.65.

Studies of the relationship between science and Christianity have been dominated by a pair of opposing stereotypes. In the latter half of the 19th century, John W. Draper and Andrew D. White published anti-Christian polemics in which they contended that Christianity has everywhere and always opposed the progress of science, inhibiting at every turn the discovery and dissemination of scientific knowledge. A modern statement of the same proposition can be found in Lewis Feuer's The Scientific Intellectual (1963). But if Draper, White, and Fetter are guilty of a naive and jaundiced view of the impact of religion upon science, the reaction to their work has produced an equally simpleminded alternative. A school of historians, taking its cue from Alfred North Whitehead's Science and the Modern World (1925) and Robert K. Merton's Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England (1938), has recently come to hold that far from obstructing science, Christianity (or Puritanism) was the very cause of the birth of modern science. The book under review, by the Dutch Historian R. Huoykaas, is solidly within this latter tradition.

Hoykaas possesses the scholarly credentials (Professor of the History of Science at the University of Utrecht and author of a large number of scholarly publications) to suggest that he might rise above the excesses and the naiveties of past polemics; but, alas, we have not been so blessed. At the heart of Huoykaas' scheme is a positivistic conception of modern science; that is, the scientist does not seek causal connections, but attempts merely to establish mathematical correlations among statements of positive fact (viz. observation statements). However, Hooykaas is not merely a positivist, but also an occalionalist. Science, he maintains, does not merely give up the quest for causal connections; properly pursued, it recognizes that there are no causal connections. Because ours is a universe wholly dependent on the Divine will, the only cause is the Divine cause. When two balls collide, the motion of the first does not cause the motion of the second; rather, the collision is the occasion for God's decree that the second ball begin to move. Now this conception of nature, llooykaas holds, is not only the right one; it is also the biblical one, and it first received widespread acceptance in the 17th century and helped to usher in the "scientific revolution."

This account is of course embellished with a fair amount of detail. The Greeks deified nature (i.e., they attributed to it independent powers and capacities), whereas scientists in the 17th century, under biblical influence, realized that nature is distinct from God and wholly dependent upon him. Consequently, they no longer worshipped nature, but viewed it as an object to be understood and controlled for God's glory and man's benefit. Moreover, with the recognition of nature's contingency, the rationalism that characterized Greek and medieval science gave way to a thoroughgoing empiricism; because God could have created the universe any way he pleased, the only way to learn how he did create it is to observe and manipulate. Manual labor (and hence technology) had been denigrated by the Greeks, but under biblical influence the founders of modern science made manual experimentalism the very foundation of their endeavor. Finally, turning specifically to the vexing question of Puritanism and science, Hooykaas argues that there was an "intrinsic compatibility" between Puritanism and the new philosophy, which created a climate of opinion favorable to the pursuit and advancement of science.

This scheme is open to serious dispute; indeed, in my view, it is pervaded with misconceptions and oversimplifications. In the first place, a positivistic conception of modern science (not to speak of 17th-century science) is wholly inadequate; historians of science and philosophers of science alike have cast doubt on the very conception of "positive" scientific knowledge, and it is abundantly clear that the search for causal connections was at the heart of the 17th-century (if not the modern) scientific enterprise. Secondly, Hooykaas builds his argument around what I would call the methodological fallacy, namely the belief that a new conception of science and of the proper methodology for pursuing it leads (and led) swiftly to a dramatic alteration of the contents of science; research in the history of science suggests, on the contrary, that the relationship between scientific methodology and scientific content is far from direct and that historically the two endeavors have frequently proceeded in total independence. Thirdly, the attempt to discover radical dichotomies between ancient and 17th-century, world views requires a drastic oversimplification of historical reality and ignores many of the results of the past halfcentury of historical scholarship. Fourthly, Hooykaas writes as though there were no viable scholarly viewpoint on the subject besides his own; to give only one example, the vast body of critical literature on the relationship of Puritanism and science is not discussed, nor even cited.

Finally, even if we were to grant everything Hooykaas claims about the conception of nature and the methodological principles of 17th-century scientific virtuosi, it remains that he fails entirely to demonstrate that these arose because of Christian inspiration or under Christian auspices. Hooykaas has offered broad generalizations without ever undertaking an investigation of individual cases. (If be provides an occasional quotation from a 17th-century source, he also commits the serious fallacy of equating the standard rhetoric with underlying motivations and theoretical commitments.) It is by no means sufficient to point out, for example, that John Kepler was both a pious Christian and the originator of important scientific ideas (both undeniable); before we can take Hooykaas seriously, it must be demonstrated that Kepler's scientific contributions were the result of his Christian commitments or his biblical world view.

The basic reason for Hooykaas' failure, I believe, is that he has attempted to answer in general terms a question that must first be dealt with in specific. When Hooykaas inquires whether Christianity (or Puritanism)
Provided a climate favorable to science, lie insists on a yes " or "no" answer, which can be applied to an entire age and an entire continent; Christianity either inhibited or advanced science, and Hooykaas wants to know which. But such an approach can never succeed. The relationship between science and religion (or any other pair of cultural phenomena) is exceedingly complex, and we must learn to ask questions consistent with this complexity. We must begin by accumulating a substantial foundation of individual instances; we must know, insofar as possible, how the work of Copernicus and Galileo and Kepler and Descartes and Boyle and Newton and a hundred other scientists reflected and was shaped by their culture, family, education, professional peers, personal circumstances, religious commitments, and so forth. Only then can we begin to construct a model of the complex and subtle ways in which religion directed the thoughts and efforts of the founders of modern science.
Why has Hooykaas failed to proceed in such a manner? The answer is obvious. A carefully reasoned historical analysis was never his real purpose. What he has prepared for us, under the guise of history, is an apologia for Christianity-which is certain to be immensely influential and widely quoted in circles where the truth and viability of the Christian faith are viewed as dependent upon its having been the fountainhead of modem science.

Reviewed by David C. Lindberg, Department of History of Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison.
Reprinted from the Christian Scholar's Review, 3, No. 2, 189 191 (1973)

THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT: A REASSESSMENT by Bruce Reichenbach, Charles C. Thomas-Publisher, Springfield, Illinois. 1972. 150 pp.

Basic to the question of the nature of faith in God are the proofs of God's existence. While nineteenth century philosophy seemed to operate under the belief that Kant and Hume had successfully disposed of the theistic arguments, modern philosophy has exhumed and reexamined the arguments of Aquinas, and his subsequent supporters and detracters. Bruce Reichenbach in The Cosmological Argument: A Reassessment presents the argument in contemporary terms with modern positive developments, transforming the "inherently weak, . . outmoded relic of the thirteenth century" into a viable option and perhaps a required conclusion for present day theistic philosophy. The author examines the issues in depth, not merely restating or sketching previous treatments, but developing a specific argument, with a thorough inquiry into the many underlying and sometimes unseen details and problems. At each point of the development, opposing views are presented and then examined for flaws or tested against the logic of the author's presentation of the argument. By deftly demonstrating the inherent confusion and misuse of terms, or by finely reinforcing the buttress of his own logic, Reichenbach disarms attacks by such luminaries as linme, Kant and Russell. Throughout the book, the author frequently restates and describes previous important points which not only refresh the reader with a new slant, but also prevent needless leafing hack to find the preceding reference. Such restatement and reference, in combination with selected examples and clarity of style, are especially' helpful to the reader who is not familiar with the intricacies of philosophical argument. Although a bit formal, the work is readable even for the uninitiated, yet it demonstrates excellent scholarship with complete referencing and footnotes.

In the first chapter, Reichenbach presents in turn each step in his formulation of the argument, expanding, clarifying and defining terms where appropriate. The argument may be summarized as:

(S1) A contingent being exists.
a. This contingent being is caused either (1) by itself, or (2) by another
b. If it were caused by itself, it would have to precede itself in existence, which is impossible.
(S2) Therefore this contingent being (2) is caused by another, i.e., depends on something else for its existence.
(S3) That which causes (provides sufficient reason for) the existence of any contingent being must be either (3) another contingent being, or (4) a noncontingent (necessary) being.
c. If 3, this contingent being must itself be caused by another, and so on to infinity.
(S4) Therefore, that which causes (provides sufficient reason for) the existence of any contingent being must be either (5) an infinite series of contingent beings, or (4) a necessary being.
(S5 An infinite series of contingent beings (5) is incapable of yielding sufficient reason for the existence
of any being.
(S6) Therefore (4) a necessary being exists.

"Contingent" is defined as "to be such that it could have been other than it is," applicable to propositions, events and beings. A contingent being is one which at any time may either exist or not exist; its nonexistence is as possible as its existence and it is neither really nor logically necessary that it must now exist. Contingency has no bearing upon the question of certainty, however, for we can still know with surety concerning a being's present existence. The author emphasizes that the first premise is grounded in the world of fact by showing that contingent beings (e.g., the author, you and I) exist in this real world, thereby establishing the argument as a posteriori, not a priori, as in the ontological argument. After disallowing any tertium quid between contingent and non-contingent beings in S3, Reichenhaeh goes on to discuss the nature of the infinite series in Ss. In one of the most crucial points of his analysis, he rightly contends that "the cause can not he temporally prior to the effect at the moment of actual causation." In an infinite series of cause and effect, each cause is itself an effect, requiring a cause, ad infinitum. Since cause and effect, at the instant of being subject and object, must be simultaneous, an infinite series must he ordered apart from any consideration of time. This is not to say that the cause may not exist prior to the effect, as long as they exist together in time at the point of causation.

In asking what adequately explains the existence of contingent beings, one must define what constitutes explanation. Might not different explanations, such as a finite series of relevant conditions instead of an ultimate and necessary condition, b0 acceptable depending upon one's methodology? Reichenbach argues that explanation goes beyond the epistemological and is grounded in an ontological question about the nature of explanation, which ultimately boils down to causation. In three chapters he discusses the nature, necessity and principles of causation, a concept most important to the validity of the argument in any formulation.

Any consideration of causation must deal with Hume's widely accepted analysis of the subject basedlargely upon the a-wareness of constant conjunction, which leads to a psychological propensity. Hume contended that rather than perceiving or sensing causation per se, mkoi develops the impression of causation upon reflection and sensing the presence of certain relations: (1) spatial contiguity, (2) temporal priority, and most importantly (3) constant conjunction. Reichenbach dispenses with the second relation in a most pleasant but effective way. Instead of temporal priority, by simple logic and example he restates his contention that causation obligates simultaneity. Concerning the objection that simultaneity eliminates the possibility of causal chains occupying time, he points out that causal activity of intransitively (occurring in time) ordered causes may proceed for a length of time, thus the chain may occupy time. In disproving the necessity of constant conjunction, the author is more questionably convincing. He presents instances where (1) the events need occur (and thus he conjoined) only once in order to suggest causation, and (2) numerous events are constantly conjoined but have no cause and effect relationship. More recently attempts to reinforce Hume's contention of the necessity of constant conjunction have rested in the development of a causal or covering law. Reichenbach analyzes the idea of causation as offered by H. B. Braithwaite, in which constant conjunction must occur and from which a deductive conclusive generalization of causation can be made concerning a relationship based upon higher (inductive) hypotheses or laws. But the higher laws to which appeal is made, reveal upon close examination to he causal, and thus the argument becomes circular.

Hume was attacking the concept of causation as production, and asserted that analysis of causation in terms of production is no analysis at all. While admittng the synonymous relation of production and causation, Reicheuhach concludes that causation is a basic which cannot be defined merely in terms of Home's relations, for causation as production must include some concept of causal efficacy, that is, the power to make some effect occur. Hume contended that causal efficacy was not an impression of sensation; however, the author draws upon the work of Albert Michotte, which shows that indeed the absence of specific sensory data does not exclude the perception of causal efficacy. The phenomenal world contains more than the world of strict sense data; stimuli alone cannot account for grouping, figure ground, closure, proximity and gestalt-forming, to cite the author's examples. He suggests that since causation is validly viewed in terms of production, then certain conditions become essential for an event to occur and in their absence it will not occur.

Reichenbach goes beyond defining causation to show the necessity of causal relations, for the cosmological argument contends that contingent beings must be caused. In proving such necessity, the author again confronts the argument of Home and lie again successfully invalidates it. flume asserted that we can distinguish and therefore can conceive of an effect and its cause as separate, and since the conceivable is really possible, then it is possible for cause and effect to exist separately in reality. The author cleverly argues that Hume has confused his conditions for distinguishable and separable. Distinguishability requires impressions of sensation which he terms 'epistemological conditions." Reichenbach, having refuted the disproof, proceeds to prove the necessity of causation. His rigorous proof argues: "[1] All contingent beings have their existence accidental to their essence . . . . [2] That which has its existence accidental to its essence derives its existence from something . . . . All contingent beings derive their existence from something, that is, all contingent beings are caused." In case you agree with the objections which lie subsequently raises to this argument, and disagree with his defense, lie gets around having to prove his point by posing causation as a basic principle of the universe. It is known by human reason to be intuitively true and it is a principle by which human reason operates; denial of the causal principle completely splits thought away from reality.

The author next deals with causation indirectly in addressing time question of whether propositions can he informative and necessary at the same time as the causal principle is. The discussion in this area deals largely in the formal philosophical characterization of propositions. While often technical in nature, and noting a number of modern philosophers of opposing positions, Reichenbach manages the remarkable feat of keeping up moderate interest and also establishing his point. Although lie shows the possibility of a synthetic a priori, that is, an informative (non-analytic) statement verifiable without reference to experience, this is not good enough to establish causation in the real world. Finally, he demonstrates that causation is really, as opposed to logically, necessary-it has its basis in the very nature of the world. The author's conclusions concerning causation appear valid, but only insofar as lie is able to ground them in the real world. His struggle with this question is complex and at times exasperating, but also most worthwhile.

In an exciting and vigorous fashion, Reichenbach takes on Bertrand Russell's objection that since causation is derived from examination of particulars there is no reason to assume that there is a cause for totality. Even after demonstrating the inapplicability of the objection to his particular formulation, he goes on to destroy systematically any remaining pockets of opposition. To the objection that a characteristic of the parts does not apply to the whole, he shows that extension to totality is valid depending upon the characteristic; particularly, contingency is a property which can be extended from individuals to the totality of contingent beings. In answer to the objection that causation occurs only within the context of the totality of contingent beings, and therefore cannot apply outside of the totality, the author cleverly hut perhaps questionably creates a totality of all beings, including non-contingent beings.

In what seems to he merely a discussion of semantics, but which is truly an important contribution to the argument, Reichenbach studies the nature of necessity and "necessary" in the final statement (Se). While the assumption pf logical necessity makes the final statement impossible, he shows that the final proposition is conditionally necessary, depending upon the premises preceding. "Necessary" appears in a second sense as a qualifier of beings, meaning to have existence as part of its nature, such that if it does exist, it always did and will exist, and if it does not exist, it never did nor will. The author also shows that the traditional proof of Kant that the cosmological argument depends upon the ontological argument is not valid. He clearly shows Kant's confusion of identification of the necessary being with the proof of its existence. Identification of a "most real being" deals with the conceptual and is invalid; however, it does not invalidate the proof of existence of a necessary being which is based upon experience in the real world.

Having concluded the proof per se, Reiehenbach finally approaches the task of relating the proved necessary being to the concept of a personal creative God. Realizing that verification is no longer possible, he shows that "necessary being" is not an empty term, but rather characteristics may deduced: it must be non-finite; since it is the reason for its own existence it must be self-sufficient and self-sustaining; and it most be eternal. These attributes are all inherent in the concept of the personal creator God. Furthermore, there are no conflicting attributes. The circumstantial evidence is very strong; however, the author is wise enough to recognize that man is not guided by reason alone, but on the contrary, lie is often led by emotion. Of what value then is the presentation, besides being mental exercise? In a fitting close, the author answers:

Granted that it is highly unlikely that the above argument will convert the atheist to theism or convince the agnostic to adopt religious belief its God; yet perhaps it will answer or east light on some of the pressing questions of reason which surround the debate about the reasonableness of a belief in God. With the question of reason aside, the ground has been prepared for the planting of reasoned belief.

Renewed by Con Lynch Ill, Deportment of Physiology, University of Rochester Medical School, Rochester, New York.

THE DUST OF DEATH by Os Guinness, InterVarsity Press, Downers Grove, Illinois (1973). Paperback. 419 pp. $4.95.

Os Guinness discusses in The Dust of Death many of the recent movements in man's search for life. The "counter culture," in rebellion against the Establishment, has attempted to accomplish that in which society has failed. Guinness shows, however, that the counter culture has also failed. He presents a "Third Way," that of Christianity, as the only solution for society's dilemma.

The counter culture's critique against the oppression, lack of morals on personal as well as social and political levels, superficiality and demand for conformity of the Establishment is valid, says Guinness. Technology is controlling man by reducing his individuality arid personal value and making him no more than a machine. As "technocracy" becomes more and more complex, it is in danger of running out of control. "Rome was no less totalitarian for having a pluralistic wealth of societies, cults, clubs, mystery religions and esoteric cliques. It just meant that citizens were better adapted to totalitarian control and did not give vent to their grievances" (p. 140). B. F. Skinner proposes in Walden Two that man can be controlled by giving him what he wants, and by indoctrinating him to believe that what he is getting is what he really wants. Guinness' criticism of this type of control by society is that it creates a "one-dimensional man"-a man who, once he is satisfied with his material comfort and recreation, has forgotten that he is more than just a machine -that there is a spiritual reality as well as a physical.

Society oscillates between forms of humanism (optimistic), and existentialism (pessimistic). Both share the same basic weakness-a false picture of man as alone and left to work out his own fate. Humanism romanticizes man's ability to better himself and to find a meaning for life in preserving "mankind." Existentialism, however, realizes the total lack of meaning in life and the resulting need to live only to experience as much of life as possible. The two always fail because of their failure to realize the true reason for man's problems-his alienation from God which implies also an alienation from himself, from other men and from nature.

The counter culture's revolution against such a failing society is valid in its criticism, says Guinness. The alternative it offers, however, although it denies the humanistic principles of society, cannot help incorporating them again into its ideology, since it begins with the same one-dimensional view of man. Thus all such revolutions are doomed to failure and absorption into society. An interesting observation Guinness makes is the irony of man's view of himself. As the psalmist says of the idol worshipers and their idols, "their makers grow to be like them, and so do all who trust them" (Ps. 115:8). The pagan's views of ultimate reality were such that he projected them into the natural world by creating idols, which were made such a part of him so as to become his reality, until eventually they "stifled his human aspiration, until he, like his idols, was deaf, dumb and immobile" (p. 147). So modern man's view of himself, since it is based on no ultimate standard outside of himself, eventually lessens his
worth and his ability to he who God created him to be. On the metaphysical level a similar process is occurring. Man is unsatisfied with himself and searches for a deeper spiritual truth. With the denial of a God, man looks inside himself through meditation or Eastern mysticism, or outside to drugs or the occult. Whatever a man chooses as his means for searching for truth, eventually becomes "truth" or "God" in itself. This lowers man's potentiality to he fully human, and the ever-downward path is begun.

The denial of a universal, unchanging standard of Truth destroys man's opportunity to he man. Modern Christian thought is traveling this road in denying the historic validity of the Bible. Without an absolute and universal truth faith becomes merely an exercise in metaphysics, totally unrelated to reality. Guinness points out that the Christian God is ultimate Truth. God himself replies to Moses, "I am who I am." God is the Absolute in relation to whom all else is defined and established, in sharp contrast to Eastern thought. An Indian guru who is believed to he an incarnation claims "I am whoever you think I am" (p. 347). Christianity must he wholly accepted as true or rejected as false. It cannot be divided into what men want to hear and what they wish to reject.

It is this absoluteness that makes Christianity the only alternative for man-Guinness' "Third Way." Guinness' claim for the truth of Christianity is based on its relation to reality. Although Christianity does not claim knowledge of the whole Truth (God is infinite and beyond our finite mind's comprehension), the truth he does give us may be verified by examining it for an accurate picture of reality.

Christianity avoids the dilemmas of the East and the pre-Christian West. The Western gods failed because they were finite and thus no more than men; the Eastern gods are infinite but impersonal, thus unable to relate to or communicate with men. God as revealed in the Bible is both infinite and personalhe can relate to man on human terms in Jesus Christ, but also provides the outside power and strength and wisdom man needs to he who God created him to be.

The Christian view of man provides what is lacking in humanism and existentialism. Existentialism sees no meaning in life, and humanism has a purpose that man cannot, on his own, fulfill-a giving of oneself to the betterment of mankind. Christianity provides a meaning in life in that God who created us will restore us to our rightful position in the world. As we are restored to God, we are able to be restored in our relationships with our fellow man. We are thus enabled to carry out the ideals of humanism.

Psychedelic drugs and the occult stand as counterfeits of a true experience with God. All experiences, though real, are not necessarily true. After a "trip" the emptiness and futility of life is even more apparent than before. Christianity provides a foundation of meaning for life, to which true "religious experience" adds richness, but is not the base. Christianity challenges man to make a clear and final choice between Truth as revealed by God and the many counterfeits of truth created by men.

Reviewed by Kim Chamberlain, undergraduate student, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305.

TOWARDS DEEP SUBJECTIVITY by Roger Poole. New York: Harper and Row (Torchbook), 1972. 152 pages.

The subjective is our haunted house; it excitingly attracts while it frightens. We are confined in it forever, but we forever strive to keep it from contaminating our actions. Our scientific credo calls us to repent of our subjectivism. It draws the scientist into one of psychology's conjured classifications, the approachavoidance conflict. Subjectivity is the seeming essence of life, yet it cannot be objectified. The psychologist says he is unable to pin it down empirically, but can infer it and define it operationally. The man-of-thelived-world says he can feel it, but cannot put it into words. He and the psychologist share the same dilemma. Like a dieter drawn and repelled at the same time to the richest of foods, we are constantly approaching and avoiding the alluring, frightening, and haunting subjectivism that is our human experience.

Roger Poole invites us to walk briskly and bravely into this awesome arena. He encourages us to dive deeply, suggesting such a plunge will lead to authentic objectivity; an objectivity not antihuman and anti-life; an objectivity that is not impoverished, but "takes objectivity seriously enough to examine subjectivity subjectively" (p. 68, emphasis his).

Objectivity as demanded in the dominant scientific paradigms, Poole argues, prefers the model to the living reality, the abstraction to the lived events. Such an attitude, he contends, leads to an impoverished concept of meaning because it retreats from subjective space. Meaning and interpretation belong together in an inseparable bond (p. 6).

Poole most certainly rests on the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and makes this explicit in a three-page historical footnote (p. 79ff). It must he left to the philosophers of esoteric thought to determine if Poole has read Husserl properly, but from this groundwork the author hurtles the philosophy of science and epistemology into the realms of polities and ethics.

"All objective knowledge is the servant of the use we intend to make of it," Poole asserts (p. 99). From this develops an argument that MIT linguist Noam Chomsky, who startled many with his anti-Vietnam war writings, has become the successor to Husserl and Kierkegaard: Chomsky knows "he has a duty to knowledge which exceeds the demands of the academic and professional world' (p. 104). In other words, Chomsky moves towards deep subjectivity.

A practitioner of deep subjectivity who is repeatedly praised by Poole is anti-pschiatrist R. D. Laing. With his associates, Laing comes' closest to utilizing the deep subjective method Poole proposes as an alternative to behaviorally defined objectivity.

Those familiar with Thomas Kuhn's work may find a passionate new paradigm for scientific research in Poole. The socio-political photographic analyses of "ethical space" that open his investigation may disturb readers, but may prove as well a germane example of the type of perception Poole is advocating. Rereading this opening chapter when one has completed the book is recommended.

Christians, whose rootedness in spiritual reality must raise queries with materialistic objectivism, may find in Poole a provoking alternative toward understanding reality. As those who have constantly asked for deeper penetration into the mysterious interplay between Creator and creation, however, they may find Poole a perturbing effort to further a humanistic panacea in the realm of knowledge.

Reviewed by Allan R. Andrews, Behavioral Science Department, North Shore Community College, Beverly, Maryland 01915.

THE EARTH IS THE LORDS? by Joyce Blackburn, Waco Texas: Word Books (1972) 160 pp. $4.95.

The Earth is the Lords? is a personal book written by a nonscientist about her concern for the local environment, one of Georgia's Sea Islands, and what she and others did to save it. Although I cannot recommend it as any sort of environment or ecology text or as a treatise on the theology of the environment, it is a wellwritten personal history of lay legal action, motivated by Christian commitment, fueled by writings spanning a range from de Chardin to Biology: a search for order in complexity and including the late Walt Kelly and Dr. Seuss. Probably this is the sort of thing more of us will have to do if environmental quality is to be preserved.

The book, like the environmental crisis itself, raises some disturbing questions. How often are citizens with the stature of Eugenia Price involved in an environmental dispute-in this case against developers and phosphate miners in the salt marsh? How often are experts like Eugene Odum available to testify? How often has a poet written the equivalent of Lanier's "The Marshes of Glynn" about a threatened area? How often can a local legislator be found to shepherd a bill like the Georgia Coastal Marshlands Protection Act of 1970 into being? How often can citizens be aroused to telegram, write and call their State legislators as they did in this case, and at the appropriate time? How often do "ordinary" Christian citizens become convinced that they are stewards of the local environment, as Blackburn did? How often do ordinary Christians express a commitment to anything, for that matter? Are Blackburn and Price less damaging to the salt marsh than those whom the developers would have brought in, just because their hearts are in the right place (presumably)? And, most important, "where will it all end"?

Reviewed by Martin LaBar, Division of Science, Central Wesl:eyan College, Central, SC 29630.

THE DELICATE CREATION: TOWARDS A THEOLOGY OF THE ENVIRONMENT by Christopher Derrick, Devin-Adair, Old Greenwich, Conn. (1972) $5.95.

The environmental crisis, according to Derrick, is spiritual. Thus, his main remedy is also spiritual. We need to repent of a heresy. "We" is modern man. The heresy is titled Manichaeanism, with parallels drawn to ancient Manichaeanism and Gnosticism.

Modern Manicbaeanism is dualist. Matter, including man's body, is evil. Spirit is good. God is good, but otherworldly, and the day-to-day running of the affairs of the cosmos is left to Evolution, a modern Demiurge. Since matter is evil, our salvation lies in more and better education and science.

Lest the previous paragraph sound like a false view of modern thought, consider such phenomena as the drug culture (a spiritual search) and the brutalizing, cheapening, and perversion of sex (the body is evil). Consider artists such as Pollock and musicians like Cage, who are either putting us on or expressing their views of the universe as having meaning only apart from real material shapes and sounds. Consider also statements of the form: "Evolution has provided (insert name of organism) with (insert name of adaption)

The Delicate Creation is not an antievolutionary book, except that it points out that regardless of how scientists feel about it, the typical modern man somehow believes in a powerful being called Evolution, although he would deny it if questioned.

At the root of the problem is the idea that matter is evil and it is our duty to restructure it. This has led to the worship of the unholy trinity: Science; Technology, which is science's child; and the Standard of Living; which study matter, study how to restructure matter, and measure how much matter has been restructured, respectively. In other word, the crisis results not from exalting material things, a gross sin, but from the opposite attitude, according to Derrick.

The brief summary above does not convey the full impact of the book, which is concise and wellwritten, taking a high view of Scripture, man and nature. Derrick takes careful aim at polluters, the SST, the transportation system, and capitalism, and also at environmentalists, communism, Lynn White, Jr. and Teilhard de Chardin. C. S. Lewis was his tutor, and his influence is apparent.

Derrick tends to he anti-science, although he seems to think "pure" science is all right and the advances of medical science, at least, must be retained. It is questionable if we can have pure science without some of the evils of technology applied for the benefit of the few and the harm of many, or if we can have medicine apart from advances in other areas.

Derrick is firmly against the notion that birth control is a solution to the environmental crisis. His reasoning in this book based on the notion that birth control is a Manichaean attack on the flesh, is not wholly convincing. The full argument is supposed to be in print by now in a hook called Talking about Population. Overall, Derrick is interesting, timely, and thoughtprovoking. I recommend The Delicate Creation highly.

THE HOLINESS PENTECOSTAL MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES by Vinson Synan, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan (1972). 248 pp. $5.95.

Vinson Synan is professor of history at Emmanuel College in Georgia and an ordained minister in the Pentecostal Holiness Church. This work is based upon his Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Georgia, although it does not betray the devastating style of so many published theses. This volume will be appreciated by both classic and neo-Pentecostals alike since it is an objective and creative treatment of the fast growing segment within Christendom. Pentecostals will welcome a detailed examination of their origins, while the nco-Pentecostals and other charismatic groups within the traditional denominations will sense the relationship of their emerging tradition to classic Pentecostalism. Also, Dr. Synan has carefully documented the rise of neo-Pentecostalism within the ranks of virtually every major denomination and among the Roman Catholics as well. Much of that information is for the first time presented in this book.

Noting that the holiness movement was first a reaction against the increasing liberal trend in Methodism at the beginning of this century, Synan shows how Pentecostalism itself reflects a theological division that took place within the ranks of these schismatics. The two groups differed on the question of what constituted "proof" for a believer having received the baptism by the Holy Spirit. Those who would be called Pentecostals settled on glssolalia.

Thus in theological tone, if not charismatic practice, modern day Pentecostalism is very close to the "historic message" of Methodism. In fact, Synan sees similarity between the early Methodist camp meetings and present-day Pentecostal meetings.

Dr. Synao indicates that the dangers for the Pentecostal Church include the failure to recognize the need for structure and community discernment-a fact that will not go unnoticed by many who have criticized the emerging movement at that very point. This wellbalanced volume is a helpful and well written source for understanding the evolution and present dimensions of the Pentecostal movement.

Reviewed by Watson E. Mills, Department of Philosophy and Religion, Averett College, Deneille, Virginia.

PREHISTORY AND EARTH MODELS by Melvin A. Cook, London: Max Parrish and Co. Ltd. (1966) 353 pp.

This book is a collection of papers written by Dr. Cook over a period of years (1956-63). The book can conveniently be divided into four sections-problems with chronology, continental drift: its causes and effects, the occurrence and origin of coal and oil, and evolution.

The first section is an attempt by the author (both qualitatively and quantitatively) to show that all of the methods of dating materials have certain assumptions which can cause errors. He spends three chapters on istopic methods (C5, U-Tb-Ph, Rb57-Srt7, K45-A45) and one chapter on other methods (salt in oceans, sedimentations, heat balance, etc.). The author concludes that there is no accurate method for measuring chronology.

The second section composing six chapters deals with various models of continental drift. Several of these chapters deal specifically with an ice cap model which, according to the author, is the best.

The third section is a series of four chapters dealing mainly with the origin and occurrence of gas, oil and coal. It also includes a short chapter on paleomagnetism.

The last section (three chapters) deals with some unsolved problems concerning the development of life, the fossil record and evolution.

In the reviewer's opinion, the book is worth reading by the scientific community but it is not recommended for the lay public. The arguments presented by Dr. Cook are logical but usually very mathematical and occasionally very hard to follow. One major shortcoming of the book today is its date of publication (1966). A newer version would improve it.

Reviewed by Dr. Floyd Wilcox, Associate Professor of Science,
Central Wesleyon College, Central, South Carolina 29630.

MEMO FOR 1976: SOME POLITICAL OPTIONS, by Wesley Pippcrt. Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1974.

In Memo for 1976, Wesley Pippert has illustrated that the relationship between one's profession of Christ and his profession of occupation is not meant to be casual-rather so intense that the onlooker can rarely witness the occupation without seeing the Christ. His primary concern in this work is of course political.

Having been intimately involved in two presidential campaigns, one as a partisan functionary (Nixon, 1968) and the other as a reporter (McGovern, 1972), the author draws heavily on personal experience and comparison. He argues that McGovern was "probably the first candidate of bona fide evangelical origins ever to run for the presidency . . . a person who endorsed biblical values and a political philosophy that cared about people ... his 1972 campaign in its final analysis was a cry for return to scriptural values." (p. 14)

In chapter one, Pippert states that the Christian has an obligation to understand what true religion is and what its impact can and ought to be on political matters. Gone, says Pippert, is the national concern about the religious faith of the candidate for public office. Some call this separation of religion and politics voter sophistication. Pippert calls it tragedy. The president is not merely the chief executive, etc., he is also the moral leader of the country. "How the president lives out his faith has profound implications for the way he makes decisions and, more importantly, for the way he stands before the people as a symbol." (p. 22) Whether voter or officer holder, the Christian has had lifechanging experiences that the non-Christian has not had. He makes his decision on a foundation of prayer, seeking God's will for himself as well as for his people. For a Christian to he a mere onlooker is hazardous. In chapter two Pippert discusses an option open to those Christians unwilling to be mere onlookers, yet uneasy with an activist such as a King or a Mclntire. lie argues that since, in all likelihood the government is ungodly, like Joseph, Mordeeai and Daniel, the Christian can influence that government through infiltration at key levels. Such an approach demands excellence, determination and spiritual vitality. The author illustrates by citing the careers of Sen. Mark Hatfield, Rep. John B. Anderson and former Lt. Gov. of Ill., Paul Simon. He follows with specifics on how and where to begin.

The Old Testament prophets indicted the nations and their leaders for exploiting the poor, making a mockery of justice, betraying the office in which they had been placed, and living blatantly and hedonistically. In chapter three the author reclaims the words of the prophets and finds a starkly contemporary commentary about our world today. Despair and distrust have spread across the nation. Some have turned away from the active political process. Others have tried revolution. Pippert illustrates the gamut of Christian involvement with references to the Jesus People, the Berrigans, Tijerina, Bonhoeffer and Stein. Each group or individual has his role. We must decide what ours ought to be. In chapter four, Pippert provides a biblical basis for political action. Primary reference is to Romans 13:3 and 4 where Paul identifies government as God's agent without stipulating that the government has to he either godly or ungodly. Regardless of the place or nature of the government or ruler, God can perform his will. In 1523 Luther said that if everyone in the world believed in the Christian faith and lived it, there would he no need for government. Pippert follows that "few persons meet this standard. Thus, God ordained government to show both his wrath and his grace in a sinful world." (p. 90)

Although the author concludes with a chapter on how to decide one's individual role, his real conclusion is at the end of chapter four from which I quote:

The Christian politician, however, has a commission that no other politician has, and he has resources at his disposal that others do not. When Jesus began his public ministry, he stood in the synagogue and read from the prophet Isaiah . . . . 'The spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to preach good news to the poor. lie has anointed me to proclaim release to the captives and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty those who are oppressed, to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord' (p. 96)

Reviewed by Roger J. Rozendal, Assistant Professor of Speech,
Houghton College, Houghton, New York.